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ABSTRACT
A Neuropsychological

Model of Human

Behavior and Therapeutic Change
February
Efrain Segarra, B.S.,
M.S.,

St.

1983

University of Puerto Rico,

John's University, M.S.,

University of

Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by:

This work introduces

a

Professor Howard Gadlin

comprehensive theory of behavior which inte-

grates neurological factors with phenomenological concepts.

The

resulting neuropsychological model proposes that the concept of
person actually defines the integrated functioning of the organism.
Such

a

functioning is postulated to be under the direction of

cognitive activity which is conceptualized as
neuronal networks.
the notion of

a

A fundamental

a

element of the proposed theory

question is conceived as

a

subliminal

The limbic activity

sensation of danger to which

the person is constantly reacting cognitively, behavioral ly

physiologically.
as core affect

and universal.

,

is

phylogenetic negative affective state of limbic

origins being the motivational root of behavior.
in

system of stochastic

,

and

Such an unwitting anticipation of harm, labelled
is

postulated to be synonymous with emotional pain

The inadvertent adaptive or maladaptive ways in which

a

person interacts with the environment are considered to occur as

a

direct reaction to the prevalent intensity of core affect.

Such

reactive behavioral maneuvers are understood in
terms of

which defines

a

continuum

ordinary adaptive behavior at one end and emotional

disturbances at the other extreme.

Anxiety in the model is construed

as an ordinary reaction of the organism to core
affect.

tations of anxiety are conceived in terms of

a

The manifes-

gradient according

to their severity and are classified into cognitive and
physical

types.

A central

purpose behind the development of the theory has

been the determination of the nature of the psychotherapeutic change
and the process of psychotherapy.

Both of the latter concepts are

articulated in terms of the normalization of an exaggerated core
affect as

a

function of the interpersonal process in psychotherapy.

The proposed model of behavior is incompatible with the traditional

assumptions about psychopathology and unconscious processes.
material

is

The

presented in terms of progressive levels of integration

from reduced neural constructs to behavioral phenomenology, including

developmental perspectives.
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CHAPTER

I

REDUCED FORMULATIONS OF COGNITIVE PROCESSES

Introduction

This dissertation proposes

vior based on the functional

psychological concepts.

gravitates around

a

comprehensive model of human beha-

integration of neurological factors and

That sort of neuropsychological synthesis

subliminal negative affective state postulated

a

to be at the core of human behavioral

activity and motivation.

The affective state in question is conceived as an omnipresent

sensation of variable intensity ordinarily out of active cognitive
awareness.

Such

a

sensation, as will be discussed later on, appears

to originate at the limbic system.

Although the affective state under consideration

is

very resis-

tant to definition, the word "sensation" is used in this work to

depict its properties because such
description.
of such

a

a

term may constitute their best

The use of the term is derived from the consideration

neuropsychological activity being synonymous with emotional

pain.

Given that such

a

sensation appears to be central to human

behavior and to have an affective nature it has been labelled as
core affect in this work.
A primary purpose

in

the development of the model

of behavior
'i

proposed in this work has been to provide an explanation for the
1

2

personal changes which are observed in

chotherapy.

As a matter of fact,

a

client as

a

result of psy-

the concept of core affect crys-

tallized from the speculations about

a

possible mechanism for psy-

chotherapeutic change.
Undoubtedly, change as
be purposeful,

a

consequence of psychotherapy should

significant, and beneficial in terms of the indivi-

dual's interaction with the environment.

As such,

it

is

the reduc-

tion in intensity of core affect from an excessive level to

a

normal

range of activity that is considered here as the primary factor

underlying the change toward increased emotional competence and capacity of the person to cope with the environment.

The latter means

that at its most basic level psychotherapeutic change is synonymous

with the normalization of core affect.
Therefore, the primary change one

is

looking at in the psycho-

therapeutic process appears to occur at the reduced levels of the
organi sm.
It

is an easy deduction,

even at this early point in the dis-

cussion, to formulate that any model which accounts for core affect
as a

limbic function would have to take into consideration the re-

duced aspects of behavior.
In

tune with the latter, this dissertation proposes

a

functional

(neuropsychological) model of human behavior which accounts for
such an affective state as

a

mostly subliminal sensation of danger

or threat in its most pure form and in terms of different cognitive

interpretations in other instances.

3

As will

become

obvious later on, the term functional is used

here in context with the integrated activity,
that is, the functioning, of the material
cal

systems of the organism such as the neurologi-

and physiological

substrates.

The functional

view of the per-

son postulated here considers the action of such
material
in

systems

interaction with the environment to constitute the individual

himself.

Accordingly, the material systems of the organism and

their own functioning are considered inseparable, much like language
is

inseparable from speech during the production of the latter.
Similarly,

a

behavior and the processes in the organism which

are taking place during such

separable from each other.

a

behavior may also be considered in-

Behavior then can be viewed in general

terms as the expression of the functioning of the organism.
a

particular behavioral display is invariably

that is,

a

a

global

Since

activity,

unitary action composed of multiple components, the or-

ganismic functioning associated with such

a

sample of behavioral

activity must also be global.
Naturally, the organ whose functioning is responsible for the

management of behavior
of the individual

shall

is

the brain.

As such,

the functional

view

be based here on the integrated or global

function of the neural substrate.

In this

case the total neural

mass and its function are both considered inseparable.

In

other

words, the psychological and neurological aspects of the organism
are functionally inseparable.

.

•1

The proposed model attempts in general

terms to integrate cog-

nition with other brain functions and physiological
systems.

It

envisions the cognitive activity of the individual
as the product
of the integration of vast neuronal networks and
behavior in general
as the expression of the functional

rience in the brain.

representation of ongoing expe-

At any given moment such

a

representation and

its behavioral manifestations are considered to be
influenced in

several ways by the intensity level of core affect.

Human behavior is further defined by the model in terms of the

behavioral maneuvers, adaptive or maladaptive, which the person

develops to avoid, validate, or react to the affective state briefly
introduced above.

However, since such

a

core affect is ordinarily

out of active awareness the behavioral maneuvers are directed to the

environment.

The latter occurs partially as

a

result of the influence

of core affect on the cognitive interpretation of the surrounding

events
The functional model of human behavior proposed here also de-

fines certain concepts in conflict with other theoretical views.
For example, while the topic of anxiety may be premature at this

juncture, it should be advanced that the model considers such

a

complex state of arousal as an automatic and ordinary reaction of
the organism to elevations in core affect.

The postulated model does not allow for the existence of an

organized dynamic unconscious in the traditional sense, nor for
the conventional

assumptions about mental

illness in the absence of

5

definite pathological changes in brain tissue.
It should be clarified that the model

psychodynamic in

a

being proposed is

neuropsychological sense.

That is, here cog-

nitive function depends on the dynamic associative
properties of
the neural

substrate.

not permit mental

However, the constraints of the model do

processes which would suggest different layers

of organized thinking, such as the conceptualization of mental

activity in terms of the traditional view of unconscious or subconscious mechanisms.
A somewhat controversial

notion suggested by the proposed

theory is that of the possibility of the free will of the person
being subordinate to the intensity of core affect rather than it
being inherently free from predetermined influences.
The latter may be considered controversial if free will

is

defined as the capacity of the person to cognitively engage the

environment and make decisions in freedom from external or internal

will

predetermined influences.

The preceding definition of free

assumes that cognitive processes are under the control of

the person through some sort of mechanism which would not be af-

fected by such cognitive processes themselves.
In

contradistinction to the latter, the model of human beha-

vior proposed here postulates that the cognitive processes are

ordinarily out of the volitional control of the individual to
great extent.

a

.

6

The bulk of the supportive material

in this dissertation

predominantly addresses the ways in which
the environment.

person interacts with

a

The evidence supporting the notion of the cognitive

nature of the representation of experience in the brain
in terms of the interaction between the individual

is

discussed

and the environ-

ment and the interplay between cognition and core affect.
The functional

(i.e., neuropsychological) aspects of the model

are examined around the information about cerebral

function and mor-

phology which may support an associative organization characterized
by neuronal

networks or systems.

The interacting components of the theoretical model are consi-

dered in terms of both clinical and nonclinical situations.

That is,

in terms of the maladaptive or adaptive maneuvers the individual

develops in reaction to core affect as
vi

a

means to deal with the en-

ronment
Such defensive maneuvers are considered by the model as the ele-

ments which constitute the personality of the individual when they
possess significant longitudinal stability.

In

a

similar vein, the

defensive maneuvers are examined as manifestations of conditions
which have been commonly labelled as mental

associated with

a

illnesses when they are

chronic elevation above the normal range in the

intensity of core affect.

Psychotherapeutic change

is

presented as

a

function of the

completion of the clinical process which brings about the normalization of core affect.

The therapeutic process is in turn considered

.

7

to be mediated by the relationship
between the client and the thera-

pist.

Such

a

the clinical

relationship is viewed as the essential
medium in which
process takes place.

Due to their complexity, the theoretical
constructs of the model

could not be presented simultaneously in
tate their penetration.

manner which would facili-

a

Understandably, the penetration of the work-

ings of the comprehensive theory proposed
could not be performed to

any degree of satisfaction without first taking

a

look at each of the

components of the model.
The presentation of the material following may be
considered
to proceed in

a

sort of hierarchical order.

the basic functional elements of the model

That is, it goes from
to its phenomenol ogical

aspects
It

is

possible that during the early phases of the progression

in the presentation of the material

and function to phenomenological

from reduced neuronal organization

human activity, the subject matter

may seem tedious to some of those without
neuropsychology.

Unfortunately, such

a

a

previous interest

in

stepwise examination of the

model becomes necessary in order for the logic of its design to be

developed and maintained through increasing levels of complexity.
The material

in

this work is organized into seven chapters.

The

first chapter emphasizes the paradigmatic value of the functional
model being proposed and considers cognitive representation in terms

of the integration of neuronal networks.
The second and third chapters deal with the basic functional

.

8

elements of the mode!, their
integration, and the different
manifestations of such elements.

Chapter

4

briefly considers the ontogeny of
core affect as it

pertains to the model
The fifth chapter describes some
of the defensive behavioral

maneuvers

a

person may develop to interact with
the environment

depending on the prevalent intensity of
core affect.
The penultimate major section, Chapter
6, considers psycho-

therapeutic change and the process of
psychotherapy in context with
the therapeutic relationship.

Chapter

7,

the final

chapter, reflects on some of the general

implications of the model of human behavior proposed
by this dissertation.

Perhaps it would be appropriate to point out at this
stage that
the theoretical

findings of this work are predominantly based on

clinical observations rather than on formal empirical studies.

The

investigation has been conducted to the greatest extent during the
course of routine clinical interventions in different settings.

Thus,

the findings draw their validity primarily from clinical experience.
As it may become clear further on,

some of the clinical

formu-

lations postulated by the model being proposed could only be developed
and evaluated within the parameters of the therapeutic relationship.

Without any difficulty, the functional model of
posed by this work may be conceived as

matic view of the person.

a

behavior pro-

very objective or prag-

However, the construction of the person

-

.

9

according to our model

is

not cold or impersonal.

On the contrary,

the theory promulgated here tells the
story of emotional

pain and

the role the latter plays in human
relations.

Towards

Functional Paradigm

a

This dissertation considers therapeutic change
and the process

of psychotherapy intimately related to the
psychotherapeutic relationship through the intensity of what has been
introduced as core affect.
It then would be

propitious if any of the prevailing psychological

theories of behavior could account for such an affective
state as

defined here.

Unfortunately, none of the preponderant psychological theories
of human behavior appear to qualify in that respect, perhaps mostly
as
a

result of their theoretical exclusivity.

It appears that the

most generally accepted paradigms of behavior may be too intertwined

with metaphorical strands to be useful in defining change in
and efficient manner, much less in

paradigm applicable in

a

a

universal manner.

psychological disciplines and subdi sci
seems that if

the paramount general

a

simple

manner which could make the
As

seems that there may be as many psychological

It

a

pi

i

a

matter of fact, it

paradigms as there are

nes

scientific paradigm could be described as

principle whose validation is attempted by

scientific research (Kuhn, 1970), it would be extremely difficult
to currently find such a fundamental

cornerstone of psychology.

and unifying principle as the

In fact, it appears that despi te the contri

10

butory relationship between
psychology and many other sciences
(Piaget, 1979) and it being

established as
a

a

a

century or so since psychology
became

science separate from philosophy
(Mueller, 1979),

consensual theoretical understanding
of human behavior appears

far from being reached.

Such

a

lack of

a

basic unifying theoretical principle
in psycho-

logy has been the basis for considering
modern psychology, with the

exception of neuropsychology, to consist
of

"a

collection of tautolo-

gous truths, unverified premises,
contradictions, outright nonsense,
as well

as facts"

(Needham, 1978,

p.

7).

Perhaps one of the most potent inhibitors of
the development
of

a

coherent paradigm for human behavior has been
the pervasiveness

of the psychoanalytic influence.
is

Anyone with some awareness of what

being published can quickly realize how popular
the traditional

psychodynamic theories are in the fields of psychology and
psychiatry
However, in our view they are too cumbersome and metaphorically
complex to sustain reduction to

a

simple basic principle.

drance to their usefulness in accounting for
change

is

a

A major hin-

universal process for

their reliance on the notion of an organized unconscious

mental activity.

The latter assumed mental

processes do not tolerate

any reduction and their existence does not appear to be supported by

neuropsychological

scientific evidence.

The efforts to validate traditional psychodynamic concepts are
still

very strong and while some are aimed at reducing such concepts

to neurobiological

principles the efforts do not appear successful.

11

For instance, the functional
disconnection of the cerebral

pheres has been suggested as the
neurophysiological

hemis-

mechanism for

the notion of defenses, such as
the assumed principle of repression.
It has

been also mentioned in connection with
the localization in the

right hemisphere of the equally assumed
concept of unconscious pro-

cesses (Galin, 1974).

Although probably

a

lesser inhibitor of paradigmatic development

than the the psychoanalytic influence,
behaviorism in

a

most conser-

vative form (Wolpe, 1969) appears to have directed
psychology away
from seeking

a

unifying concept due to its narrow theoretical field.

Nevertheless, of lately behavioral concepts have been
subjected to
attempts at integration with the contribution of cognitive
function
to human behavior with apparent satisfactory technical

Mahoney, 1974; Miechenbaum, 1977; Wolpe, 1978).

results (e.g.,

However, while these

attempts at establishing bridges between behaviorism and other models
of behavior are in the direction of an integrated paradigm, the em-

phasis still remains on the manipulation of behavior to induce change

Although there are many psychological models of human behavior
and some attempts have been made at their partial

one theoretical

level

integration at

or another (e.g., Prochaska, 1979), it is pain-

fully clear that psychology does not have

principle at the core of its activity.

It

a

fundamental

appears that

scientific
a

common

shortcoming of the prevailing paradigms of human behavior is their
lack of tolerance for reduction to
the neurological

a

simple singular principle or to

substrate of behavioral activity.

12

Since change, therapeutic or otherwise,
appears to be the es-

tablishment of new ways of dealing with the
environment by the person, any model

of human behavior considered to
account for change in

neuropsychological terms would have to focus upon
the individual's

functioning in interaction with the environment
at
ment.

However, such

a

a

functioning can exist only as

sequence of the activity of its neural substrate.
of behavior which would account for

a

any given moa

direct con-

Therefore,

a

model

universal mechanism for change

as the one considered by this dissertation
would have to be based

primarily on the functional nature of the activity and
organization of
the neurological

structures underlying human behavior.

The functional

view of behavior suggested here construes human

activity as the distillate of the functioning of the neural substrates
and the rest of the organism at extreme levels of functional
tion.

Functional

integration in turn

is

integra-

conceptually defined as the

amalgamation of the functioning of the material systems of the organism into

a

global

function resistant to fractionation.

This latter

synthesized function would be capable of representing activities,
such as the elaboration of concepts, which could not be ascribed to
the capabilities of any single functional

aspect of the material sys-

tems of the organism.
In

other words, our functional view of behavior is based on

the notion of human diligence being

inherent

in the global

activity of the material systems of the organism
the environment.

in

functional

interaction with

13

Function and Re duced Neuro1q cQcal_
0rganization
The study of an entity such as the
human being may be pursued
at several

levels, such as the biochemistry from
the chemical ele-

ments, the psychology from cell assembly
dynamics, and the personality and culture from the psychology as
the lowest and two highest

levels respectively (Scott, 1977).
A comprehensive review of the psychobiology
of mental

reaches the basic conclusion, as part of
"...

a

processes

set of principles, that

it is the pattern of activity and the
organization of the paths

of information flow, rather than the mechanics of
the neural com-

ponents, that really matters in the representation of mental
process
by nervous tissue"

(Uttal

,

1978, p.

683).

It

also reaches the

major conclusion that "... the essential neural aspects of mental
function are to be found

in

the organization of the networks into

which either individual neurons or macroscopic brain nuclei are
arranged."
In

(p.

683)

agreement with the preceding view it would appear that look-

ing at human behavior as the result of the integration of many dis-

crete functional aspects may be reasonable if such an outlook bases
its assumptions on the corresponding functional

bral

organization of cere-

structures.
As

such, the ideas about human behavior and clinical change in-

troduced by this dissertation are based on the equivalency between
mental activity and the brain.

That is, such ideas are based on

a

14

monistic functional view of ongoing
experience.
is not new since it

is well

The latter concept

known that functional organization as

a

conceptual explanation for human activity
goes far back in psychological

history.

An example of such historical

antecedents appears to be the

manifest ambition of Sigmund Freud to reduce the
clinical association
of pleasant or unpleasant sensations with
cognition, and integrate
such

a

reduction with his formulation of unconscious mechanisms.

The

difficulty of such an integration is now obvious in the following
excerpt from one of his early attempts to create

a

scientific psycho-

logy (Rothgeb, 1973).

With the hypothesis of wishful attraction and of the
inclination to repression, the state of the system of
permeable neurones (phi) has been touched.
These
2 processes indicate that an organization has been
formed in the system of impermeable neurones (psi)
Judging is a psi process which is only made possible
by inhibition by the ego and which is evoked by the
dissimilarity between the wishful cathexis of a
memory and a perceptual cathexis that is similar to
it.

49)

(p.

Although the historical comments in this section are not intended
to appear as

a

review of the history of the notions about cerebral

functional organization and their relation to human behavior, it

appears worthwhile mentioning

a

few related facts.

One of these is that as far as 50 years ago, the functional

correlation between distinct parts of the brain was integrated into
an associative model

to help explain human activity

(Luria,

1932).

The aforementioned correlation between the different parts of the brain

has been recently described in terms
of

a

more complex functional

model of the organization of the brain,
especially, the cortical

mantle (Luria, 1966, 1973).
Less than two decades after Luria
(1932) suggested an integrated

functional structure in relation to human
activity, the mechanics of
human cerebral function were suggested
to be definable in terms of
the development of cell

assemblies and the subsequent interaction

between these cell assemblies (Hebb, 1949).
in Hebb's

It is

interesting that

view some sort of postsynaptic change was seen
probable

as facilitating future traversing of the
same synapse in connection

with learning.
In

The latter is currently

a

very acceptable notion.

recent times the relationship between function and structure

has been described very clearly in some disorders of
language, with
a

corresponding disruption of function in the presence of

tion in structure

(Geschwind, 1974).

a

disrup-

A similar relationship between

structure and function may be suspected in the orderly matrix-like
structural organization found in the cerebellum (Eccles, Ito

Szentagothai

,

&

1967) and the hippocampus (Shepherd, 1974).

Clearly, the overwhelming amount of scientific research valida-

ting the observation that when brain tissue is altered or removed
a

corresponding change occurs in particular aspects of the individual,

such as language or movement, would deter even the most radical anta-

gonist from considering behavior in the absence of an active brain.
The adjective denoting activity is very important because it is the

functional manifestation of the brain which appears to constitute

16

ongoing experience.
To stress the point,

in terms of human behavior there appears

to be equivalency between mental

(1978) has put it, psychoneural

activity and the brain, or as Uttal
identity.

shared by Young (1978), who defines

This view appears to be

human brain as "a set of nerve

a

cells of immense complexity whose intense activity is
continually

directed to furthering the life of
The importance of

a

individual

is

particular individual."

(p.

266)

functional view of behavior may actually

reside in the capacity of such
of how the individual

a

a

view for being understood in terms

interacts with the environment.

not such an individual

cumstances (Ortega y Gasset, 1961).

That is, an

except in context with his cirOtherwise, behavior could not be

def i ned.
In a

similar tone, it would be more appropriate to characterize

the perception of the environment as
a

a

function of the extent to which

person interacts with such an environment in some reasonably struc-

tured fashion, rather than as the ability of the person to perceive
per se (Szentagothai

&

Arbib, 1975).

Yet this functional

interaction between the person and the en-

vironment appears far from being elucidated completely because complete information about brain processes is not available.

Neverthe-

less, there is no dearth of conceptual examples of the relationship

between function and neurological organization, especially

in

terms

of explaining that relationship with models for the neuronal repre-

sentation of ongoing experience.
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Presentational models.

The relationship between function
and

neurological organization has supported
the development of several

approaches to the study of ongoing experience
and fostered the creation of many theories.

However, reviewing the large number of simi-

lar theories would be an overwhelming
chore and would not be of any

assistance to the task in this section.
Instead of an extensive review this section will
consider just
a

few of the theoretical models which depict the
relationship between

function and neurological organization in

a

somewhat reduced manner.

The models considered follow an apparent current
trend towards the

explanation of ongoing experience (i.e., consciousness) in terms
of
the relationship between function and neurological
organization.

One of the models considered in this section envisages the

relationship between neurological organization and cognitive function
in terms of
It

electroencephalograph^ patterns (Thatcher

& John,

considers ongoing experience (i.e., consciousness) as

tational

system."

The model

is

(p.

a

1977).

"represen-

301)

based on the dispersion pattern of electroencephalo-

graphs measurements

as a function of cognitive tasks.

These electro-

physiological patterns are considered to be the product of an inter-

action between the parts of
structures.

a

system of organized cerebral anatomical

The interaction in turn is characterized by

a

statisti-

cal, non-random and temporally coordinated neuronal activity, and

occurs as
gan i sm.

a

result of either internal or external

input into the or-
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When the latter complex interaction last
long enough, "conso-

lidation"

(p.

becomes

functional aspect of the nervous system and it
may be

a

301) occurs.

That is, the pattern of the interaction

easily elicited back into the stream of ongoing
experience thereafter.

The latter means that activation of

portion of such an

a

established pattern results in activation of the pattern
as

a

whole.

The immediately preceding notion and the consideration
of the

emergence and consolidation of the neuronal patterns as
of environmental

and internal

vous system appear

a

consequence

(functional) input to the central ner-

to be in some agreement with a functional

model

of behavior or of ongoing experience.
Such an agreement would be found on the notion of said electro-

physiological model requiring

a

global or unitary functional

sentation of ongoing experience in the brain.

That is,

a

repre-

global

cognitive representation with metaphorical consequences due to maximal

associative integration of the elements which constitute the experience.

Obviously, such

a

representation would need to have previous

experience incorporated into
of the current experiential

it but

would be

a

direct consequence

instant, and could be modified by its own

cognitive content.
The model

suggested by Thatcher and John proposes that represen-

tational systems constitute the basis for experience, such as subjective experience, memories, thoughts and awareness of sensations, or

moods and emotions.

Although this model of ongoing experience based

on electrophysiological observations takes into account the relation-

.
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ship between the functional cognitive nature
of ongoing experience
and neurological organization, it does not
provide for the reduced

neural organization required to explain such

a

relationship.

More recently other models have been suggested in
which some
of the functional aspects of ongoing experience are
associated with
a

reduced neurological organization.

Two of these more reduced models

which appear to include many of the properties of other models
will
be briefly considered next in support of the conceptualization
of

function as result of

a

neural organization based on the interaction

of associative neural networks.
One of these models is

a

neuropsychological model based on

neurobiological mapping units, with similar mapping mechanisms for
both conceptual and pictorial

Wasserman proposes
is

(a)

representations (Wasserman, 1978).

that the wiring in the nervous system

specific to the system and does not follow randomness,

(b)

that

messages in the nervous system are not encoded by nerve impulses,
but are encoded and carried by cable-like chemospecif ic molecular

channel

systems in the form of an electronic excitation wave, (c) and

that cognitive structures are carried out by means of "unit molecular

mapping systems (UMMSs)"
eel

1

(p.

7), which is

a

continuous network of

s

This model assumes

a

molecular continuity across

a

particular

mapping system and between interacting mapping systems, including
continuity across synapses.

The preceding assumption is based on the

tubular carrier capacity of some elements of the neuron, such as the
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structural support provided by the
microtubules and the capacity of
the cell

to synthesize protein.

an active role in
In

such

a

a

The latter involves DNA playing

sort of algorithmic cell differentiation.

way, the creation or permanence of the
mapping systems

representing images, memories, or concepts
actually involve either
change or stability in the pre- and
post-synapti

appendages of the

c

participating cells.
Cognitive functions are explained in this neuropsychological
model

in terms of interacting UMMSs.

For example, paraphrasing

Wasserman, from the UMMSs which represent images

a

ping occurs onto UMMSs which map engrams of images.

subsequent remapSuch engram-

mapping UMMSs, called engUMMSs in abbreviated form, either
contain

already-stabilized engrams
representations.

or

are still

capable of forming engram

The latter engUMMSs are referred to as hierarchical-

ly first-order engUMMSs.

The presynaptic mapping appendage heads of the first-order

engUMMSs would serve to represent images, while the postsynaptic

appendages of

a

first-order engUMMS could be involved with forming

an engram corresponding to

a

particular image.

The latter may be

accomplished by presynaptic release of an engram-stabi izing sub1

stance, which would stabilize the pattern formed by the postsynaptic

shaped surface of the first-order engUMMS.
The stabilized postsynaptic shaped surface subsequently would

have to be matched, at least approximately, by an image-representing

pattern on the presynaptic shaped surface of that engUMMS if

a

pattern
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recognition

process

would be to occur.

In

terms of this process,

since stabilization only would occur at the
postsynaptic appendages

of the UMMSs and not at the presynaptic appendages,
this would imply
an assumed compositional
In

difference between the two synaptic borders.

Wasserman's neuropsychological model the engUMMSs on
which

the engrams of images are represented are of

a

different class from

those on which the engrams of concepts are represented.

That is, the

forms of the mapping are different in both cases, but the mapping

mechanism
It

is

is

the same in both cases.

very clear that the model being considered

is

very complex

and it is hardly likely that justice could be done to it in

exposition such as this one.
that the model

a

brief

Nevertheless, it is reasonable to state

follows current trends

in understanding behavior in

neuropsychological, that is, functional terms.

Some of the properties

of the model, especially the process of synaptic differentiation, have

considerable appeal as ideas worth incorporating into any functional
model of behavior.
as a

Perhaps the major apparent drawback of the model

functional model of behavior is that it does not appear to clear-

ly provide for the comprehensive process which would account for the

global quality of ongoing experience and the metaphorical character

of human behavior.
To clarify matters,

it should be observed that according to our

view human behavior may be considered metaphorical because it appears
to be the

indivisible synthesized output of the integration of many

processes which conveys meaning or symbolism that may not be derived
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from any one individual process.

The ascription of metaphorical

properties to any system in this work would
naturally follow the

preceding criteria.
The other neuropsychological model

considered in this section

suggests that higher cortical functions,
such as ongoing experience,
depend on the organization of very large
populations of neurons into

complex interactional systems (Edelman
model may be referred to as

a

&

Mountcastle, 1978).

"columnar functional model"

(p.

because it considers the basic anatomical unit of the model

arrangement of 110 neurons in
of diameter.

a

cortical

a

cylinder of about 30

16)

columnar
urn

This columnar arrangement appears to be both repetitive

and pervasive in the brain and is viewed as

The model

procal

This

a

local

neural

circuit.

under consideration treats brain function as the reci-

interconnection and dynamic interplay of neural activity within

and between connected systems of these replicated neural circuts.

This

selective theory assumes the formation of structured neuronal groups
before birth and during development.

These neuronal groups have

connections within each group and connections between the groups which
are specific by gene programming and synaptic selection.

The selec-

tivity is conceived in terms of the lack of influence which

a

signal

pattern may have on the formation of anatomical connections and on the

selection by

a

signal

pattern of groups which already have

a

particu-

lar established mode of activity.

The organization of anatomical

structures in terms of basic units

and the possible distribution of these units in the form of functional
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ensembles are clearly compatible with the
notions considered in this
section about the neuronal representation of
ongoing experience.
It

is beyond the scope of this dissertation
to present

a

com-

prehensive discussion of the extensive literature
concerning the
subject of neuronal representation.

The latter is especially true

when one considers that with the current scientific
knowledge it

would be extremely unlikely that an accurate description
of the neuronal

representation of experience could be verified.

ly at this

It

is

more like-

point in scientific history that if the actual neuronal

representation of experience is presented as

a

theory, the incapacity

for its validation by the scientific community would relegate
it to

just another possibility among the many models of neuronal representation.

However, despite one's misgivings about considering one theory
or another as the most factual, there is considerable consensus among

scientists about some of the elements of the models for neuronal

representation considered

this section.

in

One of these elements is the notion of neuronal representation

being somewhat of an analog of ongoing experience or of the internal
and external environments.

This analog representation is not con-

ceived in the same terms as one would consider

representation, but rather as

a

a

homologous pictorial

homologous functional representation

with hierarchical levels of representational complexity between the
origins of its elements and the integrated neuronal representation.
This means that

a

vast number of neurons would be involved with the
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production of the neural representation in such

a

way that they

would be organized in networks with increasing
interactional com-

plexity working all together as
Examples of such
be found

a

functional

unit (Young, 1978).

homologous functional

a

in the neuronal

representation may

representation of cerebellar function, which

appears to be associated with

organization (Szentagothai

&

a

matrix-like systematic morphological

Arbib, 1975).

Other examples are the

neuronal maps on the body of the retina formed by the neurons which

analyse sensory information (Young, 1978).

activity in the brain must provide

a

That is, the neuronal

faithful

representation of the

events taking place outside.

Another accepted element within the notion of neuronal representation is the interactional nature of its components.

Yet while

a

single neuron may be considered able to account for particular eel

1

-

ular memory mechanisms (Fedor & Majernik, 1977), function is construed
as the result of the interaction of many ensembles of neuronal

net-

works of untold proportions.
However, neuronal

interaction within

a

interaction occurs at the synapse, so that the

particular network of neurons has to take into

account not only the kind of activity that takes place at the synapse
but also the pattern, the intensity, and the frequency with which

such an activity occurs in the network.
So far in this chapter the aims of the dissertation have been

introduced and the opening remarks have been made in defense of
functional model of human behavior.

As

shall

a

be considered ahead,
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such

a

model departs primarily from the cognitive
representation of

ongoing experience in terms of the interactional
activity within and
between neuronal networks.

Considering the preceding, it would be appropriate, if not
necessary, to consider some of the ways in which neuronal
networks
behave, before turning to the general discussion of the model
of

behavior in the chapters ahead.
Obviously, the ensuing descriptions of the behavior of neuronal

networks are entirely hypothetical, as currently there are no

means to establishing their authenticity.
tics of the neuronal

direct

However, the characteris-

networks to be described appear to blend into an

exemplary general model of the cognitive representation of ongoing
experience, with the advantage of operating within the biological

constraints applicable to such systems.
To

a

reasonable extent, their consideration ahead is influenced

by the fact that they generally conform to the functional

of the model of behavior being proposed.

requirements

Nevertheless, the infor-

mation need only be presented and discussed in general terms as

a

functional example of cognitive representation to which the explanation of some of the aspects of the model of human behavior proposed
by this dissertation could be referred.

Neuronal Collectives

.

Trehub (1969) indicates that the gross bio-

electric output (occipital electroencephalographi

c

recordings) of the

brain may be electronically filtered to produce an output charac-
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terized by

a

narrow frequency of the signal.

then be understood as

a

Such an output can

series of temporally distributed intervals

in amplitude modulation.

That is, any given positive inflection be-

tween two cyclic depressions in the output wave
could be fractioned
into its portions reflecting changes in the amplitude
of the wave

within particular periods of time.
In humans,

the distributions of such periods of modulation, when

measured and classified in terms of their temporal duration, are
similar among individuals and are different between conditions of
no
visual stimulation and of photic stimulation.
In

order to explain the observed distributions of modulation

periods in the brain Truhub suggests

a

set of theoretical

transition

probabilities for increase or decrease in the temporally coherent
pattern of discharge of

a

particular subset of neurons, in terms of

the maximum number of neurons potentially available to discharge

coherently under

a

specified situation.

The group of neurons which participates in the temporally co-

herent pattern of discharge would be called
tive

,

a

kinetic neuronal collec -

while the maximum number of neurons in the neural mass

tion which could discharge in

a

coherent manner at

stimulus intensity would be called
A neuronal

a

a

given level of

potential neuronal collective

collective is defined by Trehub as

characterized by

a

in ques-

a

.

subset of neurons

temporally coherent discharge pattern.

As such then, at each successive temporal

interval of amplitude

modulation the decrease or increase in inflection

is

associated with

.

27

the number of cells discharging
in

a

coherent manner, that is, with

the intensity of the kinetic
neuronal

collective.

The successive intensity of the
kinetic neuronal collective in

turn would be

a

function of the ratio of the latter to
the potential

neuronal collective.

This way, the larger the ratio of the
kinetic

collective to the potential collective the
less likely an increase
in the intensity of the kinetic collective
during the next modulation

period.

Equally assumed, the smaller the ratio of the
kinetic collec-

tive to the potential collective the more likely
it is that the kinetic

collective will display

a

higher intensity.

greater the number of neurons from

a

In

particular set

coherent discharge pattern, the lesser likely it
will

other words, the

is

is

engaged in

that such

a

a

number

increase during the next coherent discharge, and viceversa.

Taking those factors in consideration Trehub compared the theoretical probability model to the actual occipital electroencephal o-

graphic measurements.

The duration of each period occurring between

successive positive inflections in the amplitude envelope was measured and multiplied by the number of periods in that same duration
class.

The percentage of total

time occupied by each class of dura-

tion cycles was determined for each of nine subjects.
He then observed that the mean distributions of percentage time

occupied by each duration class obtained empirically and those obtained theoretically with the aid of

a

digital computer turned out

to be closely similar for both no-stimulation and visual

condi tions

stimulation

.
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These findings lend some support to
the notion of collectfve
neuronal behavior being stochastic to
some degree.

assumes the mamalian brain as
nals.

a

Trehub (1971b)

parallel coherent detector of sig-

That is, an organ with cognitive processing
mechanisms charac-

terized by stochastic coherent neuronal discharge
activity.

The

latter implies support to the concept of the
neuronal collective being
a

basic interactive process in cerebral neuronal
networks.

Cognitive and sensory information to the brain appears
to follow

multiple channels of hierarchical complexity (Young,
1978).

That is,

while inputs from different parts of the organism which
are associated
with

a

particular experience are integrated at the level of the asso-

ciation areas of the brain (Luria, 1966, 1973), many of these
inputs
travel

through different routes and undergo neuronal consolidation as

they travel through the brain.
For example, Trehub (1971a) has found that under ipsilateral

or contralateral

photic stimulation conditions the bioelectric signal-

to-noise ratio is significantly higher at the visual cortex than at
the lateral

geniculate in rats.

be attributed also to

a

While the improvement in signal may

host of other factors, it is nevertheless

consistent with the notion of cortical measurement being the result
of higher-order integration.
It

appears that the concept of the neuronal collective as

a

basic interactional process among neuronal networks may be equally

applicable to small and large networks or ensembles of such neuronal
networks
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In

tune with the theoretical

and empirical

considerations about

coherent neuronal activity to this point,
Trehub (1975a) proposes
notions about signal transfer of sensory
information which could

account for hierarchical processes.
He assumes that groups of the smallest
receptor-neuron systems

capable of transferring stimulus intensity
specific and exclusive afferent neurons

(

(

sensory kernels

nervelets

)

)

have

at one or higher

orders of association, whose axons terminate in
synaptic contact with
a

specific group of neurons

(

target groups

)

which serve as recoding

stations for stimulus intensity conveyed by the nervelet
axons.
He

further assumes that the nervelet axons synapse randomly
on

the neurons belonging to the target group.

It

should be noted here

that the target groups are assumed to be specifically related to
the

sensory kernels from which they receive information through the
nervelets, and that the neuronal discharge is coherent.
be added that in terms of neuronal

It

should

systems, Trehub (1975a) defines

coherent signals as "... those parallel, mul

ti

neuronal discharges

which are optimally related to the spatio-temporal summation characteristics of their higher-order target cells during each phase of

integration of postsynaptic potential."

(p.

388)

Just like it is assumed that the nervelet axons synapse randomly
on the neurons belonging to their respective target group, it is e-

qually assumed that the relative intensity of stimulation at each
sensory kernel

is

coded into the number of neurons coherently dis-

charged in such target group once the axons of the nervelet make
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effective contacts with them.

That is, coded in terms of

a

kinetic

neuronal collective.

also assumed in the latter case that
the potential neuronal

It is

collective can increase as

a

function of stimulus intensity.

addition, it is necessary for the number of
effective axons

In
in

each

afferent nervelet to be approximately three
times as great as the
number of neurons in the matrix of target cells
for the kinetic potential

to exceed 95% of its potential collective in
the target group.

The latter situation may be described as one of
functional

redundancy.

In

that situation

a

number of the cells in

associated with the signal transfer of
not be at

such

a

a

a

a

neural mass

particular function would

given time engaged in the coherent discharge pattern of

signal.

However, at some other given time those same cells

could be enlisted into the group most likely to participate in the

coherent discharge pattern of the same signal as

a

result of the

increased ratio of stimulus intensity to neural mass.

First-occupancy principle

.

Now based on this random synaptic contact

between the axons of the nervelets and their respective cells in the
target group, and in consideration of the preceding notions, Trehub
(1975a) suggests that the signal transfer considered here follows

a

first-occupancy model.
The immediately preceding notion translates into

a

situation

where the probability of an active nervelet axon discharging its
target cell at any given instance is less than unity, and where only
one effective axon can discharge the target cell within any given
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arbitrarily brief period of time.
axon on

a

That is, the first effective

target cell precludes the influence
on such cell by any

other effective axon impinging on it
during the time period in question.

The situation being described would
also provide for the pos-

sibility of

a

limited number of target cells not having
effective

synaptic input from any axons impinging on
them during

a

given period

of time.
The latter may also be viewed as

a

case of functional redundancy

because it suggests that at any given moment part
of the neuronal
mass associated with

a

particular function would not be participating

in the coherent discharge corresponding to such

a

function.

Once again, it must be remembered that the target cells are

associated with

a

particular function and are part of an intensely

interactional system.
As Trehub (1975a) points out, this first-occupancy model

favors

continued adequate cerebral function without the severe impairment

which would otherwise follow the progressive loss of cells in the
central

nervous system due to aging or as the result of pathological

processes.

For example,

nerve fibers in
is

only

a

a

he calculates that with the loss of 50% of

particular sensory kernel of

a

major pathway, there

loss of 12% in the magnitude of the kinetic collective.

Incidentally, according to the behavioral model proposed by this

dissertation the impression of redundancy of function

in

the human

brain is attributed primarily to the effects of the extremely interactional nature of its neural substrate.

In

other words, the synthe-
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sized cognitive output of the
vast stochastic interaction
within
and between complex neuronal

networks would cover the loss of
mi nor

discrete portions of such networks.

However, when such discrete

losses in neural tissue become
generalized, such as in the case of

progressive cortical degeneration, the
impoverishment of cognitive
function becomes evident.

In

a

case such as the latter, cognitive

function would continue to deteriorate
with the gradual loss of
neuronal substance and the neuronal networks
would progressively

become stripped of some of their associative
capacity.
From

a

similar perspective, Trehub's signal transfer
model

would probably serve as an explanation for the
improvement in memory
functions occurring with slight elevations in anxiety
(Loftus, 1980).
The latter may be associated with the increased
magnitude of the kinetic collective as

a

result of enhanced stimulation intensity.

Natu-

rally, in this case the associative power of the brain
would be am-

plified by the heightened synaptic interaction.
The memory deficits observed with high levels of anxiety could

probably be seen as
collective.

a

reduction in the magnitude of the kinetic

The latter reduction could be blamed on the disorganiza-

tion of the pattern of discharge and

a

delayed refractory period

between discharges due to stimulation beyond the capacity of the
system.

Similarly, the construct of first-occupancy and, specifically,
the kinetic collective could probably the applicable to the under-

standing of the disorganized cognitive state observed in psychosis,

33

and maybe to the illogical or
haphazard associative nature of cogni-

tive representation during dreaming.
in terms of significant alterations

The preceding may be construed
in

the coherency of discharge and

the number of neurons involved due
to extremes at one end or the other

of the range of stimulus intensity.

Obviously,

associative logic of the brain would occur as

a

a

disruption in the

result of either

excessive or insufficient stimulation to its
cortical neuronal pathways

.

As indicated earlier,

interaction within and between neuronal

networks appears to occur primarily at the synapse.

With this latter

notion in mind some of the general characteristics of
neuronal net-

works behavior have been presented so far.
Since the effort at the moment is aimed at promoting
al

a

function-

view of human behavior, the further reduction of neuronal networks

to adaptive models of synaptic interaction would probably facilitate

such

a

view.

However, as it will become evident in the material which follows,

only the highlights of such functional models shall be furnished.
in the preceding sections,

the material

is

As

presented without its

mathematical derivations and its technical details.

It

would appear

that the exposition, however scanty, of the general characteristics
and applications of one or two examples of functional

of cognitive processes would suffice as

a

synaptic models

source of reference for

material and concepts considered in subsequent chapters.
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Functional Synaptic Networks

Assuming

a

neuronal

representational system without previous

exposure to any type of input, the synaptic
junctions between the
presynaptic boutons of the axons and the postsynaptic
appendages
of the dendrites could be considered to be naive
to experience.

Assume also that the activity from the presynaptic bouton
onto
the postsynaptic dendritic appendage is of

a

constant nature, but

that such a presynaptic activity induces an excitatory
variable

change in the postsynaptic dendritic matter when both of the
neurons

involved fire simultaneously.
Incidentally, the idea of

a

postsynaptic alteration as the

result of synaptic transmission has been considered in terms of

changes in concentration and structure of

a

postsynaptic protein com-

plex, and of time-controlled ionic transport across the cell membrane
as a result of the conformational

(Fedor & Majernik, 1977).

state of such protein complex

These same authors also propose that the

reception surface of the dendrite can be composed of one or more
reception fields with excitatory or inhibitory functions.
Now following the traditional notions about neuronal conduction
and considering the knowledge available about the state of affairs

during synaptic transmission, Trehub (1975b) proposes
synaptic activity or substance as

a

a

renewable pre-

constant axon transfer factor

(ATF) and suggests the existence of a postsynaptic activity or sub-

stance to be known as dendrite transfer factor (DTF).
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When pre- and post-synapti

c

neurons fire at the same time, the

reaction between the ATF and the DTF within the
postsynaptic dendritic

matter

suggested to produce an increase in

is

a

type of transmission

capacity labelled as the synaptic transfer weight

.

The synaptic

transfer weight is described as "the magnitude of any
single synaptic

contribution to the integrated EPSP [excitatory postsynaptic
potential] of its associated cell
(Trehub,

1975b,

p.

given standard presynaptic input"

440).

Upon reaction with ATF, the DTF is depleted and its transfer

weight contribution to the synapse

is

inversely proportional to the

number of axons making contact on the neuron in question at the time
both substances or activities react with each other.

Considering

a

naive two-stage cognitive neuronal network with

input and output cells, the coherent discharge of the input cells
as a result of an environmental

stimulation would be randomly distri-

buted among the synapses of the output cells.

Then, at each of the

synapses in which there are simultaneous pre- and post-synapti

c

dis-

charges, there would be an increase in its synaptic transfer weight
or,

in other words,

in

the magnitude of the contribution of the syn-

apse to the coherent EPSP during

a

learning period.

Being affected by random distribution and the number of afferent
axons impinging on the output cell, the transfer weight at particular

synapses may be higher than at others while it will remain the same
in unaffected synapses.
It

is

assumed that the distribution of the synaptic transfer
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weights among the output cells of the
network follows the activateon
l

of the input cells by

environmental

a

particular firing pattern elicited by an

stimulus with certain characteristics.

Therefore, the

synapses of those output cells which intersect
such an afferent firing

pattern will undergo an increase

in

transfer weight.

The increase

in transfer weight is established in the
postsynaptic matter of the

output cells in connection with the particular
environmental stimulus.

Thereafter, presentation of that same stimulus will cause
the output
cell with the greatest sum of synaptic transfer weight
with respect
to the input pattern produced by such

a

stimulus, to fire along the

integrated EPSP.
The learning efficiency of the synaptic matrix (Trehub, 1975b)

scantily described above, which by definition is characterized by
the mechanisms for synaptic malleability considered so far, has been

tested under simulation conditions with the aid of
In the

latter case Trehub (1975b) simulated

a

a

computer.

theoretical retina

with 25 afferent neurons or input cells which synapsed with each of
nine output cells

(

class cells

).

He then presented nine different

patterns for simulated learning to the resulting synaptic matrix.
As would be expected the responses to the learned patterns by the

class cells were 100% correct.

Moreover, the responses by the class

cells to fragments of the patterns, resulting from the random omission
of approximately 40% from each of the original

forms, were about 92%

correct.

Despite the

1

imitations of

a

very brief description, it appears

s
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from the foregoing example that the concept of the
synaptic matrix

developed by Trehub may be

viable model for neuronal networks in

a

the brain, at the very least from the mathematical

and theoretical

points of view.
It seems

example of

appropriate at this point to briefly furnish

a

graphic

larger synaptic matrix which could aid the visualization

a

of the unlimited extent to which the concept of the synaptic matrix

may be applicable to explain cognitive processes.
Figure
plays

a

1

(Trehub, 1977), appearing in the following page, dis-

complete synaptic matrix with 48 input neurons with afferent

input from the optic tract in point to point synapse with

equally afferent neurons to be known as mosaic-cells (M).
suing adaptive excitatory synapses of the matrix

conveniently illustrated as

a

(

group of

a

The en-

imaging matrix ) are

orderly arrangement of ovals with the

appropriate transfer weight for each synapse after learning two

different environmental patterns.

Notice that each of the unaffected

synapses have an arbitrary transfer weight of one unit.
The axon of each of the mosaic-cells is in parallel
all

the twelve neurons

(

fi

1

ter eel

1

)

synapse with

in the detection matrix

Once

.

again the synapses of the matrix are shown as ovals with their respective transfer weight values appearing inside each of them.
the filter cells is in discrete synapse with an output eel

Each of
1

.

that each of the axons of the output cells (class cells) sends

collateral to synapse with all
the imaging matrix.

Notice
a

the dendrites of the mosaic-cells in
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Figure
Schematic of synaptic matrix including neuronal circuits
1.
for the transformation of size and angular orientation of input patterns.
Note
From "Neuronal Models for Cognitive Processes:
Networks for Learning, Perception and Inagination" by A. Trehub, Journal
of Theoretical Biology
1977, 65, 141-149.
Copyright 1977 by Academic
Press, Inc.
Reprinted by permission.
.
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The neuron whose axon is in
parallel

synapse to the dendrites

or bodies of the output cells is
an inhibitory or

rej^ejjr™

(-)

which also receives as its input
the axons from those same output
cells.

The function of the reset neuron
is to generate an inhibi-

tory postsynaptic potential

(IPSP) to reset all

cells when these are discharged.

the class or output

The short oblique slashes in the

illustration depict fixed inhibitory synapses.

The large dots repre-

sent fixed excitatory synapses and the
small dots represent branch

points of axon collaterals.
Now the mosaic-cells (M) of the first
detection matrix near the

center of the illustration project in retinotopic
order through two

series-connected inter-matrix layers onto the second
detection matrix
on the right margin of the illustration.

The dendrite of each cell of the inter-matrix layer near
the

center of the illustration (first layer), receives an excitatory
input from an associated cell

in the mosaic-cell

(M)

array.

It also

receives an inhibitory input from each of the two decoupler cells

appearing closest to the input cells at both the upper and lower
left corners of the illustration.

One of the decoupler cells is

activated by an initiate rotation spike signal and the other by an
initiate zoom signal.
The axon of each cell

in

the aforementioned first inter-matrix

layer connects in excitatory synapse to its co-ordinate cell

in the

second inter-matrix layer to the right of the illustration.

Said axon

also contributes one excitatory collateral

to

its co-ordinate cell

in
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the rotation transformer circuit
and one to its co-ordinate cell

in

the size transformer circuit.
In

addition to receiving axonal

input from the cells in the other

inter-matrix layer, the dendrites of the cells
in the second inter-

matrix layer receive also excitation inputs
from their respective
co-ordinate cells in the rotation transformer and
size transformer.
The axon of each of the cells in this layer
synapse with all the

filter cells in the second detection matrix.
Each of the filter cells in this second detection matrix
is in

discrete synapse with an output or class cell whose dendrite
also
is under the inhibitory influence of the reset neuron

The values found in the ovals (synapses)

in the

(-).

second detection

matrix at the right margin of the illustration represent the transfer
weights associated with all the possible retinal sizes of the two
patterns learned by the network.

These two patterns are depicted by

the synaptic transfer weights in the first detection matrix near the

center of the illustration.
The size transformer would operate to expand or contract the

retinotopic discharge pattern in the mosaic-cells.

discharge

is

The pattern of

carried by the neurons of the first inter-matrix layer

to activate the size transformer when the thresholds of its neurons

are lowered by the initiate zoom neuron.

discharge is replicated

in

That way the pattern of

the size transformer.

Input to the size

transformer at this time would be blocked by the inhibitory action of
the decouplers.

.
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The neuron array of the first

i

nter-matri

x

layer is inhibited

by one decoupler as a result of
the onset of activity of the
zoom

initiating cell.

The other decoupler inhibits the
intermediary neu-

rons whose axons provide the size
transformer with the pattern of

excitation.

Inhibition in the latter case occurs as

a

result of

the output of one or more cells of
the size transformer.

The size transformer transmits the
pattern in question to the

second inter-matrix layer and subsequently
to the second detection
matri

x

The operation of the rotation transformer
follows processes for

activation, inhibition and transmission of patterns
somewhat identical
to those for the operation of the size
transformer.

transformer systems have
each other.
As

a

reciprocal

However, both

inhibitory relationship with

That way only one transformer performs at any given time.

indicated above

(p. 40 ),

the values in the synapses of the

second detection matrix represent the transfer weights associated
with
all

possible retinal sizes of two learned patterns.
Given that,

it

is

not difficult to imagine that the firing of

any one of the output cells would represent

size of

a

learned pattern.

a

particular retinal

Therefore, if the output cells could

be stimulated to fire in

a

matrix would represent

series of changes in retinal

a

a

particular sequence the output of the
size.

That is,

zooming effect which could correspond to the moving of an object

toward or away from the retina.
The functional

flexibility afforded by the stochastic process

4?

illustrated above allows for an
associative interaction of untold
proportions.
At any given time

minute fraction of
tic matrix.

a

a

particular neuron may constitute

module being represented by

That means such

a

cell

a

a

very

particular synap-

has the largest sum of transfer

weight and fires along the EPSP
associated with the matrix output.
Just the same, that particular cell
may participate
less synaptic matrices at different
times.

count-

in

That is, at one instant

it may be an effective part of
one matrix and at the next instant

participate in

a

different one.

Now if one considers that each of the
billions of cells in the

brain may have as much as tens of thousands
of axons synapsing with
it,

in

addition to its own autaptic synapses, it is not
difficult to

visualize the magnitude of the degree of synaptic matrix
integration

which may be possible.
In

analogy, such an interaction may be seen as an impenetrable

web, whose weaving pattern changes from instant to
instant.

Clearly, the capacity of one cell

to participate

in a

different

synaptic matrix at any given different time would be accompanied
also by the identical capacity of

a

particular synaptic matrix to

contribute to different synaptic matrix ensembles at different times.
Thus, one would end with an infinite number of combinations.

According to the view presented here,

if

it

would not be for

the associative flexibility considered above, one would not be able
to

discriminate between two objects with similar properties in

a
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metaphorical manner.

For example, one would not be
able to construe

the circular properties of a wheel

as similar in principle to those

of an orange.

That is, the synaptic matrix (or matrices)
representing the

concept of circularity participates in the
cognitive representation
of each of the objects.
It is

painfully obvious that in order to do justice
to the

neuronal models already described in this chapter
it would be necessary to go into details of the models which for
the sake of brevity
have been omitted.
It

is

hoped, however, that despite the cursory exposition of

such models, the purpose of suggesting

a

possible theoretical format

for understanding cognitive representation of ongoing
experience in

terms of neuronal networks has been achieved.
In terms of the

arguments in favor of

latter, Trehub (1977) presents very compelling
a

neuronal view of cognitive processes in terms

of networks for learning, perception and imagination.

Also for

stereoscopic vision (Trehub, 1978) and associative sequential recall
in a

synaptic matrix (Trehub, 1979).
It is

possible, with

a

little imagination

,

to visualize how the

principle of the adaptive synaptic matrix (Trehub, 1975b) could be
used to formulate all types of cognitive representation in the brain.
As a matter of fact,

Trehub (1977) suggests that

a

brain model based

on the stochastic principles proposed by him accounts for

a

few hun-

dred million cells less than the total number of neurons estimated for
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the brain.

The latter would allow for
considerable loss of brain

cells before function would be
affected significantly.

Considering the material addressed so
far, it appears the
metaphorical nature of ongoing experience
could be visualized as
the result of the elaborate integration
of vast multiples of stochas-

tic neuronal

networks.

Understandably, the cognitive representation
required in such
an integration would have to be expeditiously
coalescent in order

for it to be an analog of ongoing experience
from instant to instant.
A global

analog of ongoing experience of this sort would
have to rely

on highly accelerated hierarchical processes
in order to maintain its

dynamic properties.

Unfortunately, as stated before, the veridical organization of
the neuronal

networks representing ongoing experience is currently

undeterminable.
to be

a

global

That is, the biological reduction of what appears

integration of such neuronal networks seems beyond

reach at this point.

Obviously,

a

considerable theoretical jump would have to be

made in order to suggest any sort of model for

a

final

integration

of neuronal networks which could account for ongoing experience.

While the suggestion of any particular neuronal organization
for the representation of ongoing experience would have to be more

speculative than factual, in the present case such

a

suggestion should

have some coherent relationship with the elementary theoretical

tions about neuronal network behavior.

no-
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seems necessary that the theoretical
jump from the elementary

It

notions about neuronal network behavior
to the phenomenology of ongoing experience be based on

a

basic concept which could connect,

even if tenuously, the two edges of
the theoretical abyss between
such two ideas.

For the current purposes, that kind
of basic concept

appears to be the stochastic neuronal
by the synaptic matrix (Trehub,

network integration depicted

1975b).

Cognitive Matrices

The functional model of behavior proposed
by this dissertation
is

visualized in terms of

a

cognitive representation of ongoing ex-

perience with the stochastic characteristics of neuronal
networks
considered in the preceding sections.
In

the proposed model, the cognitive representation of
ongoing

experience can be conceived as the global integration of higher-order
matrices of neuronal networks.

Much like the synaptic matrices pre-

viously discussed, but in this case the output of given matrices,
rather than

a

cell, containing vast numbers of neuronal

networks would

constitute the input of other matrices during higher-order integration.

At

a

less than ultimate level, this intensely associative

process can be envisaged between, let us say, the primary cortical
areas for vision and their respective cortical association areas
(Luria,
It

1966), as
is

a

theoretical example.

hard to visualize the extreme degree of interconnection

between and within mammoth neuronal networks which would be necessary
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to describe a higher-order
matrix of such networks.

However, the

cognitive resolution required for the
global representation of ongoing experience demands such

a

level

of associative activity.

Given

the very refined cognitive product
which emerges from the represen-

tational properties of these hypothetical
matrices they will be called

cognitive matrices in this work.
Since the person can only actively
focus on

of the environment at any given time,
such

a

limited portion

a

portion of the environ-

ment about which the person is perceptually
aware constitutes the re-

presentation of ongoing experience in the form of
matrix of higher-order cognitive matrices.

a

highest-order

That is, it is the cog-

nitive representation of that portion of the environment
the person
is

purposefully interacting with.

would have
the brain.

a

This highest-order matri

x

obviously

substantial input from the frontal association areas of
Being dynamic, the highest-order cognitive matrix would

vary from instant to instant depending on the changes in
cognitive
input occurrring with shifts in the active focus of awareness.
To clarify,

it

should be emphasized that the highest-order cog-

nitive matrix is postulated to encompass the maximal
tive resolution allowed by the perceptual

systems of the organism.

level of cogni-

substrate and other material

Naturally, the level of cognitive resolu-

tion would be affected by neurophysiological variations and cognitive

deficits.

However, regardless of the person being blind, deaf, or

brain-damaged the cognitive resolution of the highest-order cognitive
matrix at any given time would always be the maximal one for that
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organism.
Of course, at any given cognitive
instant, the portion of the

environment which is out of the active
perceptual awareness of the
person is represented in the brain
in terms of higher-order
cognitive
matrices.

Incidentally, it is possible to visualize
the foregoing

process as facilitating representational
transition from higher-order

matrices to the highest-order matrix when
focus is actively shifted
to a different portion of the
environment being primarily represented
by an adjacent higher-order cognitive
matrix.

That is, the cognitive

representation in the higher-order matrix is already
integrated close
to the integration required by the
highest-order level, and only

needing the focus of active awareness to complete
the transition.
The preceding notions imply that thebrainis
constantly also

processing as cognitive input that portion of our environment
which
is out of our active perceptual

awareness.

That is, the brain is

processing information into higher-order cognitive matrices

in a

passive manner, even if the person is not aware of the information
being coded.

One may look at this process as some sort of passive

awareness or parallel thinking.

From

a

purely popular point of view,

this process may be considered equivalent to the notion of "uncon-

scious" thinking.
The assumptions considered above establish

a

passive mechanism

through which particular cognitive material may become part of the

highest-order cognitive matrix, that is, drifting into the person's
awareness apparently from nowhere.

.
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Evident in the upcoming example and
examined in the forth-

coming chapter, the invasion of the
highest-order cognitive matrix
by cognitions from higher-order
matrices representing material out

of awareness may be mostly related
to the intensity of the core
affect

associated with such cognitions.
cribed as

a

As a reminder, core affect is des-

sensation of consternation or danger,
ordinarily out of

the awareness of the individual and
which is synonymous with emotional
pain.

Thus, the sensation of consternation in
question would influ-

ence the infiltration of cognitions into the
highest-order cognitive

matrix which may be tangential or alien to
the activity being focused
upon
An anecdotal

example of the latter cognitive transfer

ticular experience someone had while riding as
rear seat of an automobile.

a

is

the par-

passenger on the

At the time of the experience in ques-

tion, the passenger was riding on the center of the
back seat with

ample view of the windshield and dashboard.

Suddenly, without having

any connection with the conversation the passenger asked the driver
if he possessed

a

portable electric pump to use in case of the acci-

dental deflation of one of the tires.

He then proceeded to offer the

driver one of these pumps he had in his own automobile two thousand
miles away.

Right after the latter verbal exchange the party arrived

at their destination, a restaurant which turned out to be closed at

the time.

Returning immediately to the automobile the driver noticed

with considerable bewilderment that the right front tire was deflated.

Apparently, the passenger had subliminal or passive awareness of
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perhaps the inclination of the dashboard
or of any other cognition
such as the noise of the deflating
tire as it rolled over the road.

According to our model, such cognitions
would be symbolic of danger
and would elicit some elevation in
the intensity of core affect, as
an affective complement to the
cognition.

However, since the focus of awareness is
not on such cognitions,
the brain tries to make sense out of that
sensation through the asso-

ciative integration of the highest-order cognitive
matrix by virtue
of the influence of the frontal

lobes.

This way,

a

particular cogni-

tive association at the margin of active
perceptual awareness becomes

integrated into the highest-order cognitive form of
the representation
of the ongoing experience.
from

a

That is, there is

a

transfer of material

higher-order matrix (passive awareness) to the highest-order

cognitive matrix (active awareness) which is associated with

a

parti-

cular intensity of affective complement.
Notice that the behavior in the preceding example had to do with

dealing with the affective complement or core affect associated with
the cognition.

It

is,

therefore, not difficult to see the behavior

of the passenger as an attempt to feel secure by trying to achieve
a

certain degree of closeness with the driver, who happened to be his

brother.

Recalling from previous sections, once

a

pattern is encoded

synaptic matrix as the result of the presentation of
stimulus, the subsequent presentation of

a

a

in

particular

fraction of that same

stimulus will in many cases elicit the whole pattern encoded before.

a

',()

Similarly, according to the model proposed
whenever

a

higher-

order cognitive matrix at the margin of perceptual
awareness contains

cognitive information which may resemble, however
vaguely,

parti-

a

cular stimulus associated with certain elevation of core
affect,
the material may invade the highest-order cognitive
matrix and be-

come part of our awareness.

Apropos, while the latter may or may not occur, the elevation
in core affect may be

the body.

sufficient to elicit

The topic of anxiety will

a

reaction of anxiety by

be covered in subsequent chap-

ters, but to avoid being vague it will be advanced again that anxiety
is

considered in this dissertation as an ordinary defensive reaction

of the body to the generally subliminal sensation of threat or of

personal disintegration being called core affect.
Human activities require active parallel
as when efforts at recall

thinking at times, such

are made or when the need arises to esta-

blish particular cognitive associations.
This process appears to be an accessory mechanism to the highest-

order cognitive matrix.

perform
imagery.

a

By definition,

this accessory mechanism would

host of highly associative functions, such as recall and
Such

a

mechanism could serve to hold patterns or

to

inte-

grate information being recalled.
The proposed accessory mechanism appears to function as an

accessory imaging system with the associative properties of
order cognitive matrix.

The cognitive material

a

higher-

it represents at any

given moment may constitute input to the highest-order cognitive

.
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matrix or may be the object or
representation by the highest-order

cognitive matrix itself.

The latter appears possible when
the

imaging system is visualized as
having somewhat similar stimulus

properties as the external environment.
The preceding statement means that
while the cognitive material

in the

imaging system may become the focus
of active per-

ceptual awareness, its representation
in the highest-order cog-

nitive matrix would have to adhere to the
same perceptual con-

straints as the representation of an external
stimulus.
However, the highest-order representation of
material from
the imaging system would have less than
analog characteristics in

virtually all

instances where the material would be more complex

than simple dimensional designs.
An ordinary example of the latter is the observation
of the

very poor fidelity of the mental

image of

a

complex object when

compared to the actual observation of the object.
the example depicts the inability to recall

In

other words,

any complex object

accurately enough to describe it as well as when the object

is ac-

tual ly bei ng seen
It

should be noted that the fidelity of mental

when the material is associated with
core affect, hence increased anxiety.

a

images increases

mildly increased level of
It also appears

to

increase

with episodes of intense concentration, such as during hypnosis
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(Spiegel & Spiegel, 1978).

As a special

case, the fidelity of mental

images is increased in the cases
where the person displays what has

been called eidetic imagery, or as
popularly known, photographic

memory (Loftus, 1980).

General Assumptions of the Proposed Model

One could say that all the effort has been
devoted in this

first chapter to proposing human behavior,
hence ongoing experience,
as the functional

neuronal networks.

manifestation of the ultimate global integration of
Naturally, since the interaction between the per-

son and the environment is metaphorical

phenomenological terms.
cal

it can only be described

With the latter in mind,

a

general

in

theoreti-

format for understanding ongoing experience in terms of
cognitive

matrices has been proposed.
While pithy, the cumulative theoretical exposition of the rela-

tionship between neurological organization and function in the preceding sections has been aimed at establishing said relationship as

a

foundation for the understanding of the functional and phenomenological

aspects of the model of behavior considered in forward chapters.

Hopefully, at least for some, such

a

goal

has been achieved.

Now it may be suggested, according to the arguments presented
so

far and those considered in subsequent chapters, that the function-

al

model of behavior proposed by this dissertation follows the ensu-

ing assumptions.
1.

It

considers human behavior as metaphorical according to our
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definition of the term.
2.

It

considers ongoing experience as

a

dynamic global activity

possessing instantaneous cognitive efficiency.
3.

It

considers ongoing experience as essentially

a

cognitive

activity with affective and behavior-mediating
components.
4.

It

considers ongoing experience as the product
of functional

aspects which maintain

reciprocally-influencing relationship with

a

each other and their combined global
5.

It accounts

integration.

for the additive influence of experience on

human behavior.
6.

It

accounts for the gradation of cognitive and emotional

development and the stability of

a

range of behavioral characteristics

during adulthood.
7.

It

accounts for changes

in

the beliefs, attitudes, and be-

havior of individuals.
8.

It

accounts for idiosyncratic human conditions, such as

a

state of psychosis.
9.

It

endures

a

which tends to support
own functional

human behavior.

limited neurobiological theoretical
a

reduction

coherent relationship between the model's

properties

and the phenomenol ogi cal

character of

CHAPTER

II

THE COGNITIVE NATURE OF ONGOING EXPERIENCE

Explaining the interaction of the many aspects of the model
of human behavior proposed by this dissertation in

a

manner which

could make it easily and readily understood appears to be

a

form-

idable task.
The complexity of the model

general
lies

requires more than just

a

brief

explanation to convey the integrated design which under-

it.

Therefore, while according to the proposed model ongoing experience and its manifestations are considered to be global functions, the model could be best understood if its elements would be

presented in

a

gradual

fashion.

To such an effect, as depicted by Figure
an

artificial

model

is

2

on the next page,

separation of the basic functional elements of the

considered as an aid in the discussion of the model.

Parenthetically, this illustration will be presented as part of
a

comprehensive diagram of all the elements of the model

in

Chapter

5.

The reciprocal

interaction of the functional elements of the

model as indicated by the connecting arrows between such elements
is

obvious at first glance.

Indeed, the reciprocal

interaction in

question is more accurately defined as the reciprocal
54

integration
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of the functional elements into

a

global

functional activity.

To simplify matters, each of
the functional

model

elements of the

discussed as independently as possible
from the others.

is

However, overlap between the discussions
of the different functional

elements
standing

is

not only inevitable, but also facilitative
of under-

.

Accordingly, this second chapter will consider
the basic
elements of the model associated with cognitive
representation.
That is, the cortex, the cognitive representation
of the environment, and the accessory imaging system.
As

reminder, the accessory imaging system was briefly dis-

a

cussed in the previous chapter and its consideration in this
chapter
will

be supplemental

The stochastic cognitive representation of the environment in

terms of neuronal networks was considered also in the previous chapter.

It

should be indicated that the topic of neuronal representa-

tion was considered very early in this dissertation in the belief
that an early introduction to the topic would facilitate the penetration of the many elements of the model which are being subsequently
i

ntroduced
Now, while this chapter mainly addresses the phenomenol ogical

manifestations of cognitive representation, reference to the neuronal
representation of ongoing experience, that is, the cognitive matrices
discussed in the previous chapter, will be made all along the discussion.

The latter

is

a

theoretical necessity because the model
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is based on such a global

cognitive representatiion

Unquestionably, an attempt at accurately
defining ongoing

experience in terms of neuronal networks
currently
impossibility.

is a

virtual

Therefore, speculation in the form of
theory has

to substitute for fact during such
an attempt.

However, as indi-

cated earlier, in the latter situation
the speculation should be
based on some fact and have

a

coherent relationship with the pheno-

mena it tries to explain.
In

in the

consideration of the foregoing premise, it was
postulated
preceding chapter that ongoing experience

the brain in terms of

a

is

represented in

cognitive functional analog resulting from

the coherent integration of cognitive processes.

Such cognitive

processes have been conceptualized at their upper levels of
integration in terms of stochastic higher-order cognitive matrices
composed of hierarchical ensembles of neuronal networks.
The approach to the understanding of brain function based on
the interaction of neuronal

networks

is

hardly novel or unique since

most neuroscientists appear to concur with such an approach.
However, the conceptualization of the higher-order and highest-

order neuronal network integrations postulated

in the

preceding chap-

ter is perhaps one step beyond what has been proposed by neuroscience
to this point in defining the cognitive representation of experience.

The succinct treatment accorded to the topic of cognitive repre-

sentation

in

the brain in the preceding chapter could be considered
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by some as

inadequate to justify the consideration
of the notion of

the proposed cognitive matrices.

However, it must be emphasized that such

a

notion emerges from

the observation of the mature brain's
virtually instantaneous cog-

nitive efficiency.

It

appears obvious that the brain could not

represent ongoing experience from instant
to instant as expeditiously
as

it does

unless such

a

representation would have the metaphorical

properties ascribed to the postulated cognitive
matrices.

Obviously, the cognitive representation of ongoing
experience
has global

functional properties, but from the fund of information

in the neurosciences emerges

the fact of the neocortex being the

tissue with the highest capacity for integration of cognitive
material

.

The Cerebral Cortex

Clearly, the vast portion of cognitive processing, especially
in terms of

tical mantle

functional representation, appears to occur at the cor(Luria, 1966, 1973).

That is not to say that other

areas of the brain are not involved with functional
for example, the cerebellum (Szentagothai

&

representation,

Arbib, 1975).

The cerebral cortex, as it appears, possesses the orderly

cellular organization which would support the understanding of brain
function in terms of neuronal networks.

The orderly structure of

the cerebral cortex becomes obvious when contrasted to the irregular

neuronal organization found in subcortical areas, for example, par-
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ticular areas of the reticular formation
(Nauta
The thickness of the cerebral

&

Feirtag, 1979).

cortex has been considered to

consist of about six cytoarchitectonic layers
or laminae (Luria,
1966; Szentagothai

&

Arbib, 1975) with varying types of cells.

These layers appear to have

a

somewhat discrete columnar organiza-

tion, which at very small

diameters could be construed as

neuron unit (Szentagothai

&

a

basic

Arbib, 1975).

Indeed, one is reminded about the prevalent vertical
neuronal

organization found in the thickness of the neocortex

in

of the brain, consisting of about 110 cells within

column with

diameter of about 30 pm (Edelman

&

a

Mountcastle, 1978).

some areas
a

This type of

cellular arrangement has been identified in some cerebral areas,
such as the frontal

and parietal

cortices.

The basic unit of func-

tion of the neocortex in this case has been suggested to consist of

anywhere between 50 and 10,000 neurons.
The cortex appears to operate as
organ.

a

very powerful

associative

The late Luria (1966, 1973) emphasized the associative nature

of the cortex by describing the brain as consisting of hierarchical

functional

levels of association.

higher cortical

in his

functions, the basic perception of

at a primary cortical

modality.

For example,

representational area for

a

a

view of the

stimulus occurs

particular sensory

Such an information gathered by the primary cortical

region is then integrated at two succeeding association areas, not

only in terms of the sensory modality in question, but also in terms
of other functional modalities converging on the association areas
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of the cortex.

Therefore, at

the inferior parietal

a

tertiary association area, such as

lobule, cross-modal associations can be made

which allow the integration of visual, tactile,
and auditory stimuli
(Strub & Black, 1981

).

Of particular interest is the role of the frontal

the associative process.

lobes in

The frontal cortex has considerable af-

ferent and efferent connections with the association
areas of the
cortex which are prevalently reciprocal.

These neuronal pathways

convey integrated cognitive information to the frontal lobes
about
the internal

(functional) processes and the external environment

(Strub & Black, 1981).
A second extensive reciprocal

frontal

connection exists between the

lobes and the limbic system.

The extensive limbic input

arriving at the frontal cortex comes from several subcortical structures, such as, the amygdala, hypothalamus, and the limbic midbrain
area (Nauta & Feirtag, 1979; Strub
The reciprocal

&

Black, 1981).

nature of the pathways between the frontal

lobes

and the two major systems, cognitive and affective, has been consid-

ered to suggest that "the frontal
ties of the intellectual
of both types of input"

lobe acts to modulate the activi-

and emotional

systems through the synthesis

(Strub & Black, 1981 p. 33).

The latter

synthesis will be illustrated in the following chapter in terms of
what may be called

a

functional metaphor

.

The magnitude of the associative power of the brain can be

visualized, not without difficulty, if one considers that each of
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the estimated 100 billion cells
in the central

nervous system has

thousands of synaptic contacts with neurons
impinging on
&

it

(Nauta

Feirtag, 1979).

Obviously, such
would support

a

a

global

staggering associative cerebral engagement
functional

view of cognitive processes.

of the ways of conceptualizing such

a

One

view is through the observa-

tion of the functional activation of the
brain during the perfor-

mance of cognitive tasks.

Functional

activation

As

.

indicated in the previous chapter, the

functional activation of the brain can be ascertained
to some extent
by means of electroencephalograph^ recordings

1977).

In

(Thatcher

&

John,

the latter case, differing dispersion patterns of elec-

troencephalograph^ recordings have been obtained during the performance of cognitive tasks.
A more recent development has been the preliminary work on

a

method to discriminate between different areas of the brain by measuring the respective magnetic fields during the performance of cog-

nitive tasks (Kaufman

&

Williamson, 1980).

Such

a

method may also

reportedly detect the differences in response latencies to certain
visual

stimuli between two different populations of cells in fairly

close proximity.
A more colorful

and graphical method to measure functional

activation, which conforms to the topography of the neocortex,

is

the evaluation of metabolic activity at the cortex with the aid of
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radioisotopes.

For example, administering

a

radioactive nutrient

and measuring the cortical metabolic
diligence during the perfor-

mance of different cognitive tasks (Lassen,
Ingvar

&

Skinh0j,

1978).
In

the preceding example,

the radioactivity emitted by the

labelled nutrient was measured for each cerebral
hemisphere.

radiation was dispersed with

a

collimator in

The

manner which divided

a

each hemisphere into many small portions of cortex.

In

the resul-

ting composite depiction of the measurements, the cortex
appeared
to be composed of continuous small

squares of

a

particular color

depending on the level of metabolic activity.

Consistent with the preceding, it appears obvious that depending
on the context of ongoing experience certain areas of the cortex

would display considerably more metabolic activity than others at
any given time.

For example, the measurement of emitted radiation

during reading aloud has reflected an increase in metabolic activity
in the occipital,

(Lassen, et
is

al

.

,

Broca's, Wernicke's, and supplementary motor areas
1978).

A particular observation with this method

that during the performance of all

the cognitive tasks some in-

crease in metabolic activity was always observed in the supplementary motor cortex, that is, the frontal

lobe.

Another observation which can be made with the latter method
is

that, akin to the view of

a

synthesized functional representation

of ongoing experience proposed by this dissertation, varying low

levels of activity can be detected in areas other than those
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intensely involved with

particular cognitive task.

a

The clever method to measure cortical
activity described above,

may be considered to demonstrate the
global functional characteristics of brain function.

intensely involved with

That is, while some cortical areas may
be
a

particular task, other areas of the cortex

appear to contribute in limited varying
degrees to the overall function of the brain during the performance of
such given task.

A

particularly animated state of global activation of
virtually the
entire cortex may be observed with this method when

intensely or emotionally in

a

task (Lassen et

al

.

,

a

subject engages

1978).

The Accessory Imaging System

As postulated in the previous chapter,

system

is

the accessory imaging

conceived as an internal mechanism possessing the asso-

ciative properties of

a

higher-order cognitive matrix.

The cogni-

tive material represented by such an accessory imaging system may
at any given moment constitute input to the highest-order cognitive

matrix.

It can also be the

object of representation by the highest-

order cognitive matrix, as if within the focus of perceptual awareness

.

Such an imaging mechanism, ascribed with higher-order associ-

ative power, could serve to hold mental patterns or to integrate

information being recalled.
Clearly, such volitional cognitive functions could best be

modulated by the influence of the frontal cortical area.
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In

support of the preceding, an imagined
kind of speech, such

as, counting repeatedly from one to
twenty in one's head, activates

the frontal

(Lassen et

regions, particularly the supplementary motor
area
al
.

,

1978).

While there is some noticeable activity in

other areas of the cortex, including those
involved with regular
speech, in the above case such an activity is
insignificant when

compared to that of the frontal cortex.
Such findings lend support to the notion of pure mental
events

being primarily modulated by the frontal cortex.

Similarly, they

would support the notion of the highest-order cognitive matrix
being
also under the predominant influence of the frontal areas of
the
brain.

The latter appears especially congruent with the findings

of the pervasive measurable activity at the frontal

region of the

cortex during the performance of cognitive tasks, and its consider-

able activation during other periods (Lassen et
It

al

.

,

1978).

should be noted that the person's capacity for parallel

consideration of perceived, or recalled materials during active
thinking may be
system.

a

predominant function of the accessory imaging

Clearly such

a

system could not possess the cognitive

efficiency it displays without the metaphorical properties ascribed
to the already proposed higher-order cognitive matrices.

A particular example of the associative power of such an imaging

system is obvious in the capacity of blind people to integrate
sensory information into the mental

image of an object and be able

to draw a reasonable facsimile of the object

in

some cases (Greenberg,
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1978).

Functional Analog of Ongoing
Experience
The predominantly cognitive view
of ongoing experience suggested

here follows from the observations
made in the preceding sections

about the necessarily integrated functional
quality of human conduct.

Nevertheless, such

a

tional by biological

cognitive view of ongoing experience

func-

definition.

Not too long ago,
(i.e., consciousness)

is

it
is

was suggested that ongoing experience

derived from the functional properties of

presumably discoverable higher-level cerebral
processes which simul-

taneously exert influence on the lower-order processes
which produce
them.

That is, ongoing experience seen as the complex
interaction

of highly organized brain processes (Sperry, 1976).
as discussed

in

More recently,

the preceding section, the integrated functional

activity during different tasks has been elegantly demonstrated
using radioactive labelling (Lassen et

al

.

,

1978; Sokolof, 1977).

Perhaps some of the best evidence for the cognitive properties
of ongoing experience is provided by the results of electrical

stimulation of the cerebral cortex during neurosurgery (Penfield,
1975).

In

the latter case,

it was

found that electrical stimula-

tion of certain areas of the cortex produced visual and auditory

imagery of previous circumstances, as if watching
being aware at the same time of the present.
are noteworthy in the latter situation:

(a)

a

scene, while

At least two things

the subject was aware

.
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that the memories were just that and
did not confuse them with the
then present circumstances, and

(b)

the stimulation of

a

group of

cortical cells produced coherently
organized visual and auditory
images
Both of the preceding observations
appear to be in substantial

agreement with the notion of
ence at the cortex.

a

cognitive representation of experi-

It is evident that in the experiment
described

above the electrical stimulation would have
had to affect directly
or indirectly many brain cells, necessarily

a

vast network, in order

to produce such a complex cognitive output.
In

accordance with the proposed model, it should be
emphasized

that meaning, objective or subjective, appears to be
directly re-

lated to the synthesized functional
event.

representation of an experiential

Thus, despite the fact that in the surgical case above, the

inhibition of the language mechanisms by electrical stimulation
hampered the proper identification of

a

picture of

a

butterfly, the

subject later reported to the neurosurgeon not having been able to
get the words, but being able to think in terms of an approximation
to the meaning of the object,

such as the word moth.

That is, the

subject could sense the objective meaning, but could not express

it

and sought for an acceptable approximation to it.

Although the site of stimulation in the latter case included
the speech area in the left cerebral

hemisphere, it nevertheless

appears that the processing of the global aspects of

a

stimulus is

not obviously lateral ized to one hemisphere, but rather may be

a
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reasonably bilateral function (Martin,
1979).
It

should be noted that the reference to
cognitive represen-

tation made here includes all sensory
modalities.
The sensory cortex may not be easily
perceived as

a

network

of systems with coherent organization when
the observation

is

made

that the cells that compose it do not seem
to be much different
from each other (Puccetti & Dykes, 1978).
that some functional

organization

sensations, just as it

is

is

However, it is obvious

necessary in order to have

obvious that sensory information

grated with and is part of cognitive representation.

is

inte-

Obversely,

people would not be able to ascribe the same meaning, verbally
or

otherwise, to

a

construct which

is

perceived through different

sensory pathways.
For example, congenitally blind persons are able to make recog-

nizable drawings of things such as tables, moving objects such as

pinwheels, and of

person (Greenberg, 1978).

a

these blind persons must have used nonvisual

It

is

obvious that

sensory mechanisms to

construct these "images" whose originals they had never seen.
A similarly

interesting situation takes place

of the phantom limb phenomena.
the cortical
as

level

In this case the

in the

case

representation at

allows for the limb to be cognitively perceived

if it would still

be there.

Thus, the functional

representation

for the limb remains sensitive to activation after there is no

longer such
stump.

a

limb under certain neurological conditions at the

This activation appears to occur as

a

result of pulses on

68

the neuronal

pathways previously connected to
the limb, which ap-

parently elicit the same representation
at the cortex as if the
limb had not been removed.

These latter phenomena appear to
support

the notion of highly associative
hierachical

processes forming

a

part of functional representation.

While on the subject, the frequency of
phantom limb sensations
has been found to be higher in the
dominant limb (Almagor, Jaffe
&

Lomranz, 1978).

According to our model, the latter dominant
limb

effect may be associated with

a

more intense associative processing

in the language-dominant cerebral

hemisphere.

cognitive processing would result

in a

Such

a

fine-grain

more enduring cognitive

integration of sensory information in the language-dominant
hemisphere.
A somewhat unfortunate and aberrant example of

a

deficit in the

capacity for an adequate integration of different functional
aspects
of ongoing experience is provided by the study of an individual

with

a

tremendous capacity for remembering (Luria, 1968).

The man

in question could remember things perfectly even twelve years

later,

and could lower the temperature of one arm while raising that of
the opposite arm by just using his imagination.

This man associated

his perfect memory to the fact that his senses were all
at the same time.

vividly active

That is, he smelled, saw, tasted, felt, and heard

everything at the same, but could not integrate everything into

a

synthesized whole.
The material being discussed appears to be illustrative of the
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manner in which ongoing experience
a

global

fashion.

functionally integrated

is

That is, each functional

tribute to ongoing experience, not as

a

in

aspect appears to con-

separate mechanism usually

detectable through empirical means, but
as part of the synthesized
whole.
The significance of the integrated view
of human functioning

being portrayed here should not be underestimated.

The view of

human functioning expressed in the present
work indicates that

resynthesis of the person's global functional
representation of an

experience may be caused by the ongoing incorporation
of new experience on that experience previously assimilated by
the individual.
This historic resynthesis appears to be able to occur
in context

with the ongoing experience and the affect linked to it.

The pre-

ceding implies that everything, and anything, may influence the manner in which an individual will

interpret or act the meaning of an

event or experience, from birth, or even before, to death.

although the latter statement may be

a

formal

However,

truth, the statement

needs modification in terms of what the field of psychology, and
for that matter what most people have observed in that respect.
It

is

a

well

known fact that the number of elements of any

event or experience which the person may visually attend to are

related to his capacity for purposeful perceptual focusing (Neisser,
1976).
a

That is, one cannot attend separately to every element of

visual experience at the same time, but may focus on

number of such elements as

a

a

very small

result of the limitations of the visual

.
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apparatus.

However, such limitations do
not mean that those

el e-

ments of an experience which are
not purposely focused on, for

example, those peripheral to the
fovea! region, do not become
part of the functional aspects
of the global

event or of the ongoing experience

in

a

representation of an

the form of

a

functional

anal og
In

order to interact with the environment,
including other

people, the individual cannot stop to
analyze and integrate every
detail of an experience before reacting
to it, but has to react to
the experiential event as

a

whole.

He has to react with such an

efficiency and speed as if the experience
and the reaction to such
an experience were continuous or part
of each other, that is, as

if

they were analogs.
Thus, the individual's observable behavior in
context with
an experience must actually be

a

functional

representation of that experience.

In

aspect of the global

other words, it appears that

both the actual experiential event and the behavior related
to that

event share the same functional representation.
This may be the reason why the individual

behaves in

a

global

way towards an event, as if he could focus on all the elements of
an experience at the same time on an ongoing basis, and automati-

cally produce

a

response.

Since the global functional representation

of any one experience within two finite points in time seems equi-

valent to its meaning (objective or subjective) for the individual,
it appears

reasonable to suggest that behavior

in any form

(e.g.,
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speech) is an expression of meaning,
thus, metaphorical.
As a result of the sharing of
the global

functional

represen-

tation of ongoing experience by
both the experiential event and
the behavior of the individual,
the latter considered merely an
out-

come of behavior-mediating processes,
it becomes clear that there
is

a

continuum between the physical world and
the metaphorical one

through the processes that mediate
behavior.

That is, the meaning

of experience, experience itself, and
the physical world are func-

tionally intertwined with each other.
The functional

representation of an experiential event

is

unequivocally inseparable from the biological
processes which produce
it,

and the biological

processes which produce the functional repre-

sentation are inseparable from the experiential event.

For example,

spoken language is inseparable from the biological
processes, which

produce it (Needham, 1978).

In

the same manner, the biological

processes which produce language are inseparable from either
the
functional representation of language in the ongoing experience
or the physical world.

conveyed, and such

a

One speaks according to the meaning being

speech reaches

a

tympanic membrane by means

of molecular vibrations which in turn activate the biological pro-

cesses or functional aspects associated with experience in another

organism in terms of that same meaning being conveyed.

The same

situation occurs with vision, but by means of the action of photons,
that is,

a

physical contact between an individual

envi ronment.

and the general
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It

is

possible that the inseparability of
language from the

synthesized functional representation of
ongoing experience in the
human organism has been the reason why
ongoing experience (i.e.,

consciousness) has been considered to be built
up with
or lexical

a

vocabulary

field whose terms are all metaphors or
analogs of beha-

vior in the physical world, and only as
new as 1,500 years old
(Jaynes, 1976).
It

is

obvious that the latter definition of ongoing
experience

may be considered

questionable

on the grounds that it assumes the

totality of meaning to be based on only
aspect, as

a

part of

a

major functional

language of the behavior-mediating processes which

is

express ongoing experience.
of the functional

It also

lacks the comprehensiveness

global ity which is actually observed in humans.

Moreover, communicational abilities in global aphasics, with

a

normal

right hemisphere, demonstrate that the individual who lacks language
skills evidences
logical

a

conceptual

system with which he can handle some

tasks (Gazzaniga, 1972).

However, language, due to its

functional flexibility, may be the best medium for the expression
of meaning.

Its

importance as the means to obtain the most accurate

approximation to what the global functional representation of an
experiential event could be, cannot be overestimated.
The nature of language is such, that the group of mechanisms

which maintain it forms an essential part of the cognitive aspect
of meaning.

It

an experiential

is with language that the global

event for one individual

representation of

becomes alive for another
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individual.

It

is

also where meaning may be
observed to be both

the content of the cognitive
function of language and to be
beha-

viorally mediated by the speech
mechanisms simultaneously.
all

That is,

three seem inseparable.
For these reasons, it does
not come as

a

surprise the fact

that in all therapeutic interactions,
language plays

a

cognitive

role albeit the theoretical or
methodological differences assigned
to such a role.

However, verbal expression may only be
considered an approxi-

mation to the actual global representation
of ongoing experience.
That is, no matter how accurate

a

verbal

expression of the content

of the representation of ongoing experience
may be, it would never
be

a

perfectly accurate description of such

a

for the latter appears to be that the global

content.

The reason

representation of

ongoing experience seems to have equivalence with
meaning.
implies

a

That

cognitive complexity not verifiable through any discrete

functional aspect, such as verbally organized cognitions.
To concretize this notion of a synthesized representational

function, one may suggest the analogy of
each of the functional

a

color mixture.

aspects of an individual as

a

Imagining

color, the

addition or deletion of one color, or changing any of its characteristics, will affect the color or the characteristics of the final
mixture.

Similarly,

in

the human being there appears to be

ly coherent reciprocal

a

continous-

influence between the individual functional

74

systems of the organism and the
integrated output of those
systems.
That is, between any two given
points in time, any variation
in the
global

representation of an experience will
cause

a

relevant comple-

mentary variation in some or all
of the functional systems.

Thus,

change of the parts causes change
of the whole and vice versa.
It

seems noteworthy to mention how
the preceding appears to

have some relevance to the attempts
to favorably influence the

treatment of cancer patients with
mental
With Mental

Images," 1978).

In

imagery ("Fighting Cancer

the latter case, the immunological

defenses are apparently stimulated to
act through the cognitive
influence of mental

images.

The functional representation of ongoing
experience obviously

changes instantaneously and can only occur
as
process in constant synthesis as

experiential
It

a

a

coherent dynamic

function of constantly changing

input from one cognitive instant to another.

should be emphasized that the global representation
of ex-

perience necessarily has to be constituted by
biological processes

organized in such

a

way as to produce

of such an experience.

In

a

coherent functional analog

addition, such

a

coherent analog of ex-

perience must be able to continuously change as

a

function of ongoing

experience without loss of efficiency, that is, automatically.
Perhaps
global

a

good example which may support the existence of the

representation of an experiential event may be found

in the

naturalistic brain-lesion experiments of the visual agnosias.

In

the case of the rare syndrome of visual

&

object agnosia (Hecaen
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Albert, 1978), the subject may
see an object which is shown
to him,
but cannot appreciate its
character or meaning.
The latter is observed albeit the contention that
visual sensory defects, aphasia,
and general

subject.

intellectual

impairment may be evidently absent
in the

However, the subject may possess
object-related abilities

which have been suggested (He'caen

&

Albert, 1978) to enable the

subject to

describe the shape, outline and interior
parts of the object
without being able to name it or describe
its usage verbally
or by gesture.
If the object has a characteristic
sound and
the subject hears the sound, or if
the subject is allowed to
palpate the object, or if the object has a
characteristic odor that that the subject smells, he can
immediately name it
It

J

195)

(p.

is

also possible that the latter subject may
deduce the

meaning of the object presented by adding the pieces
he
identify.
ful

is

able to

He may also use one particular detail which
may be meaning-

enough to allow the identification of the object as

as the identification of a boat by

a

whole, such

its mast.

A similar situation in which one aspect of functioning
is absent,

but in which apparently the global

representation of an experiential

event appears virtually intact when other functional aspects are

challenged, it is probably the condition known as either pure word
deafness or auditory verbal agnosia (Shoumaker, Ajax
1977).

In this case,

there is

a

&

Schenkenberg,

selective inability to understand

spoken words in the absence of aphasia or hearing loss.
sounds are recognized and reacted to and there

is

no

Nonverbal

loss of spon-

taneous speech, writing, or understanding printed words.
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These examples appear to make
clear the connection between

objective meaning and the individual
functional aspects.

They also

demonstrate that all the functional
aspects involved with the global
functional representation of an
experiential event or object are
associated with each other.

In

addition, they show that in the

absence or impairment of one of the
functional aspects, the objective

meaning or global cognitive representation
in question

is

not lost.

Finally, the ability of an individual
suffering from any of the above
two mentioned conditions to ascribe
meaning through other sensory

or sensorimotor modalities supports
the notion of the cognitive

nature of the functional representation
of an experiential event.
The integration of functional

aspects into

a

global

represen-

tation with the metaphorical properties of
objective meaning may be

depicted by the task of learning

a

musical

instrument.

For example, mastering an instrument like the
piano from scratch

would take much longer than mastering the swinging of

a

wooden stick.

The amount of integration of elements in the latter is
not as great
as

in the former.

That is, learning to play the piano requires the mastering of

motor movements which have to be painstakingly integrated at the same
time with cognitive elements such as the types of musical notes,

their values, their relationship to each other, and so forth.

Like-

wise, everything else would have to be gradually integrated with sen-

sorimotor elements such as the feel of the keys, the precision of
the hands, the sound of each note, the differences in pitch, and so
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forth.

Thus, the skilled production
of

a

musical piece is the out-

come of the integration of
many active functional aspects
of the
individual into one ongoing
synthesized representational function,

expressed in this case by

a

set of behaviors.

The cumulative quality of
such an integration is probably
seen
in the

commensurability of the level of complexity
of the music

Played with the skills of the pianist
at different epochs of his

development as
Piece

is

a

global

a

musician.

That the skilled production of

ongoing function

is

a

musical

evident in the instantaneous

manner in which all the functional
elements come together to make
musical sense out of

a

series of symbols and letters.

Stability of Cognitive Representation

has been observed here that objective
meaning appears to be

It

equivalent to the global cognitive representation
of any experiential

event and that is

Such

a

is

constituted by major functional processes.

cognitive representation appears to have longitudinal
stabil-

ity to some extent.
For example, personal

never worn

a

experience may show that

a

man who has

beard before may realize that others notice the beard

while it was being grown or after.
off after

a

However, if the beard

is

shaved

very short time, the incidence of acquaintances, and

even of close relationships noticing the absence of the beard may

actually be lower than those noticing the beard initially.
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This example suggests that
the global

event or object, in this case

perception of

familiar face,

a

is

a

known

fairly stable

and resistant to change even
under conditions where

a

part of the

cognitive representation of that
object or event must be functi onally slightly different than
the original representation
learned.
The following empirical example
may make these notions

little

a

more clear.
A psychological

experiment conducted for purposes other
than

those considered here (Bruner

&

Postman, 1949, cited in Kuhn, 1970),

had the subjects identify a series
of playing cards using short and

controlled exposure techniques.

The group of cards contained many

regular or normal cards, and some cards
which had been made anomalous in terms of the shape and color of
their figures

(e.g.,

a

red

six of spades).
A single card was displayed to a single
subject in

a

series

of gradually increasing exposures at each
experimental run, with
recall

after each exposure.

Each run was terminated when two suc-

cessive correct identifications were made of each card.

Most of the

normal cards were identified correctly by most of the subjects
either
at the shortest exposure or after

a

small

increase in exposure time.

However, the anomalous cards were almost always identified as normal

without any indications of having noticed their incongruous properties.

Further increases in exposure time produced reports of undif-

ferentiated anomalies and confusion until the correct identification
of two or three anomalous cards would be produced by most of the
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subjects.

The subjects who were able
finally to identify correctly

the anomalous cards would
not have further difficulties
identifying
the rest of such cards.
It

is

noteworthy that even at forty
times the mean exposure at

which normal cards would be
recognized for what they were, more
than
10% of the anomalous cards were not
correctly identified.

The latter

was related to the expressions
by the subjects denoti
ng personal distress at their inability to identify
the incongruous cards.
it appears as

if most subjects already had

of the normal

cards as

a

a

Thus,

cognitive representation

function of previous experience and
were

able to perceive the anomalous cards
in those terms, at least until
the exposure was long enough to
allow the integration of

a

cognitive

representation of the already mentioned
anomalous cards.
Not it seems that in the case of

a

new perceptual

closely resembles other previous experiential

input which

input, there is

a

ten-

dency to recognize that new input as the one
previously experienced

when the perceptual details of the new input are
not completely
available.

However,

a

detained experiencing of the new input, during

which the characteristics of the latter may be analyzed
and incorporated, will allow the recognition of such

experience and its

proper

Incidentally, such

a

a

new input as

a

new

identification thereafter.

durability of well

learned cognitive repre-

sentations appears to support the stochastic process of integration
of synaptic matrices during learning which was discussed in the previous chapter.
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Although intended for other
purposes, the preceding study
usi nil
anomalous cards clearly illustrates
the relative stability of
the
cognitive representation of an
experiential event in terms of its
objective meaning.
There

is

no dearth of empirical
examples

in the psychological

literature whose results may be
viewed as illustrating these
notions
of stability in the cognitive
representation of an experiential
event.

According to the model of human behavior
pursued by this dissertation, it appears that the
phenomenologi cal manifestations of cog-

nitive representation considered
above are in theoretical agreement

with the principles for neuronal
network integration postulated in
the preceding chapter.
To summarize, the view presented in
this chapter postulates that

there is

a

sort of physical continuum between the
environment and

the cognitive representation of such
an environment in the brain.

The physical continuum in question appears
to make use of the functional

processess which mediate behavior, such as speech,
motor func-

tion, and so forth.

These behavior-mediating processes which appear

to serve the behavioral

expression of the cognitive representation

of ongoing experience, are functionally tied to such

a

cognitive

representation.
Since behavior appears to be metaphorical, the cognitive repre-

sentation of ongoing experience

is

fittingly envisaged as

a

synthe-

sized functional analog of such an ongoing experience and possessing
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metaphorical properties.
As

indicated earlier, the segregation
of the basic functional

elements of the model depicted by
Figure

2

represents an artificial

separation of otherwise functionally
inseparable factors.

As that

figure indicates, the stochastic
cognitive representation of ongoing

experience alluded to throughout this
work is functionally influenced
by an affective complement or
core affect linked to it.

The relative omission in this
chapter of such an affective

influence on the cognitive matrices has
been intentional.
The purpose behind such an omission
has been to describe human

behavior as primarily the manifestation of the
integrated cognitive

representation of ongoing experience, independently
of the affect
linked to it.
Indeed, such an affective influence constitutes
an important

functional factor in the metaphorical properties
of the representation of ongoing experience.

The discussion of how core affect effects

the cognitive representation of ongoing experience
is the task of the

ensuing chapter.

C H A P T

E

R

III

INTEGRATION OF AFFECT AND COGNITION
From the preceding chapters
it may be observed that the
cyto-

architecture of the cortex may appear
deceptively simple when compared with the complex cognitive
functions which may be ascribed
to it.

The complexity of such functions
is obvious in the difficulty

which

encountered in attempts to describe the
cognitive repre-

is

sentation of ongoing experience.

Particularly difficult, as it could be observed
in the previous
chapters, is the description of the cognitive
analog of ongoing

experience in readily understandable terms.
As

it was observed previously,

the global

tation of ongoing experience proposed here is
That is, there is
tional

an

analogical

cognitive represena

functional analog.

correspondence between the func-

systems of the organism and the environment.

Thus,

the cognitive representation of ongoing experience
and

the experiential

qualities.
tinuum.

event being represented share the same dimensional

And as mentioned earlier they also share

For example,

human or mechanical

a

physical con-

sounds could not be heard

if a space of vacuum existed between the source of the sound and

the listener.
As

a

result of these representational factors the visual per82
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ception of one's environment
appears to be

mirror image.

However,

be that as

1t

may

,

a

sort of

,„

commentary

sensQry

are integrated in a manner
which enables the individual
to perceive
the dimensions of the
environment through any one
of such sensory

modalities.

An example

of this is the ability of
the congenitally

blind person to draw objects
never seen.
To facilitate the discussion
in this chapter, it will
be assumed
that the ultimate integration
of the higher-order cognitive

matrices

is

synonymous with

a

functional mirror image of the
environment.

That is, viewing the global
cognitive representation of the
environment as a sort of functional
reflection.
In this case,

the brain, especially the
neocortex,

as a cognitive generator.
a

is

conceived

That is, it is considered to
function as

sort of cognitive machine.

However, while the representational
function is
log,

a

cognitive ana-

its interpretation by the brain by
means of the latter's asso-

ciative capacity may be different from one
period to another depending
on the level of affective influence linked
to the cognitive represen-

tation

.

The affective influence in question,
as may be derived from the

material covered so far, is the affective
complement to the cognitive

representation or core affect.
In

other words, the concrete, objective meaning of
the experi-

ence produced by the analog cognitive representation
acquires

subjective dimension.

Thus, the experiential event has

a

a

subjective

.

meaning in addition to what
it means objectively
or concretely.
This affective influence
on the cognitive processes
has been

considered for about four decades
to emanate from the
structures
which comprise the limbic
system in the brain.
As

it appears, a brief
exposition of the limbic structures

and of some of their pertinent
connections may establish

neural

a

substrate for core affect and
facilitate its visualization.
The Limbic Influence:

Core Affect

The structures of the limbic
system form

a

somewhat undefined

ring around the perimeter of the
inner aspect of the cerebral hemi

pheres
Some of these structures are, the
hypothalamus, the amygdala,
the hippocampal

gyrus.

formation, the hippocampal gyrus and the
cingulate

Also the dorsomedial and anterior nuclei
of the thalamus,

the septal

nuclei

in the posteromedial

frontal

lobe, the limbic

midbrain area, and probably portions of the orbital
and medial cor
tex of the frontal

lobe.

Of these structures the hypothalamus

is

considered the central point of the major part of limbic
activity
(Strub & Black, 1981

).

The structures of the limbic system operate in reciprocal

association with each other and with other structures.

In

general

terms, the function of these structures has been considered to be

responsible for innate drives, memory, and emotional behavior.
Strub and Black (1981) enumerate several

important reciprocal
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neural connections between the
limbic structures themselves
and

other areas of the brain.

Some of these neural pathways are
gra-

phically depicted by Figure

3

in material

ahead which considers

neurotransmitter activity.
One of the major reciprocal neural
pathways between the limbic

structures themselves and other cerebral
portions

is

the fornix,

which travels from the hippocampus to
the mamillary bodies of the
hypothalamus and the septal nuclei of the
frontal lobe.
A second major pathway is the group
of fibers going from the

mamillary bodies to the anterior nucleus of
the thalamus, and from
there to the cingulate gyrus.
A third major neural

pathway, the stria terminals, runs from

the amygdala to the ventromedial

The fibers of

a

hypothalamus and the septal region.

fourth major pathway, the medial

forebrain

bundle, emerge from the inferior frontal cortex and septal
nuclei
and go to the limbic midbrain area after connecting
with the lateral

hypothalamus.
There are many connections between the structures of the limbic

system themselves and other brain areas in addition to the four main
fiber pathways enumerated above.
The amygdala has fiber connections directly with the hypothalamus

,

wi th the

orbitofrontal cortex, and with the habenula and septum

Also there are interconnections between the limbic midbrain area
and the brain stem reticular formation.

Of particular importance to certain aspects of the model of
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human behavior being proposed are
the ascending activating and in-

hibiting reticular systems.
These systems appear to determine the
level of alertness of
person as

a

a

function of the dynamic balance between
the two of them

(Strub & Black, 1981).
In arousal,

some of the fibers originating from the
pons reach

thalamic nuclei with extensive interconnections,
especially the

anterior thalamic nuclei which sends afferent
fibers to the cortex.
Limbic system structures, such as the
hypothalamus and septal
nuclei, receive

a

great number of ascending fibers from the mesen-

cephalic reticular formation.
The ascending inhibiting system, which works in
counterbalance

with its activating opposite, when stimulated produces
in arousal

a

decrease

which depending on the level of stimulation could lead

to a state of sleep.

The ascending activating system, on the other hand, may
induce

states of hyperalertness and overactivity similar to those which
can be observed during periods of anxiety.

Apparently, this acti-

vating system may participate in the general state of arousal defined
as anxiety,

particularly during the waking hours.

A probable mechanism for the latter is that anxious arousal

could stimulate the activity of the ascending activating system
or block the ascending inhibiting system.

In

addition, it

is

pos-

sible to postulate that anxiety resulting from an abnormal elevation
in core affect could override the counterbalanced activity of these

87

systems beyond

a

particular threshold of the
anxious arousal.

threshold of anxiety may be
violently evident when one
from a nightmare by intense
manifestations of anxiety.

Such

a

At any rate,

awakened

it appears that the
balance between the ascending

activating and inhibiting systems
maintains
cortical tone at all times.

a

even during sleep there is
it appears

particular level of

The cortical tone would be
higher during

periods of alertness and lower
during sleep.

Yet,

is

a

minimal

level

The latter means that

of activation in the brain

that during sleep the activation
of the brain is

not quite enough to maintain

a

coherent associative process.

There-

fore, the cognitive matrices during
sleep would be somewhat disor-

ganized and the associative process
could be idiosyncratic or aberrant.

The latter would produce the deficient
version of the ordinary

global

function of the cognitive matrices

commonly known as dream-

ing.

The manifestations of the functional effects
of anxious arousal

during dreaming may be seen in the increased
sharpness of thinking

during sleep which allows some cognitive
consolidation of the experience for recall after awakening.

Such an enhanced sharpness in

cognitive representation would obviously result from the
increased
synaptic interaction of the neuronal networks involved.
tional

The func-

effects of anxious arousal during sleep also may be seen in

the vividness and sharpness of the dream.

Obviously, in the latter

instances the ascending inhibiting system would be maintaining some
control

on the level of cortical

arousal despite the presence of some
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anxiety during sleep.
Since
will

be

a

dream is just

a

poor version of ordinary
thinking it

influenced by the intensity of
core affect.

content of

a

dream may reflect an emotional

Therefore, the

state between an anti-

cipation of harm and an anticipation
of nurturance depending
on the
prevalent intensity of core affect.
As illustrated by Figure
3 (Betz, 1979) on the following
page,

the level of cortical activation
appears to be mediated mainly by
the neurotransmitters norepinephrine
(NE) and serotonin (5-HT).

Norepinephrine, originating from the
locus ceruleus

in the

pons and the medial reticular
formation, is transmitted to the

structures in the limbic region and
to the neocortex.

Serotonin is considered to dampen large
inputs and magnify
small

inputs, thus allowing

a

variability in the system.

arises from the pontine raphe nuclei
and

is

Serotonin

transmitted to the hypo-

thalamus, the basal ganglia and the neocortex.
A particular neurotransmitter
associated with limbic activation
is

dopamine (DA).

indicated by Betz on the same illustration

As

ahead, dopamine arises from both the pars compacta
and substantia

nigra in the tegmentum.

The dopamine arising from the substantia

nigra is transmitted to the basal

ganglia complex and it is asso-

ciated with complex body functions, such as, postural
changes and
drinking.
The dopamine emerging from the pars compacta is transmitted
to
the nucleus accumbens

,

which is presumably the portal of entry for

89

NEOCORTEX

-'-T

'Olfactory
tubercle

u
Hippocampus
•

Af

LIMBIC SYSTEM

\

I

jy9

dala_
|

_|

i
I

HYPOTHALAMUS

(NE)
J

I

MIDBRAIN

to

body muscle

ARCHICORTEX

CORD

Figure 3.
Schema of major brain regions, structures and pathways.
(NE= norepinephrine, DA= dopamine, 5-HT= serotonin, MFB= medial
forebrain bundle, Ach= acetylcholine, S.T. = stria terminalis,
GABA= gamma-ami nobutyric acid)
Note
From "Some Neurophysiology
Aspects of Individual Behavior" by B. J. Betz, The American Journal
of Psychiatry 1979, 136, 1251-1256.
Copyright 1979 by the American Psychiatric Association.
Reprinted by permission.
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dopamine into the limbic system.
In both

instances the transport of
dopamine is modulated by

the inhibitory feedback
activity of gamma-ami nobutyri
As

acid (GABA).

c

it appears, failure in the
controlled modulation of dopamine

entry into the limbic system may
create
The latter could result in

a

disorganized limbic system.

a

state of excessive arousal linked
with

unrefrained hypothalamic activity
associated with defensive behaviors
against harm.

apparent connection with the latter,
Betz suggests

In

that it is possible to assume that
an excessive amount of dopamine
in target systems,

such as the basal ganglia and limbic
system,

disrupts their functioning in

a

manner which induces the manifes-

tations of the behavioral complex she
describes as schizophrenic

phenomena
In general

terms, fleeing and fighting behavioral

controlled by the amygdala and the hippocampus
(Strub

reactions are
&

Black, 1981).

The amygdala in this case transmits signals to
the hypothalamus to

either inhibit or release
against any danger.
at

defensive

Evidently,

the limbic and cortical

a

responses to protect the organism

general

state of arousal occurs

levels during any period of defensive

activity by the organism.
The following quotation describes

a

postulated sequence of

activity in the limbic system while encountering and emotionally
laden situation.

of the smashing of

The particular situation being considered is that
a

parked automobile by

a

moving vehicle while

the owner of the parked car is watching (Strub

&

Black, 1981,
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The view of the limbic influence on
the cognitive representation

of experience postulated by this
dissertation differs

a

bit from the

foregoing description.
In the model

being proposed,

a

threatening event such as the

one described above would similarly have an
objective analog repre-

sentation in the higher-order cognitive matrices.

The aversive

elements of such an event would also be vastly associated
with
previous similar knowledge which is symbolic of danger
to the particular individual.

Assuming that the analog cognitive representation of the event
could be fractioned into

a

element would carry with it

large number of elements, each cognitive
a

particular level of symbolic danger.

Such an allegorical threat would be proportional to the degree of
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danger perceived during
the current event.
Assume that there is

a

constant low-level signal
potential

of danger to the limbic
system from the cortex in
reaction to the
most minimal environmental
demands from the organism.
As such, all
the elements of the current
experience possessing any degree
of
symbolic threat would elicit
an increase in such a
danger signal
in proportion to their
representative risk.

The sum of the increases in
the danger signal or the
strongest
minacious potential associated
with any cognitive element would

elicit the elevation in the limbic
"sensation" of danger.

Obviously, such
normal

a

sensation of danger would in turn
elicit

defensive reaction of the body with

a

a

resulting display of

defensive behaviors associated with
fleeing or fighting, that is,
as

if repelling an attack.

Under these circumstances there would
be an increase in visceral
or autonomic nervous system activity
and arousal

the central

at all

levels of

nervous system.

The characteristic level of general arousal
during this state of

affairs, that is, anxiety, may have both
physical and functional

manifestations according to its effect on the somatic
and visceral
functions and its effect on the neocortex, respectively.
The level of anxiety in this case would be proportional

to the

intensities of the danger signal and the resulting limbic
sensation
of threat.

Obvious in the situation being described

is

that the state of
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anxiety and the defensive behaviors
occur so simultaneously that
they blend into one action.
As a matter of fact,

increased arousal

is

it appears very likely
that a state of

necessary for the implementation of
the de-

fensive behaviors against possible
harm.

According to the model being proposed
the core affect resulting
from the constant low-level

input of

a

signal of danger to the limbic

system should be present ideally at
such

a

minimal range of activity

that it would elicit only very subdued
or adaptive defensive behavioral reactions.

Accordingly, such

a

constant normal range of the sensation of

threat would result in

a

tonic level of minimal general arousal

in the central

nervous system.

A mild need for safety which is out of the
awareness of the

person results from the normal
Such

a

level

of the sensation of danger.

need for safety would drive the person to display
feelings

such as empathy and love, and generally seek

a

higher level of

a

sense of competence in interacting with the environment.

Above the ideal normal range, this sensation of danger which
has been labelled in this work as core affect would elicit anxiety

and defensive reactions proportional

intensity.

to its

Therefore, in the light of these notions, anxiety and other

defensive reactions are triggered by the intensity of core affect
at any given moment when

a

phasized that anxiety

construed here as

is

threat is perceived.
a

It

should be em-

ordinary reaction to
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elevations in core affect.

Therefore, anxiety could not
be synon-

ymous with core affect at any
time.
The locus of core affect in
the limbic system appears far
from

being determined.

It

is possible that many
limbic structures par-

ticipate in the production of the
sensation of danger which characterizes the concept of core affect.
However, according to the clinical
observations during the

three-year period of this investigation,
core affect has been described as

a

visceral discomfort with pain-like
characteristics,

like a sensation of danger or imminent
organismic disintegration.

The latter observations assign to the
hypothalamus an important,
if not predominant, role in the
limbic regulation of the manifesta-

tions of core affect.

work as

a

Obviously, the limbic structures appear to

system and the sensation of danger or consternation
in

question, which appears equivalent to the popular
notion of emotional
pain, very likely could be the product of the
activity of the system

rather than of one single structure.
Indeed, there are enough reciprocal

connections between the cor-

tex and the limbic structures to account for

a

discharge symbolic

of danger to the limbic system in general.
However, such
by the frontal

a

lobes

symbolic input would appear to be best modulated
in

association with the hippocampus and to

some degree with the limbic system in general.
In

very simplistic terms, after receiving

a

danger discharge

above the ordinary low-level potential from the cortex and hippo-
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campus, the amygdala would be
the hypothalamus

a

a

primary candidate to transmit
to

signal which would lead to
the release of defen-

sive activity in proportion to
the strength of such

a

signal and the

core affect elicited within the
system.
The resulting discharge of neural,
endocrine and defensive

organismic responses may be attributed
predominantly to hypothalamic
activity.

The responses to

to the level

a

particular event would be proportional

of threat elicited by the cognitive
representation of

such an event.

Clearly, in the previous situation of the
automobile crash

a

stimulus which is symbolic of danger is
present.
However, core affect may be present in the
absence of stimuli

with obvious elements symbolic of danger,
such as in the case of
fear of an

earlier,
all

i

is

nnocuous object

.

The reason for this, as formulated

that the limbic sensation in question

is

present at

times, although desirably at very inhibited levels.

There is no question of core affect being amenable to being

described as some sort of sensation of danger.

And as it will

be

discussed later it can be construed as different feelings depending
on the context of the situation.
To elaborate further,

within

a

core affect is proposed to be ordinarily

particular range which serves as the force behind

need for safety.

a

mild

This mild need for safety, customarily is not

within the scope of awareness but serves as the drive behind motivation and the need to seek nurturance and support commensurate with

.
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its

intensity.
The constant presence of core affect
makes it necessary for the

individual to develop behavioral maneuvers
to maintain

sense of

a

safety, despite not being aware of the
sensation of danger in question nor the need for safety.

When core affect is present above its normal
range it may or
may not be perceived as such.
in the

However, its elevation is evident

increased level of arousal or anxiety and other
defensive

responses in the form of behavioral maneuvers aimed
at reducing
its

intensity.

An elevated core affect is also evident in
the ap-

prehensive cognitive interpretation of the environment
by the individual

.

Quite obviously, what is being described immediately above
is

either

a

defensive reaction to an aversive stimulus or

a

mal-

adaptive state of emotional upheaval.
The limbic sensation of danger formulated in this section may
be also construed as

a

sensation of threat or consternation, vul-

nerability and, very appropriately, emotional pain, among many other

descriptions

According to the model being proposed here, such
is

a

sensation

the core affect which underlies human behavior.

The Faces of Core Affect

Attempting to define core affect

in terms of limbic system

activity appears to present the same mammoth difficulties encoun-
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tered in attempting to define
ongoing experience in terms
of neuronai
cognitive matrices in earlier
materia,.
However, of the two concepts,
core affect appears to be more
obvious in the intercourse
between
the person and the environment.
Core affect, as described here,
has phylogenetic roots and
is

conceived as

a

universal human affect.

It

appears to be exactly

what Koestler (1967, cited in McLean,
1979) has called the "paranoid streak" inherent in the nature
of the human being.

McLean (1979) redefines the latter
as

"a

general affect charac-

terized as an unpleasant feeling of
fear attached to something that

cannot be clearly identified".

(P.

27)

McLean further emphasizes

the ability of this affect to manifest
itself in many different

ways.

The high frequency of paranoid symptoms
in psychosis is

considered by him to support such

general

a

Undoubtedly, core affect is very well
forms of fear and emotional

pain.

affect.

known to everyone in the

For centuries, poets have been

describing the unhappiness inflicted by the unfil
filled need of
the feeling of safety which

is

love.

From the evolutionary point of view, an elevated
intensity of
core affect must have been an absolute necessity for
survival during

prehistoric times.

One can only imagine the numerous and continuous

dangers facing prehistoric humans.

A constant elevation in core

affect would have been necessary then to maintain

a

continuous defen-

sive posture.

According to the view of human behavior proposed here, it was

.
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the vulnerability associated
with core affect which probably
prompted
the formation of early societal
nuclei.

The need for safety or support
prompted by core affect

is

what

ordinarily drives the individual to
seek the interaction with others.
Similarly, core affect appears to be
the cohesive force which maintains the integrity of personal

relationships, and of social and

political systems.

However, while

normal range of core affect intensity
leads

a

to adaptive fulfillment of the need
for safety, a higher than normal

intensity leads to unproductive means for
fulfilling such
In

in a

the latter case, the individual

a

need.

reacts to the environment

defensive manner, as if he were facing some sort
of danger

which is actually not present.

A major problem in this and every

other case is that the person is ordinarily not
aware of the core
affect, nor sometimes of the defensive nature of the
behavior per-

formed to diminish the intensity of such
As

is

core affect.

such, the individual may engage in avoidance, aggression,

or other behaviors associated with
In

a

general terms,

that the individual

a

'

s

defensive posture.

a

basic postulate of the model being proposed

behavior

is

virtually always aimed at main-

taining an inhibited core affect.
Of course, as depicted by Figure

function of the limbic system,

is

2

earlier, core affect, as

considered here

a

functional

element of the model
Being present at all

times, core affect performs two major

a

.
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reciprocal functions, among its
many effects.
One function is its own
activation by

bolic of danger.

In terms

a

cortical

input sym-

of the activation of core
affect, it

should be recalled from earlier
material that the cognitive element
symbolic of danger may vary according
to its nature.
That is, its

effect may vary with the severity
of the danger symbolized.

The

more severe the danger the stronger
the effect of the cognitive

element symbolic of danger and the
more intense the core affect.
Obviously, such an activation would
elicit

a

defensive reaction

proportional to the intensity of the core
affect.

It

should be

emphasized that the defensive reaction of
the organism, while directed
at the environment,

is

basically only

a

reaction to core affect.

The strength of the cognitive input to
the limbic system sym-

bolic of danger invariably would determine
the intensity of the
core affect.

However, as postulated earlier, the cognitive value

of the element, which may by high or low, would
not matter with

very strong symbolism of danger.

In

other words,

a

a

strong element

of danger within the scope of awareness, that is,
in the highest-

order cognitive matrix, would probably elicit the same
intensity of
core affect when out of active perceptual awareness.
An anecdotal example may be considered to illustrate the

concept
At about the age of seven years,

a

boy

very vicious dog under ususual circumstances.

relatives and friends decided to give

a

was bitten by
As recalled,

a

some

surprise birthday party to

.
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one of the cousins at

a

neighbor's home.

These neighbors had two

dogs with very ferocious
reputations which were supposed to
have
been locked in one of the rooms
during the party.
On the day of the party, the
seven year old boy was charged

with bringing in the cake shortly
after the party was to start.
Being as apprehensive as most boys
his age would be, he asked if
the dogs were present as he entered
carrying the cake into the

living room.

He was assured that the dogs were
locked away and

encouraged not to be afraid.
However, one of the dogs was lying under
the sofa and when the
boy was in the center of the living room,
it jumped up and dug its

fangs on the boy's left forearm.

Naturally, the boy was taken by

surprise and was very scared, but did not drop
the cake.
arm was treated, the party went on as scheduled.

After his

Be that as

it may,

it is very likely that the boy did not eat cake
that day.

Many years later the same person, now an adult,
reportedly
did not like cake because it tasted dry and too sweet.

In

addition,

he felt somewhat anxious at weddings and birthdays
for no reason

at all, and did not like parties with more than

or if they were noisy.

a

few participants

He also was afraid of dogs with certain

appearances
The point in the process of being made is that cognitive elements

from that early experience still elicited years later an intensity
in core affect equal

tial

experience.

or close to the level

associated with the ini-
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should be noted that the cognitive
element symbolic of

It

danger need only to have

a

vague connection with danger or
with

a

previous threatening experience to
elicit core affect.
It

is

derived from the above that the model
being proposed

considers the representation of ongoing
experience being metaphorically linked to any previous associated
information.

That is, due

to the extremely associative properties
of the cognitive processes,

there is

a

mation.

An example of the above is the many
associations that

constant integration of new experience with
stored infor-

concept, such as

a

ball would have.

It

is

a

clear one may spend

considerable time before running out of verbal
associations to
such an object, depending on age and experience.

That is, for

a

small child, the number of associations which could
be obtained

would be
Now,

much

smaller than for the average adult.

besides

being activated by cognitive elements symbolic

of danger, the other major reciprocal function of core affect
being

considered here

is

its

influence on the cognitive matrices repre-

senting ongoing experience.
The way the latter is construed is that once core affect is

activated it will reach the cortex in the same form that it
duced.
is

That is, as

a

sensation of danger.

is

pro-

This sensation of danger

envisaged to integrate with the cognitive matrices representing

ongoing experience.
As such then, the associative power of the cortex would auto-

matically try to adjust the cognitive matrices to the affective

.
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input.

The resulting integration
is

a

cognitive interpretation

of ongoing experience in
accordance with the intensity of
core
affect.
Such an automatic interpretation
will

be of

a

threatening

nature, that is, symbolic of danger,
even when the person is not

aware of it.

The threatening content will

in turn become a threat-

ening input to the limbic system
and elicit another increase in
core affect with the resulting
defensive body reactions and behavioral maneuvers.

The last increase in core affect will

cognitive matrices with

a

again in turn color the

shade of threat, and the cycle would repeat

itself.

The latter is what is proposed to happen
when someone feels

very threatened.

The content of his thinking will reflect an
anti-

cipation of adverse circumstances.

The negative thinking would

increase the feeling of threat, which in turn, would
intensify

negative thinking and so on in

a

reciprocal cycle.

These core affect reciprocal functions of being activated
by

symbolic danger and of influencing the cognitive matrices to

a

negative interpretation of the environment are always in operation.
The previous example of the dog bite considers elicitation

of core affect by cognitive elements symbolic of danger from earlier

experience
However, core affect clearly can be elevated to varying degrees
even when it

is

obvious that cognitive elements suggestive of danger
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are not present.
In the

latter case, the elevated sensation
of danger would

initially direct the subjective quality
of the interpretation of
the environment to a negative one.

Also the reciprocal core affect

functions between the cortex and the
limbic system would become
acti ve.
A good extreme example of the
latter case is that of

a

paranoid

psychotic state.
In the case of
is

paranoid psychosis, the intensity of core affect

chronically very high.

influence
ening.

a

Typically, the sensation of danger will

subjective interpretation of the environment

This, in turn, will

as

threat-

increase the intensity of core affect

and the reciprocal activity will continue unless
interrupted.

This reciprocal activity of core affect is what to

a

great

extent appears to maintain the continuous defensive posture in
paranoid psychosis and other states of emotional upheaval.

Without question, in paranoid psychosis the person has

jective feeling of imminent danger.
a

harmful.
will

is

that the person will

sub-

However, unless explored, such

feeling of pending harm remains out of awareness.

in this case

a

The problem

interpret the environment as

However, since the person's cognitive matrices are, as

be discussed later,

in a state of disorganization,

pretation of the environemnt
A particular clinical

young man, who worked as

a

is

the inter-

idiosyncratic.

example which comes to mind

dishwasher in

a

restaurant.

is

that of

He used to

a
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recall that every time
she was going to kill

first.

a

waitress came into the kitchen,
he believed

him.

Therefore, he felt the need to
attack

Fortunately, despite this person
not going through

a complete
course of psychotherapy he gained
enough awareness of the mechanism

for his suspiciousness to
be able to reduce the incidence
of the

paranoid thinking within
It

a

short period of time.

should be emphasized again that
the cognitive representation

of ongoing experience and the
influence of core affect on the cog-

nitive matrices are considered here
to be integrated into

a

global

function.
The analog representation of ongoing
experience has to be con-

sidered

behavior

a

global
is

function with metaphorical properties because

essentially metaphorical, according to our
earlier

definition of the term.

The functional metaphor.

The metaphorical

nature of the functional

representation of ongoing experience considered here
does not allow
for the active separation of its components.

However, it would be

heuristically convenient to divide the observed unitary
function of
ongoing experience into the following three major functional
aspects,
(a)

The cognitive aspect would comprise any and all verbal and

nonverbal

representational functions, including sensorimotor repre-

sentations and imagery,

(b)

The affective aspect would be consti-

tuted by the intensity of core affect,

(c)

The behavioral aspect

would be constituted by the mechanisms which mediate all verbal and

.
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nonverbal behavioral

activity.

Thus, in essence, this heuristic
division assigns to the cog-

nitive aspect the responsibility
for the representation of
ongoing
experi ence
The affective aspect would be
responsible for the subjective

quality of ongoing experience, while
the behavioral aspect would
be responsible for effecting the
functional

representation of ongoing

experience.
The

artificial

division of the global representation of
experi-

ence into three major functional aspects
is depicted by Figure

4

on the following page.

The illustration portrays the global

functional representation

of ongoing experience at the minimum finite
period of time during

which such
it as

a

representation could exist.

if static in time.

Such

time T has been denominated

That is, it

is

a

a

global

In

other words, it depicts

representation at finite

functional metaphor

.

the briefest period in time during which

a

par-

ticular metaphorical or global representation of ongoing experience
can exist.
The latter means that ongoing experience is composed of succes-

sive functional metaphors.

In

analogy, this process could be concep-

tualized much like the effect produced by the extremely fast projection of the successive frames of

Figure
finite time

4
T.

a

film.

depicts the functional metaphor Rs of stimulus
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The shaded area

X

represents the portion of our environment

upon which the focus of active
perceptual
is, the highest-order cognitive
matrix.

awareness is placed.
As

That

indicated earlier, it

should be recalled that active perceptual
awareness is limited by
the person's sensory range.

Areas

P

obviously represent that portion of the
environment

out of the range of the person's active
perceptual awareness.

How-

ever, as postulated earlier, such portions of
the stimul us are repre-

sented in the functional metaphor in terms of
higher-order matrices.
As

a

reminder, the representation Rs of areas

integrated functional representation.

and

P

X

is

an

Therefore, the representation

of these portions of the stimulus cannot be distinguishable
from
each other except in terms of the focus of awareness.
The functional metaphor Rs has been
into three functional

artificially

divided

aspects.

Aspect A is the stochastic cognitive representation of
is,

the integrated sum of the stochastic functional

S.

That

input of all

the cognitive elements from the stimulus S.

Functional aspect

E

corresponds to the sum. of the core affect

associated with the cognitive elements of stimulus

S.

Finally, the third functional aspect (BMP) is composed by the

behavior-mediating processes used for the expression of the functional
metaphor.

Two of these processes are speech and sensorimotor acti-

vity.

Particular efforts have been made in the illustration to empha-
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size the reciprocal

interaction or integration of the
elements of

one functional aspect with the
elements of the other through
the
synthesis of the functional metaphor.
To review, the global
is

representation of ongoing experience

considered by this model to be
essentially

a

cognitive function.

That is, any experiential event
is represented in the brain
in terms
of

functional analog or reflection.

a

Such

a

functional reflection is construed in
terms of the inte-

gration of stochastic systems of neuronal
matrices.

networks into cognitive

These cognitive matrices are considered
to occur at very

high levels of associative integration.

The latter means that they

possess metaphorical properties, such as
meaning.

Moreover, these cognitive matrices are considered
to be the

ultimate products of the integration of previous
and current experience.

However, the functional reflection of ongoing
experience receives
a

constant limbic input in the form of

affect.

a

sensation of danger or core

When any of the cognitive elements of the functional analog

of ongoing experience is symbolic of danger, there is
an increase in

the intensity of core affect which is commensurate with the degree

of symbol ic danger.
As a result,

a

defensive reaction of anxiety and defensive

behaviors are displayed through the activity of the behavior-mediating processes.
To continue,

it

is

surely difficult to conceive ongoing experi-
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ence as frozen in time.

However, with some imagination,
one may

visualize the notion of the functional
metaphor if
requiring swift defensive action

is

a

situation

considered as an example.

An example of the latter is the
quick reaction one may have
to a sudden violent noise.

very small.

It

The delay in response in this case is

seems at times that threatening auditory
stimuli

elicit core affect and defensive responses
quicker than threatening
visual

stimuli.

A similar situation which comes to mind is
that of driving on
a

two-lane highway and noticing that an automobile coming

opposite direction
In

is

in the

suddenly swerving towards our side of the road.

this example, at the precise moment the cognitive element
sym-

bolic of danger, the swerving of the car, becomes part of the
functional metaphor there is

a

virtually simultaneous increase in core

affect and almost simultaneously the release of
is

initiated.

In

a

defensive behavior

other words, the cognitive representation, the core

affect, and the defensive reaction all occur automatically.
The latter is of particular significance because it means that

thinking

is

ordinarily automatic.

That is, the associative processes

of the brain integrate information into cognitive matrices constantly
on its own.
It

appears reasonable to consider that

ly think,

but that the brain does.

a

person does not actual-

That is, the brain performs all

the associative activity necessary to produce what one may understand
as ongoing experience.

The latter becomes more real when one consi-

no

ders that ordinarily the person thinks
and behaves according to the as-

sociative output of the brain.

Such

a

situation exists, for example,

when the person uses behavioral maneuvers to
decrease core affect whi ch

entertain

a

particular cognitive interpretation of the
environment of

of oneself.
In

this case, the person does not realize that
the cognitive

interpretation in question is an automatic defensive
maneuver which
is

ordinarily out of volitional control.
An example of the above may be observed in the reasons
for

a

dislike for cake in the dog bite anecdote discussed earlier.
In

that case, the person stated not liking cake because of

ing dry and being too sweet.

cake had
As

a

i

t

tast-

However, the truth was that thenotionof

symbolic value of danger of which the person was not aware.

such, the cognitive analog of ongoing experience was injected

in that case with an elevated

intensity in core affect.

Then, by

means of its associative properties, the brain produced the necessary

cognitive formulation to validate the core affect
current experiential event.

in context

with the

The net result was that the intensity of

core affect was reduced by the avoidance of the threat symbolized by
the notion of cake.

The reasons given to avoid eating cake were cog-

nitive formulations of the concept in terms of core affect.

Theoretically, any experience, even the briefest one, consists
of more than one functional metaphor.

It

is

also postulated that

the functional metaphor changes from one instant to another.

This

change is considered to depend on the variability in the cognitive

elements and core affect, and the
feedback from the functional processes which mediate behavior.
That is, the global

any given instant is

a

external environment.

representation of ongoing experience
at

metaphorical reflection of the internal
and
As any part of the environment
changes, the

functional metaphor changes also.

As a matter of fact,

tulated that the functional metaphor

never

is

it is pos-

the same.

In

order

for it to be the same from one instant
to another, both the entire

organism and the surrounding environment would
have to be

in a state

of suspended animation.
One of the apparent reasons for

from one representational

a

different functional metaphor

instant to another is that the synthesized

representation of ongoing experience is historical.
In

other words, previous experience integrates with every new

experience, creating an ever increasing net of complex associations.
The global nature of the functional metaphor may be artificially

broken down also into two representational components.

As

illustrated

in Figure 4 above, one of these is the representation of that
portion

of the stimulus (X) which is the focus of active perceptual awareness.
The other one is the representation of that portion of the stimulus
(P)

which is not the focus of awareness.
Once again, given the brief duration of the functional metaphor

in ongoing experience,

it

is

necessary to consider

a

whole experi-

ential event in the formulation of the two representational

classified above.

functions

Obvious,,, one
representation rule ,„
both cases (f
rePreSentati
iS
°"

t

'

fUnCti °-'

of the total
penceiv-

able environment.

Another rule

is

elicited by the cognitive
elements of such

However,

H

^

connect1on with

Potion of the stimulus
ness the

_

that in both cases
a„

which are symbolic of
danger.

(X)

^

^

,„

^

a

representation

case rf

^

focused upon by active
perceptual aware-

events

symbolic of danger may
be ohvious or may
he conceptually associated
with part of the
perception.
On the other hand,
in the case of that
portion of the
(P)

*fch

is out

stilus

of the focus of active
perceptua! awareness

the

elements commonly considered
as symbolic of danger
would invaria b l
y
be out of awareness.
The y also could be
hidden within a subliminal

^nocuous element

in the for™ of

a

conceptual association.

The cases where the
elements symbolic of danger
are inherently
threatening, bo th when the
y are ohvious and then the are
out of
y
awareness, have heen considered
earlier and follow straightforward
formulations.
Therefore, the example to be
furnished further ahead
onl y aims at formulating
the case where the element
symbolic of
danger is hidden within a
harmless element either within
or outside
of active perceptual awareness.
It

should be noted that in the
case of elements inherently

symbolic of danger which are beyond
the scope of awareness, they
are postulated to become obvious
if focused upon.

An applicable
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example is the anecdotal
situation of the
tne flat
tlat tlr
H e considered earduring the discussion
of the cognitive
prices
The cognitive
matrices responsible
for „ euronal
and the mechanism
operating i„ the preceding
situation

considered before and
do not need further
elaboration

0«*mmy,

It ,s clear

*

have teen

^

mt

cogn1tjve
of danger always elicit
an elevation in core
affect.
The latter
Happens regardless of
whether they are obvious,
i„herentl y dangerous
but outside of awareness,
or hidden within a
harass element in the
form of a conceptual
association.
It

appears plain that if

a

harness cognitive element
elicits

an elevation in core
affect it is because such
an element could be

associated with

threatening experience which
originally elicited
a similar elevation
in core affect.
On the other hand, it
only may
be associated with
another harmless cognitive
element which in turn
may be associated with
an original threatening
experience.
a

The latter implies that
the association is
cognitive rather
than affective, because it
would be a cognitive element
which would
have a particular elevation
of core affect linked to it.

Therefore, even stimuli which
may only resemble or be vaguely
associated with the original
stimulus, will elicit a similar
elevation in core affect to that
elicited by the original stimulus.

However, it appears that for
the latter to occur, the core

affect elevation originally
elicited must be substantial in the
case of

a

single experiential event, and
less than substantial

in

.

the case of

a

datively

continuous threatening
situation

The following clinical
exampie iHustrates
the foregoing assump-

tions

The Person in this
case was a married
woman slightly less
than

sessions.

She

confined

of constant severe
disabling anxiety

shortness of breath, fear
of he i ghts

,

fear of

^J^

fear of falling asleep
at night, fear of riding
as a passen er in
g
a car, disrupted
family relations, constant
iHnesses reguirin
9

freguent hospitalizations,
freguent episodes of
hyperventilation,
and many other complaints.
Her history showed
deprivation in ma ny areas.

However, when
she was prepubertal, as
a punishment, her
stepfather allegedly

Placed her in

a

deep hole in the ground,
for a period she described

to have been overnight.

She recalled the incident
and found it

very distasteful to talk
about it, but could not see
any relationship between that incident
and the circumstances which
brought her
to therapy.
A particular memory of
the incident was about calling
for her

mother to rescue her and not
obtaining

a

response.

Clearly, the core affectinthis
case was very intense.
it was

found out that

a

Also

core affect elevation in this
case was eli-

cited by any stimulus which in
any way was associated with her
early
experience.

That is, even the vaguest similarity
between the stimulus

and the physical properties of

a

deep hole in the group elicited

a

.
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-ction
«

of anxiety.
height, descent,
darkness, and s0

fonh

,

also any criticism.

The most extreme
example of such distant
associations was a
severe increase in
anxiety as a result of
an almost
imperceptible
elevation of the door
leading toahall„ ay
from hen
The connection of the
stilus to hen anxiety was
discovered
by chance upon exploration
of her description of
the door as being
"up there".

hospital

Obviously, the preceding
observations are based on
many other
findings during the course
of therapy.
Nevertheless, it appears
that the lifted discussion
of the clinical vignette
suffices to
convey the intended concepts.
Vet, to one's consternation,
the clinical example
above presents
a

complicating element.

The complicating element
in this case is the

chronicity of the elevation

in core affect.

The problem here is that
with a chronic elevation of
core affect

considerably above its normal range,
there would be necessarily an
automatic and unwitting predisposition
to perceive the environment
as
threatening and to react in all
likelihood with maladaptive defensive
maneuvers
Therefore, it appears likely that
there would be an increased

sensitivity to threatening stimuli.

This way, even completely harm-

less stimuli could be perceived
as aversive, and of course, vague
cogni-

tive associations to earl ier harmful

stimuli would be more apt to bemade.
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A" 1n.port.nt point
here Is that previous,,
aversive sti rau ,i
which under normal
circumstances would not
elicit a defensive

re.-

tion, would in this
case.

The preceding may
he illustrated with
the earlier example
of
the dog 5i t e.
In that case, the
individuai
longer apprehensive
about dogs.

Nonetheless, when his oore
affect
or insecurity is
elevated, even if unaware
of such ap
core affect, his
apprehension about certain
dogs may appear again
upon contact with the
animals.

^

This implies that some of
the intensity in core
affect which
was linked to the stimulus
before could be elicited
anew due to the
Person's enhanced insecurity
in the presence of
residual threatening

cognitive elements associated
with dogs.

In this case,

with the
increased core affect the
reciprocal activity between
the cortex and
the limbic system considered
earlier is activated. That
is, the

stimulus, again perceived as
aversive, will in turn elicit
another
increase in core affect, which
in turn will further
induce construction of the stimulus as
threatening,
and so forth.

At any rate, the foregoing
consideration of the operational

aspects of the functional metaphor
raises the need for additional

discussion of the phenomenological
effects of core affect on the
global representation of ongoing
experience.

cognitive interpretation of the environment
as
intensity of core affect.

That is, what is the
a

function of the
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^liti^e__fjce_of_j^^
about the injection
of

a

S«.

Thprp
There is no mystery
at this point
•

sense of danger
ranger into th.
the cognitive matrices

by core affect.

Also, it is not surprising
that

vironment as harmful when
wnen therp
there

i«
is

a
a

a

person

„
real,

ra

ay perceive the en-

.

danger present.

After all

one sees this sort of
thing often enough.
It

is

perhaps somewhat more
difficult to conceive
the person
as being affected by
a mostly undetectable
sensation of danger and
reacting to it without even
knowing it.

Similarly unpalatable is
to contrue the associative
processes
of the brain as automatically
trying to make sense out
of such a
sensation of threat on their
own, as it was proposed
earlier.
To complicate matters,
the defensive behaviors
associated with

such a sensation are considered
here to be mostly learned
patterns
of response, to a great
extent also out of
volitional control,
and their intention to be
mostly out of the realm of
awareness.

Even though ordinarily one
is unaware of core affect,
its pre-

sence becomes evident in the
behavior of the individual.

behavior is always aimed at seeking

a

a

a

sense of comfort, safety,

control, competence, fulfillment,
and the like.

achieving

Such

These attempts at

reduction in core affect are,
proportionately, as

intense as the elevation in core
affect.
In

the course of these attempts to cope
with core affect, the

individual tends to interpret the environment
in context with the

circumstances of the moment.

Invariably, such

a

cognitive inter-
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pretation is influenced
by we
sense of vulnerability
y the spo.p
characteristic of core affect.
i

Of course, the higher
the vulnerabHity
the more extreme
the interpretation
of the
mc burrounaing
surrnimHinn aenvironment.

A clinical example
recalled where core
affect was very intense
6Xtremely a " 9ry react ''°"
•*
young woman to not
finding

'*
a

is

vacant parking space on
her way to an
appointment.
Clearly, rage is

a

defensive reaction, which
incidentally,

appears to be closely
associated with anxiety.
In the

of

latter case, the woman
construed the unavailability

space to park her automobile
as the cause of her
anger because
she was concerned about
being late for her appointment.
As it
a

happened, however, she had ample
time.
A less dramatic example is
the clinical vignette of

would react with great anger
and accuse

a

a

woman who

male acquaintance of being

discourteous because he would happen
to look at his wrist watch
and
excuse himself because he was
late for a meeting.

The same thing

happened with the therapist.
In the preceding cases,

the women in question were
suffering

from an elevated sense of
vulnerability or core affect, but were
not aware of it.

Nevertheless, they interpreted their
circumstances according
to how threatened they were,
validating the sensation of danger

with elements in the environment.
Naturally, they did not plan to react that
way.

The associa-

119

tive processes of the
brain took r^rp
*
care ,f
of *integrating
the
stances with the need to
reduce the core affect.
No question about
it,

ci

rcum-

the development of
the cluster of defen-

sive maneuvers to cope
with core affect must
be influenced by
cultural, socioeconomic,
developmental, and many other
factors.
That
is, no two persons try
to quell core affect
in exactly the
same
manner.

However, the interpretation
of the environment as

a function
of the intensity of core
affect is considered here
as universal.
This interpretation may be
associated with avoiding
acknowledgment
of core affect, actively
reacting to it, or passively
validating it.
That is, the cognitive
interpretation of the environment
may at different times constitute the
defensive maneuver or be part of
it.

The idea of people interpreting
their environment in terms of

negative affect is not new and
has been considered to be the
cause
for depression (Beck,
In the

1976).

latter case, the person is considered
to have

view of himself, to interpret
ongoing experience in
shion, and to have

a

a

a

negative

negative fa-

negative view of the future.

The activation of this combination
of cognitive factors is

considered to be the cause for the signs
and symptoms of depression
in

conjunction with an idiosyncratic way of
processing information

(Beck, Rush, Shaw

&

Emery,

1979).

However, while these cognitive patterns appear
to be considered

above as the primary step in the depressive
syndrome, their source
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is

stated as undetermined.

According to the mode,
of hlTOnbeh «
v1orbein9
cognitive patterns
constitute a passive

vacation

thrown the cognitive
interpretation of
tion of

a

of core affect

the environment as

a

func-

state of vulnerability.

A measure of core affmrt
.

since
iince core »ff^
affect+ may be construed
as an

unwitting sensation of
threat, the cognitive
interpretation of an
event could contain
events associated with a
particular ,evel of
subliminal apprehension.
Two modes in which those
cognitive elements can exist
are in
tenns of an increase or
a decrease in the
intensity of core affect.
In other words,
a

they could exist in terms
of either an aversive or

Pleasant interpretation of the
surrounding circumstances.

Since the need for safety
is considered to drive
the person
to seek nurturing interpersonal
interactions, it would be useful
to

examine core affect in terms of
the aversive or pleasant
cognitive
constructions made during such
interactions.
It is postulated that any
situation will

be construed as plea-

sant it if satisfies the need
for safety or nurturance.

That is,

if core affect is reduced.

Likewise,

a

situation will be construed as aversive
if it

increases the level of core affect or
if it does not reduce

it as

needed.
The neuropsychological mechanisms
for these core affect opera-
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tions were considered
earlier and it shall
not be elaborated upon
them at this point.
To the case in point,
it should be observed
that if

a situation
construed as either peasant
or unpleasant certain
beliefs and
expectations could be foreseen
according to the degree

II

of core affect

-tensity associated with such
by definition a subli.ina,
as an anticipation of

ha™

a

situation.

Obviously, core affect

sensation of threat, may
be identified

when it is heightened or
as an ant,cipa-

tion of safety or nurturance
when it is reduced, as the
respective
effects of two given situations.
The latter would also be
affected
by the prevalent baseline
of core affect unrelated
to the situation.

Depending on its intensity, core
affect could act as

a predisposing
factor or catalyst for the
appreciation of any situation as
either
adverse or favorable.

At any rate, when safety or
harm is anticipated it is reasonable
to expect that such an anticipation
would be based on the factors

surrounding the particular situation
in which the individual finds
himself.

As such, attributions are made
to such

a

situation in con-

nection with the anticipation of
either harm or nurturance.

One of

those attributions could be how aversive
or favorable the situation

may seem to the individual as

a

measure of either the anticipation

of harm or the anticipation of
safety.

In

other words, what are the

foreseen consequences of the situation for
the person.

Another attribution which could be made in the
preceding situation is the level of anticipation itself.

That is, the degree to

which the situation
favors tne
the reali,»t,-„
realization of* an
anticipation of
either harm or safety.
I n
still other terms,
*•
terms
th « estimated
the
chance
of the foreseen
consequences actually taking
place.
Not it seems that one
W ay to evaluate the
intensity of core

affect in

negative situation and the
decrease of such an intensity in a positive
situation, is ,„ terms 0 f
the perceived consequences fro, the situation
and the estimated
likelihood of their
actual occurrence.
a

other words, how threatening
or nurturing the situation
is
perceived as and to what extent
it is reasonable to
perceive it
In

as such.

The following preliminary
experiment illustrates the
relationship between the two preceding
notions while assessing the
elevation or reduction in core
affect.
The experiment considers events
or situations which are
based
on interpersonal

interaction.

is assumed to be at subclinical
In the ensuing experiment,

It

uses two subjects whose core
affect

intensities.
the two subjects, one 19-year-old

(Subject A) and one 21-year-old
(Subject B) female college students

were each asked to complete two
questionnaires every day for 30 consecutive days.

One of the questionnaires was to
be answered in connec-

tion with each subject's strongest
positive emotion for the day.
The second questionnaire was to be
answered in connection with each

subject's strongest negative emotion for the
day.

The questionnaires
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used were an amended
version for Subject A,
and an intact version
for Subject B of a
questionnaire previous,,
reported as a tool of
personaiity research (Epstein,
in press).
[t should be

^

clarified that the emotions
reported in the
questionnaires are those
considered primary emotions,
such as

^

^^

^

wh,cb are considered to
be defensive maneuvers
and not core affect

The format of the
questionnaires was the same in
all instances
In essence, each
subject was supposed to write
narratives describing
the situation which
elicited each of the reported
emotions and to
rate, using a 5-point
scale multiple variables
which included concurrent emotions, duration
and intensity of the
emotions reported,
and so forth.
Of all the variables, only
four were used in this

experiment and were the focus of
the experiment to the
exclusion
of all other variables.

Of these four variables, one
that was rated by both subjects
was the oMecliyJt^ of the
interpretation of the subjective
stimulus

eliciting reported emotions.

That is, how reasonable their
reactions

were in relation to the stimulus
from completely subjective (coded
as

1)

to completely objective (coded
as 5).

For Subject A, one of two other
variables considered was the

rating of the effect of foreseen
consequences as

a

result of the

situation to which the emotional reaction
was directed, from no consequences at all

(coded as

1

)

to either extremely favorable or ex-

tremely adverse consequences (coded as
5), depending on which ques-

tionnaire was being completed according to the
type of emotion being
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reported.
The other variable
considered for Subject
A was the rating of
the probability, of
those foreseen
consciences actua, ly occurring

should be noted that
whatever the consequences
foreseen were, the,

affected the subject's rating
of the

s*.

That is, besides probab,
y

being an invasion of
privacy.
For Subject B,

in

addition to the rating of
the objectivity

variable mentioned above,
the
the emotional

si^icance

of the situation eliciting

reaction reported constituted

rated from trivial

(coded as

1)

a

variable and was to be

to very important

(coded as 5).

The

rating of the significance
of the situation eliciting
the emotion
reported was worded in the
instrument as the degree to which
the
outcome of the situation would
have important implications
for the

subject's future happiness or
well-being.

In the

latter context,

the rating of significance was
considered to be approximately equi-

valent to the rating of the effect
of foreseen consequences with
the

probability of their occurrence, but

in a

less objective manner.

For

this reason, the rating of
significance was used with one subject

(Subject B), and the rating of the effect
of foreseen consequences
and the probability of their actual
occurrence were used with the

other subject (Subject A).
To summarize,

both sets of two questionnaires for either
positive

or negative situations were identical,
except for the rating of
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UMlicance
°f

for Subject B and not
to. Subject A, and
for the

^ effec^fjoxesee^^o^es

-curcence for Subject

A,

and their

but not for Subject

B.

„«„

orobabijit^f
Thus, the only

variable considered for both
subjects was the rating of
their object,.
VU* in their interpretation of
the subjective stilus
eliciting
a reported emotion.
The results of this pilot
experiment show that as it
would probably be expected, both
subjects were somewhat increasingly
more

objective in the interpretation
of the stimuli for both
negative and
positive emotions over the 30-day
period.

However, Subject

rated
the objectivity for stimuli
eliciting positive emotions much
higher
than for stimuli eliciting
negative emotions, while the
opposite

applied to Subject

A.

B

A much smaller discrepancy
between the rating

of the objectivity for stimuli
eliciting positive emotions and the
rating of the objectivity for stimuli
eliciting negative emotions
was observed for Subject A than for
Subject

B.

Although Subject A was more consistent
in the rating of objectivity for both negative and positive
subjective stimuli that Subject
both subjects showed mean ratings of
objectivity at visibly higher
levels during the last 18 days than during
the first

12

days.

While the rating of objectivity increased for
both subjects

during the 30-day period,

a

different pattern emerged for the rating

of foreseen consequences and their likelihood of
occurring, and for
the rating of significance for Subjects A and B,
respectively.
As may be seen

in

Figure

5

on the next page, the mean ratings

B,
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»y Subject B of the significance
of the situation
editing the
emotional reaction show
a different
pattern for each of
hoth the
negative and positive
emotions during the
30-day period.
I" contradistinction
to

the rating of
significance by Subject

B,

the rating of the
effects of foreseen
consequences and the „
ta
Hhood of their occurence by
Subject A followed a
visible decreasi ng
pattern for both the positive
and the negative
situation, as depict!
by F,gures 6 and 7 in
the ensuing pages.

Figures

6

and

7

display the patterns of the
mean ratings for

Subject A of the effect of
foreseen consequences and
the probability
of their actual occurrence
during the 30-day period.
The foreseen consequences
as a result of situations
at which

particular emotional reactions
were directed were rated
progressively
as
ly,

less favorable or less adverse
during the 30-day period.

Similar-

the probability of the actual
occurrence of such consequences

were also rated progressively

lower

during the same period.

It

should be noted that the correlations
between the rating of the effect
of foreseen consequences and the
probability of the consequences

actually occurring were r
tions, and r
It

is

= +

.67,

£

• +

.77,

£<

.001

for the positive situa-

<.001 for the negative situations.

interesting to note that Subject A
consistently rated the

negative consequences and the probability
of occurrence higher than
their positive counterpart.

While it is difficult to generalize from
the preceding results,
it is clear that both subjects
became

increasingly more objective
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in their interpretation
of subjective stimuli
w1th time
B
si

with Subject
reporting higher levels
of objectivity,
especially for positive
tuation.
,

With these high levels
of objectivity reported,
it cou ld be
expected that the rating of
significance (see Figure
5) „ou,d fo, low
the same decreasing
patterns as the rating of
the severity of foreseen consequences and the
probability of their actual
occurrence (see
Figures 6 and 7) given that
they appear to be similar
parameters of
anticipated outcome.
However, from the data
available, it emerges
that the combined rating
of the severity of foreseen
consequences and
the probability of their
occurrence, while a very ,i ke ly
indirect
and relative measure of
core affect, is not the same
as the rating
of the significance a particular
situation may have for someone in
terms of that same person's
future.
The combination of the ratings
of the effect of foreseen conse-

quences and the probability of their
occurrence may be considered
relative measure of core affect.
tool

However, it could also serve as

a

a

for making adjustments to our
interpretation of the environment

through the cognitive reformulation
of our interaction with such an
envi ronment.
In

the case of Subject A,

that appears to have been the case,

and it is noteworthy that Subject A
reported to have continued the

same evaluative process long after having
completed the experiment,

especially for negative emotional states.
In

connection with the preceding,

it

should be noted that cog-

n

—

t1Ve

;
*•
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«»-

Preceding experfmewt
for

in the

^^ ^ ^ ^

aspects sim.arto
themethQd
fl

management of depression
epreSS10
"

1979;

Emery, Hollon 8
Bedrosian,

'tcan

be said that

a „n

^

+u

other conditions
(Beck et a,.,

1g 8 l).

conceptual,

the preceding

re-

Subject

confront her sensation
of threat or safety
wi th
the reality of her
environment.
Such a process appears
to have produced

a gradual
reduction
the intensity with
which she perceived her
environment. That is
a .ore neutral
cognitive interpretation
of the environment.

-

^

results of this latter
experiment endorse the
notion of
Positive emotions being
also mediated by core
affect, because they
appear to be associated
with a strong reduction
i„ such a core
affect
as a result of an
environmental factor.
in tune with our
observations in this section,
it should be noted

that during the period of
clinical observation leading
to this dissertation, the writer has
found the confrontation of
core affect with
environmental reality a very
effective too, in obtaining
fast improvement in a variety of clinical
symptoms.
The reduction in symptoms in
the latter cases have been
accompanied by a complementary change
in
the cognitive interpretation
of the environment.

Meaning

While the notions surrounding the
concept of meaning have

been covered, albeit indirectly,
in the preceding sections, it
would
be convenient to make a distinction
between objective and subjective
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meani ng.

Clearly, ascription of
meaning is
a

Particular object or situation.

emphasized, such

a

formulation is

a

cognitive formulation of

However, as has been
continuously
a

global

function.

Naturally, meaning may be
ascribed to anything according
to
its intrinsic properties
or in terms of many other
associations with
or without emotional tone.
For instance, a plain
square wooden block
may seem just that to some
people, to others it may
also have pleasurable or unpleasurable emotional
connotations.

Accordingly, objective meaning is
considered here to be the
conceptual appreciation which
describes the properties of a
particular object, subject, or situation,
but devoid of emotional connotation.
On the other hand

s

ubjective meaning

is

conceived as the con-

ceptual appreciation which describes
the same properties of such an

object, subject or situation, but charged
with an affective tone.

Consider for example,
ground.

It

is

a

plain black circle on

a

white back-

quite unlikely that the meaning ascribed
to such

a

circle would be less than objective according
to our definition.
Not quite the same thing happens when one
looks at the "faces"
on Figure 8 on the following page.
In

this case, one may perceive the face at the bottom
right

of the illustration somewhat friendlier than its diagonal
counterpart.

That is, the face on the upper left may be perceived as
gloat-

ing and perhaps as

a

little sinister.

Although, there may be many
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other ways of perceiving the
drawings.
The point is that there is
a difference in the
appreciation of
the faces.
The appreciation of one
of the faces is more negative
than that of the other.
The broken lines on the
illustration have been added to
illus-

trate the fact that the appreciation
is global.

Considering the

number of cells which the intersecting
broken lines make, the elements
changing the affective tone of the
perception constitute a little
less than 5% of the face area.

Similarly, the objective or concrete
meaning of an object or

situation may change to

a

more subjective meaning under
circumstances

increasing or decreasing the intensity of
core affect.
For example, for one person automobiles
may have meaning in

terms of their physical properties and
of other associations not

particularly emotionally charged.

The same person, however, could

later construe automobiles as threatening
objects given circumstances
in which such an emotional

shift could occur, like

perience in an automobile accident.

a

near-death ex-

Obviously, in the latter secon-

dary instance, the notion of automobiles would be
permeated by

a

negative or unpleasant affective tone.
To explain the change in the example above, one may recall

that

ongoing experience could be considered to be functionally represented
from instant to instant

i

n

global cognitive terms.

instant of experience may be

a

That is, each

cognitive instant historically associ-

ated with other cognitive instants through

a

stochastic neuropsycholo-
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affect which is

tary to the cognitive
instant.
Thus,

in terms of the

ccpW
'

example of the automobile,
the object

would be cognitively
represented in the
«.ne brain
Drain in t-ho
the same way before
and after the accident.
However, the affect
associated with
that

cognnive representation wouid

he different after
the accident and

the object would be
appreciated differently.
In other words,

since the person is the
same, the cognitive

representation of the stimulus
would virtually be the
same in both
situations, except that after
the accident there would
be a

particular intensity of affective
discomfort associated with the
latter

situation, creating different
beliefs about the automobile
and/or
related activities.
Therefore, the basic change
before and after
the accident would have
occurred in the quality and
intensity of
the affective tone, understood
as part of the ongoing
experience.

That is, the automobile or
related activities may now be
understood
to be threatening objects.
It appears

reasonable to suggest that the quality
of the affect

associated with any cognitive instant
would be the factor determining
the meaningfulness of that same
cognitive instant, that is, pleasur-

able or unpleasurable.

This affective meaningfulness which
an object

or situation may have for one
person could be called subjective

(affective) meaning.
Thus, in order to change the subjective
meaning of that instant,
its affective complement has to change
while the cognitive represen-
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tatlon may re.ain virtually
the same, but „ ow
understood in ter ms
of the new affective
complement and different
set of beliefs.

mmiMMmfm.

Any elevation in core
affect may be accompamed by varying degrees of
subjective discomfort.
However there
my be individuals who do not knowledge
any subjective discomfort
despite there being evidence
of an elevated core
affect in the same
individuals.

Subjective discomfort is
considered here to invariably
be a
mixture of core affect
derivatives and manifestations
of anxiety,
in varying degrees of
one or the other.

By definition,

it could be perceived
as an uncomfortable sen-

sation characterized by

a

mixture of manifestations of
anxiety and

feelings, such as visceral
discomfort, apprehension, uneasiness,
feeling that something is wrong,

a

and so forth.

It appears that

whenever subjective discomfort

is

negated by

the person, one is apt to
observe other manifestations of
anxiety

and symptoms such as pain,
headache, and rationalization.

It

appears

such individuals are very distant
from their own feelings.

Attitude.

attitude

There is no question according to our
view, that the
a

person may display toward another individual,
object, or

situation is influenced by the intensity
of that person's own core
affect.

It

must be reminded that the core affect in
this case remains

much out of the realm of awareness.
In

such

a

case, the subjective meaning someone or something
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™y

have for a person

Person

w„l

di

determine the type of
behav Qr such
.

spldy towards the said

^

For example, in the
display of prejudice the
individual

directing

g

is

hostile and demeaning
attack at someone else.
This
hostile behavior may be in
the form of a verbal
or nonverbal action
or in just a thought format.
a

Prejudice is

a

particularly good example
because it satisfies

the need for safety prompted
by core affect in at
least two ways.
First, the individual is
able to use the maladaptive
defensive

maneuver of generic aggression
to deal with his own sense
of vulnerability or core affect.
In this case, the cognitive
interpretation of the victim by the
aggressor constitutes

a

'

good part of the

defensive behavior in terms of the
pejorative allegations about the
victim.

Second, the need for safety is
partially satisfied by the support
and justification obtained by the
aggressor from the relationship

with other persons displaying the same
maladaptive behavior for identical

reasons.

Clearly, in the case of prejudice, the
aggressor unwittingly

attempts to decrease his own sensation of
incompetence or core affect
at the expense of the victim.

The labels for core affect

.

It

could hardly pass unnoticed that

throughout the material covered so far, many different
nouns have
been used for core affect.

The reason for the
latter
m,,*
'•tttr is that
according to our
concept of
core affect as a
primary universal
affect all „negative
arrect,
.
,.
subjective
feebngs are considered
core affect derivatives.
That is, feelings
of doom, inferiority,
incompetence, sadness,
o^ness, h elp, essness
worthlessness

k

,

,

C ° nSternat1

°

""« Nation,

and the endless list
of others wnich
would

ts,
«« a

manifestations of core affect.
cognitive

disintegration, guilt

foHow

are, without excep-

Clearly, each different
label

nterpretat 10n of the sensation
of danger according
to circumstances,
culture, experience,
education, and the l,
ke
i

Conceptually, for example,
an actually guilty
person is someone
«ho has inflicted
intentional harm and will
receive commensurate
puni shment.

Naturally, very few of the
people who express feelings
of guilt
fit that description.
That is, they may feel
guilty, but the reality
is

that they are not.

However, what is important
here is that if guilt

explored it
is found to be both a
negative interpretation of
oneself and an anis

ticipation of punishment or
harm, that is, like something
adverse
imminent.
Evidently, the similarities
between the latter and a

is

sensation of danger or threat
cannot be disregarded.
Perhaps the most flagrant evidence
for the synonymous generic

relationship between negative feelings
and core affect is that in the
presence of a significant elevation
in
core affect, the same person

may simultaneously use several
different labels to describe how he

.
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feels.

AH

one has to do to prove this
point is to explore the
feelings
of someone who is very
depressed.

Anjdety_

Hopefully redundant by now,
anxiety is to be considered
an automatic and ordinary defensive
reaction of the organism to an
elevation
in core affect.
As recalled from earlier
material, anxiety may be defined
as

a

state of general defensive arousal
predominantly mediated by the limbic system and by the reticular
formation.

When an elevation in core affect
occurs as

a

result of danger,

fatigue, pain, physiological strain,
infection or other pathology,
injury, rejection, loss of support,
stress, traumatic experiences
and other innumerable factors, including
anxiety itself,

a

reaction

of anxiety is elicited.

Since core affect is readily increased by
the mildest of the

environmental challenges, it
here and there.

is

reasonable to expect some anxiety

Of course, when core affect is at

a

normal

range

whatever tonic anxiety there is would be considered subclinical.
That is, its manifestations are not evident because the
general
or arousal

level

is normal

However, when the intensity of core affect goes beyond the normal

range, anxiety gains clinical

significance.

According to the model being proposed here, there are two types
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of manifestations of
anxiety, physical and
functional.
The physical manifestations
of anxiety are those
produced

by

the genera! state of
defensive arousa, on physical
processes, such
as the cardiovascular
system, the muscles, the
endocrine system, and
all

other physiological mechanisms,
except those serving the
cognitive functions.
As may be derived from
the preceding, the

funOn^

manifestations of anxiety are those
occurring at the cognitive level.
That
is, they are manifestations
of the effects of anxiety on
the functional

integrity of the cognitive matrices.
The severity of the manifestations
of anxiety in any case are

proportional to the level of anxiety
prompted by the core affect.
One must not forget that anxiety
is

a

unitary concept.

pears also that anxiety increases and
decreases in
sity gradient.

a

It

sort of inten-

Therefore, it would be difficult to
discriminate

between partitions of such

a

gradient unless the discrimination was

being made between two somewhat distant
levels of intensity.
ly,

ap-

Natural-

any fractionation of anxiety or its
manifestations into discrete

stages would be arbitrary, albeit necessary for
clarity.
Now one may observe that Figure
the manifestations of anxiety as

a

9

on the following page depicts

gradient in each case.

It

is

intended for the illustration to show that the higher the
level of
anxiety, the more severe the manifestations of anxiety are.

Notice that the functional manifestations of anxiety are assumed
to begin appearing at a moderate level

of anxiety.

While the physical
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manifestations may beqin to0 aannpar »+
y
PP ear at

a
a

i~
low or negligible level
of

anxiety.

Naturally, the gradients are
theoretical and not absolute.
That
means that for any particular
person, either type of
manifestation
of anxiety may have a slope
varying from the theoretical
one.
Some individuals tend to display
physical manifestations of
anxiety predominantly, while others
would tend to be more sensitive
to the effects of anxiety on
the cognitive functions.

For example,

person displaying severe physical
manifestations

a

of anxiety may, at the same time,
exhibit very mild functional mani-

festations

Although less likely,

person exhibiting severe cognitive

a

(functional) manifestations of anxiety
could simultaneously appear
to be

suffering

from mild to moderate physical
manifestations of

anxiety.
The reason for the latter being less likely
is that anxiety is

considered here

a

defensive reaction to core affect.

This means,

that its purpose is to activate the tone of
the organism for action.

Therefore, its effects would be predominantly aimed
at functions

other than cognitive.

As a result,

a

more intense discharge would

be needed for it to begin to affect the cognitive
processes beyond

an adaptive increase in alertness.

One reason for

a

tendency to increased functional effects may

be that some people could have

a

neural

substrate for cognitive

functions which is abnormally sensitive to anxiety.
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Another reason could be
that such

a

receives an abnormally higher
than usual

cognitive neural substrate
limbic discharge with

a

less than comparable
discharge to other parts
of the body.
In the case where both
of the above abnormalities
would be

Present, one could imagine the
consequences on the cognitive
matrices.
A similar situation may
exist in terms of physical
anxiety in
the case where there is an
abnormally high sensitivity
of some parts
of the body to anxiety.

For example, the cardiovascular
and gastro-

intestinal systems in some
individuals.

However, it is possible,

that just like in the case
with functional manifestations
of anxiety,
there could also be an abnormally
intense limbic discharge
affecting
parts of the body below the head.

When the long term consequences
of the effects of anxiety on
the stomach, intestines, cardiovascular
system, and other organs

of the body are considered, it is
not difficult to imagine the deleterious changes which have the potential
to occur in brain tissue with
functional anxiety of many years duration.

Obviously, the constant

bombardment of the cortex by intense arousal
for prolonged periods
would likely have generically similar effects
to those induced by
chronic anxiety in other tissues.
While it would be unrealistic to enumerate all the
manifestations of anxiety of one type or another, some
examples will be given

below in terms of their severity.
the examples of the physical

For the purposes of practicality,

and functional manifestations of anxiety

are separately considered below.

However, it must be reminded that

144

both are manifestations
of the sa me general
defensive state of arousal
which facilitates behaviors
such as aggression and
evasive actions.

^^^^

In

the mildest range of
physical

anxiety, one could include
symptoms such as dry mouth,
moist palms,
flushed face, mild restlessness,
and many others.
The moderate range of
physical anxiety may include,
among many
others, moderate restlessness
and exacerbations of normal
physiological functions (e.g.,
increased heart rate).
It appears also

convenient to consider less than
severe sleep

disturbances as moderate physical
manifestations of anxiety.
as may be recalled from earlier
material,

However,

the ascending activating

and inhibiting systems may be
associated with the opposite extremes

of cortical arousal.

In addition,

anxious arousal may be considered

to be in a position to stimulate
the ascending activating system,

deactivate the ascending inhibiting system,
or override the counterbalanced activity of both systems.
correct in also

considering

Hence, one would be technically

insomnia as

a

functional manifestation

of anxiety.
At any rate, insomnia is invariably
intimately intertwined with
a

cluster of physical manifestations of anxiety.

aim to make an arti factual

Since it is our

separation of the somatic from the cog-

nitive manifestations of anxiety, sleep disturbances
will be included

among the physical manifestations of anxiety.

Among the severe physical manifestation of anxiety one may find,
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for example, severe
sleep disturbances
uances, aaitat^
agitation, severe disruption
of Physiological processes,
and so forth.

Examples of physical
manifestations of anxiety
are plentiful
and it would be unnecessary
to elaborate further
on them.
However, it appears
worthwhile to examine

a particular
clinical
case which shows the direct
effect that anxiety may
have on the phy-

siology of the body.

The case in mind also
dramatizes the relation-

ship between core affect
and the cognitive
interpretation of the
environment and between anxiety
and core affect.
The clinical example to be
described formed part of

borative presentation at

a

a

colla-

medical teaching facility
regarding alter-

native therapeutic modalities
(Segarra, Note 1).
The subject in this case was

was slightly over 30 years of
age.

a

considerably overweight man who
He reportedly was satisfactorily

employed and happily married, and
was generally satisfied with himself and his life.

Generally speaking, the only major
difficulties he could report
were to be

suffering

from untreated severe essential
hypertension

and to be unwilling to take
antihypertensive medication.

His appre-

hension was so extreme that he would not
submit to diagnostic pro-

cedures, such as, an electrocardiogram.
It

appeared clear that the man was extremely
concerned about

becoming seriously

ill

while simultaneously being unable to accept

treatment for his hypertension.
He reportedly did not find himself to
ordinarily be a nervous
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person.

However
er, hp was
wa<: ^hnn
taking
an anxiolytic at
the time, which may
have had something to do
with his ,ac k of
compiaints associated with
anxiety, except in connection
with medica, management
of his hype,tension.
As

•

it turns out,

,

the subject had received
treatment for his

hypertension two years before
with severely adverse
consequences.
He had reportedly become
critically ill due to severe
potassium
deficits and pneumonic
complications, and had to remain

in an inten-

sive care unit for several
days.

Ever since then, the subject
became afraid of antihypertensive
medical treatment and the side
effects of antihypertensive
medication.
From the preceding observations
it is gleaned that the
subject
realized the need to lower a
dangerously high blood pressure.
Nevertheless, he perceived the consequences
of antihypertensive treatment
so adverse that he would not
try it.

In addition,

he was not willing

to engage in a course of
psychotherapy.

At this point, the goal of the
intervention was to bring the

blood pressure down as much as
possible.
To that end,

consisting of
and incidental

a

the subject was placed in

relaxation trance with visual

a

management program

imagery, biofeedback,

counselling associated with the discrepancy
between

his fear and the benefits of antihypertensive
therapy.
An increased temperature of the left middle
finger and

a

reduc-

tion in the electromyographic activity of
the forearm extensors and

frontalis

muscles were used as indices

of relaxation.

Blood

,

session
The subject was
seen for one hour

approbate!*

o„ C e weekly

for a total of nine
visits.

Recalling, since core
affect and anxiety elicit
each other and
the manifestations of
anxiety are proportional
to the level of such
anxiety, reducing anxiety
may reduce its manifestations
and influence a reduction in
core affect. At the
same time, a reduction
core affect will soften
the negative cognitive
interpretation of
the environment.

-

-

Again recalling from previous
material, the global functional
representation of ongoing experience
may be affected to some
extent
if one of its functional
elements is altered in any
way.
In the present case, a
relaxed state would decrease
the severity

of the manifestations of
anxiety, which in turn would
be indicative
of a lowering of the level of
anxiety, and of course, the
blood pressure.

At the same time, the successful
application of biofeedback by
the subject would help increase
to some extent his sense of
competence

that is, reduce core affect, by
the margin of control afforded
by the

procedure.
Now, in that state of affairs,
the cognitive interpretation of
the environment may be reformulated
in less apprehensive terms,

especially if some pertinent incidental
counselling

is

available.

Clearly, in the case being addressed, the
acute elevation in
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-re

affect is associated with

bolrc of danger.

a

particular cognitive
element s*.-

That element is the
antihypertensive treatment

with medication.
As would be expected,
as the process of a
tonic relaxation

gradually too k place, the
manifestations of anxiety
decreased, and
the cognitive interpretation
of the cognitive element
previously
symbolic of danger became less
negative.
Of course, as the general
state of arousal diminished,
the
indices of relaxation,
electromyographic and temperature
readings,
would reflect it.
Figure 10 on the next page

illustrates the gradual increase
in

tonic finger temperature during
the course of the intervention.

Ob-

viously, increased finger temperature
reflects vasodilation which

is

incompatible with the sympathetic
peripheral vasoconstriction which
may be associated with anxiety.
A drop in temperature around
the fifth session is considered

directly associated with an initial
attempt by the subject to take

antihypertensive medication with some resulting
side effects.
Likewise, Figure

11

on the following pages reflects some de-

creases in muscular tension readings during
the course of the intervention.

However, the gradual changes in muscular
tension are less

dramatic than those of the temperature readings.

Once again, it

can be noticed an increase in tension around the
fifth session asso-

ciated with an attempt to take medication.
Since the subject was very apprehensive initially about
taking
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antihypertensive medication to
the point of seeking
relief through
behavioral methods rather than
with
drugs, his beliefs about
the

medication must have become
less negative by the
fifth session for
him to attempt taking such
medications.
The latter being the case, then
the clinical elevation
in core
affect must have been somewhat
reduced by the fifth session.
As was illustrated by
Figures 10 and 11, those
indices of

relaxation,
general

or obversely, of anxiety,
indicated

a

decrease in the

state of arousal.

Now, Figures 12 and 13 on the
ensuing pages, illustrate the

gradual decrease in blood pressure
during the course of intervention.

Notice the downward trend in blood
pressure readings both between
sessions and within sessions.

While the decreases between sessions

are the desired outcome, the
within-session decreases are extremely

important because they demonstrate the
discrete reduction in the

manifestations of anxiety as

a

result of

a

discrete reduction in

anxiety itself.
The latter is well

illustrated by Figure 13.

In

addition, that

figure shows the gradual tonic decrease in the
manifestations of

anxiety in terms of the decrease in blood pressure
readings.
can be noted on this figure, there was

a

As

smaller within-session effect

around the sixth session which may be associated with the
anxiety
linked to the medication trial.
As would be expected,

by the end of the intervention, the sub-

ject was able to take medications on

a

regular basis without much
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220
Pre- session systolic
Pre-session diastolic

Post-session systolic
Post-session diastolic

200

180

mm

160

Hg
140
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10

Treatment Sessions
Figure 12.
Systolic and diastolic blood pressure readings before
and
after each treatment session.
Note
From "Assessment and Choice of
Therapeutic Modality" by E. Segarra, Grand Rounds, Department
of
Behavioral Medicine and Psychiatry, University of Virqinia
Medical
Center, October 2, 1979.
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under control with
medication.

n

our view, the preceding
case demonstrates
the relationship
between core affect,
anxiety, the physical
manifestations of anxiety
and the cognitive
interpretation of an
experiential event.
U aU o
depicts the target effect
of anxiety on specific
physiological systems which may be sensitive
to it.
,„ the
4tter case
cular physiological
system was the cardiovascular
system.

^

,

_

^

It

should be clarified, however,
that in the case considered
above, the acute core affect
was associated with
particular stimuli
«hose elements symb olic of
danger had a known etiology
during adulthuod.
Once the stimuli no longer
elicited an elevation in core
affect, anxiety and its
manifestations decreased to
subclinical levels.
The latter is considered
to mean that the above
management

techniques

may be very appropriate for
obtaining

a

long-lasting

decrease in the physical
manifestations of anxiety associated
with
a particular stimulus
symbolic of danger with a clear-cut
origin..
In addition,

they may be appropriate for the
palliative reduction of

Physical manifestations of anxiety
affecting

a

particular physiolo-

gical function or in the case of
pain or injury.
It

is

postulated that those techniques

would have

effectiveness in achieving an enduring
reduction

in

functional manifestations of anxiety
associated with
cal elevation in core affect.

a

limited

the physical
a

and

chronic clini-

'
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chcce of m ana 9em ent according
Psychotherapy as

wi„oe

e,evations in core affect,
the
to our lnodel

WQu d be psychotherapy

discussed in chapter

,

6

is

defied

as the

of core affect is
normalized.
It

should be pointed out that
according to our model,
anxiolytics mainly act to
ameliorate the physical
manifestations of anxiety
caused by acute or chronic
elevations in core affect.
In addition
some anxiolytic effect by
these drugs on the
functional manifestations
of anxiety appears to take
place sometimes.
It appears that the
usefulness of anxiolytics in
obtaining a lasting improvement
in con-

ditions associated with

a

chronic clinical elevation
in core affect

would be less than negligible.

Obviously, anxiolytic drugs would

make very poor substitutes for
psychotherapy in such cases.
A particular problem with
the use of medications in
the manage-

ment of anxiety is that the latter
is invariably reduced beyond
the
level which ordinarily could
be considered tolerable
with minor dis-

comfort.

It seems

that in acute and chronic clinical
elevations

in core affect the subjective
need for comfort or support far
exceeds

what would be reasonably expected.

Therefore, the anxiolytic effects

anticipated by the person are quite
exaggerated.

Being that the

amount of medication administered is
proportional to the degree of

discomfort reported by the patient, the dosage
of the medication
invariably

exceeds

be tolerated well.

the degree of anxiety which ordinarily
could

Obviously, the latter is tied to some of the

,

.
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well

known adverse

medications on

a

consequent
onsequences

nf th„
of
the management of
anxiety with

long term basis.

An examolP
mi
example of th
those consequences

the dependence on
anxiolytics
yucs io
rnn P with
to cope
with everyday ordinary
environmental challenges.
is

A disturbing disadvantage
of the effects of
medication in the

manager

of anxiety is that they
hamper the progression
of the
therapeutic process.
It is postdated that
in order for the
process
of therapy to reach maturity
the client must be in
a position to
confront his own vulnerability.
Obviously, such a confrontation
would necessarily entail some
degree of affective discomfort
and
anxiety.
The prospects for the preceding
therapeutic necessity
become dimmed by the use of
neuroleptics or anxiolytics without
regard for the process of
psychotherapy.

functionaljanifestations of anxiety.

The severity of the functional

manifestations of anxiety follow the
same rule of being proportional
to

the level of anxiety.
In the

milder clinical forms, one may include
distractibi ity
1

deficient recall, and mild exacerbation
of existing cognitive deficits
(e.g., anomia), among others.
At the moderate range, some of the
manifestations are considered
to be perceptual

illusions, deficient concentration, memory
deficits,

moderate exacerbation of existing cognitive
deficits (e.g., dysphasia)
and somewhat idiosyncratic thinking toward
the upper limit of the

range

f
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tang

the severe

function

-elude hallucinations,
thought

ma „i estations of

,„„*„„,

m

^

^

severe confusion

_

may

_

Plete disorientation,
concreteness of thought,
disorganized or
bizarre thinking, and severe
exacerbation of existing
cognitive
deficits (e.g., aphasia).
It ™ay be difficult to
conceive all

as functional

of the preceding
symptoms

manifestations of anxiety.

However, if one considers

the potential barrage of
neurodynamic and chemical
activity to which
the cortex could be subjected
to as a result of a
state of general

defensive arousal,

it

is

not difficult to visualize
its effects on

the cognitive matrices.

The stochastic cognitive
matrices postulated in this work
would
be resistant to

a

loss in representational

associative properties.

power due to their vast

Clearly, with some increase in
the intensity

of the level of arousal, the
sharpness of the cognitive functions
could improve.

However, with an excessively intense
generalized

stimulation, one could visualize

a

disruption in the coherent dis-

charge properties of the neruonal
matrices.
In

the latter case, the increasing levels
of cognitive matrix

disorganization would be directly associated with
the increasing
levels of cognitive disorganization or
dysfunction.

Obviously, in such

a

situation, the associative processes would

be disrupted and di stant concepts could be
integrated with each other
to produce

a

metaphorical nonanalog of ongoing experience.

According to our view of the process, increasing
levels of such
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a

denized

synaptic activity W ou,d
create countiess of
,»„,„,
cognitive matrices. With
pensive ,eve,s of excessively
intense

station,

there wou,d be eventuaUy
severe cognitive
dysfunction
a result of the
profound deterioration of
the higher-order cognitive matrices.

«

A particular process
for which the functional
manifestations

of anxiety have been
examined is memory.
If one examines the
graphic illustration of the
Yerkes-Dodson

law (Loftus,

1980),

to an optimal

it shows

that the efficiency of
memory increases

level with increasing
levels of alertness.

it additionally illustrates

However,

that the efficiency of memory
also gra-

dually deteriorates with
increasing emotional arousal
once the optimal
level of said arousal

has been passed.

A clinical example which
vividly demonstrates the cognitive

manifestations of anxiety is considered
below.
In this

particular case,

a

chronic clinical elevation of core

affect is quite evident.
The subject in this case was
20 and 30 years old, who was seen

more than 20 weekly sessions.

a

in

single woman somewhere between
individual therapy for slightly

Her complaints included constant

general anxiety, inability to hold
employment, gastrointestinal

disturbances, and other physical distresses,
severe anxiety attacks

which led to emotional crises, and so forth.

A psychological evalua-

tion from two years prior to the period of
therapy being reported,

indicated she performed at an I.Q.

level of 63.

Her life history,

.
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although obviously evidencing
deprivation of several
types
indicate that she had been able to
complete high school
despite havi ng
been labelled as retarded
since childhood.
It also indicated
that
she had been under
psychiatric care and took
medication for several
years.
It was evident that
throughout all her life,
this woman met
with rejection and negative
affect whenever she tried
to display
whatever intellectual skills
she may have had.
Right at the onset of therapy,
it was clear that his
woman could
not learn as fast as the
average person does, and that
anything that
required performance from her
produced severe anxiety.
For example, she would become
disabled by anxiety by the actual

or imagined presence of
job.

a

supervisor whenever she tried to
hold

a

Likewise, other attributions with
the same results would be

made in other situations, such as
those of interpersonal nature.
Therefore, difficulties such as
interpersonal incompetence, fears
of several types, and

a

whole range of other symptoms were common

occurrences
However, by the end of therapy, the subject's
I.Q. was found to
be 93, she had no symptoms, and was
on her way to vocational

rehabi-

litation.
The I.Q.

scores difference in this case is quite significant.

Undoubtedly, in order for this woman to score an I.Q.
of 93,
it would

have been necessary for her to enjoy the approximate
corres-

ponding level of cognitive function.

Also, she had to have the neural

substrate which would support the measured intellectual performance.
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Given the severe manifestations
of anxiety she exhibited
previous to psychotherapy, according
to the model being proposed
it
may be concluded that her deficient
intellectual performance

prior to therapy was predominantly
anxiety.

a

functional manifestation of

This connection between anxiety
and diminished cognitive

performance may be quite obvious at
times during the psychological
evaluations of some school children.
Perhaps supporting the view presented
here is the improvement
in cognitive functions following
the brief administration of a
neuro-

leptic to persons in an acute state of
psychosis (Wahba, Donlon

&

Meadow, 1981).
In the

latter case, 44 hospitalized psychotic
individuals were

placed in three treatment groups of high,
moderate, and standard doses
of haloperidol for

a

period of 10 days.

Clinical and psychological

ratings showed similar and significant improvement
in concentration,

abstract thinking, and ability to respond appropriately
in all three

treatment groups.
Clearly, the view which considers the above data in terms
of

a

decrease in functional anxiety, postulates the desired pharmacological effects of haloperidol

as a reduction in the cognitive

(func-

tional) manifestations of anxiety.
In

this case, the neuroleptics would act to reduce the level

of arousal and disorganization in particular neural pathways of the

limbic system.
in

Chapter

3.

Some of these pathways have been considered earlier
In

tune with the consideration of the effects of

.

anxiolytics in previous
sections, the activity
of neurolepUcs is
viewed here as a
predominantly palliative
effect on the functional

-ifestations of anxiety.

Exception

of such an assuasive
effect as

d-orders as defined

a

in this wor k

at ti.es to have also

s ome

„

ffla

lon 9 ten,

de to the consideration

treaty

of optional

Naturally, neuroleptics
appear

.

ameliorating effects on the
physical mani-

testations of anxiety.
Of course, according to
the model being
postulated, the underlying cause for chronic
anxiety and its manifestations
is the clinical

elevation of core affect.

of anxiety in our view

is

Therefore, the way to

a

subclinical level

through the psychotherapeutic
normalization

of core affect rather
than by means of medication
on

a

long term

basis
It is quite transparent
that the material

in this

section establishes the functional and
physical manifestations of anxiety
as
a

result of the varying activity
of

a

normal defensive mechanism.

Similarly, it establishes said
manifestations of anxiety as part
of the defensive picture which
results from clinical elevations
in

core affect.

Mlety__loo£.

Now,

it

must be recalled that any mental or
physical

stress elicits core affect and that
the physiological activity cha-

racteristic of anxiety may be considered
itself very stressful.
Therefore, one may conceive

elicits

a

a

repetitive loop where core affect

discharge of anxiety and the anxiety increases
the inten-
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slty of core affect in
a reciprocal vicious
circle.
No doubt that anxiety
could cli mb to very high
levels through
this process.
Such a process appears
to be descriptive
of the reelprocal activity of core
affect discussed earlier.

Emotional

Pi

stnrhanrpc

Emotional disturbances appear
appropriately named because
their
primary etiology is considered
here to be a clinical
elevation of
core affect.
In the

view expressed by this
dissertation, emotional distur-

bances are constituted by the
maladaptive defensive behavioral
maneuvers aimed at a reduction in
the chronic clinical level
of core affect, together with whatever
corresponding physical and/or
functional

manifestations of anxiety which may
be present.
As will be discussed further
in Chapter 5, the defensive
maneu-

vers in question are behaviors
aimed at satisfying the need for
safety which is out of awareness.

However, they are directed mainly
at

counteracting core affect, rather than
at decreasing

it.

The defensive maneuvers are functionally
linked to the cognitive

interpretation of ongoing experience as

a

function of core affect and

are, at times, facilitated by anxiety,
which recalling is in itself

defensive reaction.
As

a

possible example

is

the situation of child abuse where

very vulnerable parent becomes angry and
uses physical force

on

a

a

a

.

.
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crying child who may be ill
or scared.
In the latter case,

the already clinically
high sensation of

danger or core affect in the
parent is further increased
by the
evidence of an elevated core
affect in the child.
The defensive
behavior is aggression, which
appears to be facilitated by
the increased anxiety.

another example, the individual's
need for safety may be
alleviated to some extent by maintaining
a rigid structure for
everyIn

thing.

In this case,

the elevated core affect would
be eliciting

increased manifestations of anxiety
unless the person resorted to
some kind of activity which would
provide the structure needed.

A

particularly common type of such activity
(or symptom, if preferred)
is

the incessant toil of trying to
organize the contents of

or house repeatedly over

comfortable.

In all

a

a

room

short period of time in order to feel

likelihood, the person in this case would
not

be aware of the role of such an activity.
It

should be noted that the defensive behavioral
maneuvers are

considered here to be developed according to factors,
such as, developmental, cultural, socioeconomic, physical, perhaps
genetic, and
others

According to our view, the more chronic the clinical elevation
in

core affect, the more complex

is

the cluster of defensive maneuvers

and the more affirmed are the beliefs associated with such defensive

maneuvers
On the other hand, temporary or acute elevations in an already
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clinical core affect may
exacerbate the quality of
the defensive maneuvers, such as
hostility becoming
agression.

Obviously, the severity of
the manifestations of
anxiety
and the target functions
affected by anxiety would
contribute
to the type of clinical
picture presented by the
manner in
which the person interacts
with the environment.
In the case of psychosis,
just like in any case where

there are other than severe
functional manifestations of
anxiety,
the core affect has a clinical
elevation and the defensive maneu-

vers are in operation.
In

such

a

case, the cognitive representation
and interpre-

tation of ongoing experience as

a

function of the intensity of

core affect would be characterized
by

a

lack of cognitive logic.

Therefore, the defensive maneuvers
could be extremely
cratic, bizarre or illogical in many
ways.

idiosyn-

Nevertheless, their

function would be the same as in the
case where there

is

no

cognitive disorganization, that is, attempts
at counteracting
core affect.
A particular clinical
a

visit to

a

example of the above was observed during

large public psychiatric hospital.

described occurred at

a

male ward during

a

The situation to be

very crowded Monday morning

meeting between staff and all of the residents.

The group present

i

.
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included many newly admitted
residents
»c «
'^biaents as
e n as
well
those
been admitted the previous
week or before.

who

had

addition, there were several
visitors among the standingroom only crowd.
The visitors were
particularly conspicuous
because
either, 1 ke the staff,
they were dressed in
coat and tie or they
were females.
In

A very restless man,
who kept trying to draw
the attention of
the staff from the back
of the crowded room, frequently
excused himself from whomever was next
to him to go out and drink
some water.

Finally, he was able to attract
the attention of the staff
and ask
them, with some obvious hostility,
about who had given permission
for his thoughts to be
broadcasted on television.

The staff, consisting of

a

psychiatrist and

a

psychologist, pro-

ceeded as may be commonly done,
to confront the man about the
logic
of his beliefs before going on to
talk to another resident.
that in

a

It seems

case like this focusing on the affective
content of what

was being said would probably have been
more productive than focusing
on how it was said.

Clearly, according to our model, the man
in the example was

feeling very threatened, that is, his core
affect was very elevated.
His interpretation of ongoing experience
and the expression of such
a

representation reflected

a

need to protect himself from the invasion

of his privacy by all the strangers in the room.

However, given the

disorganized associative state of his cognitive matrices, his
expression was

i 1

logical
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The task in this chapter
has been very arduous
since the concepts being considered are
as difficult to
explain as they are to
discern.
Each of the concepts discussed
is considered to be
an 1-

portant part of the integrated
functional view of human
behavior proposed by this dissertation.
One very important principle
which is implied in the
theoretical constructions considered
so far is worth emphasizing.
Such a principle is that
regardless of the available
cognitive
resources, core affect is always
the same sensation and such
cognitive resources will always be
used to attempt to fulfill the
need for
safety.

Accordingly, whatever cognitive resources
are available, they
will be used for the cognitive
interpretation of ongoing experience
as a function of core affect.

It does

not matter if the cognitive

resources are very limited or more than
adequate.
The great importance of the preceding
is that it allows for

a

better general understanding of the
manifestations of anxiety, defensive maneuvers, and behavior in situations
like those in which
the person is intellectually impaired, has
suffered brain damage, or
has any type of significant deficit in cognitive
functions as

a

re-

sult of brain pathology of some sort.

That is, the model of human behavior being proposed is
applicable
to all

human circumstances.

Another very important precept which is also implicit

in

the

material covered to this point is that of the traditional notion of
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psychopathology or mental illness
being alien to the model
undergoi ng
description.
This being the case, the
concept of pathology here
be
comes associated with actual
deleterious changes in neural
tissue

rather than with

a

conventional view of
psychopathological activity.
Parenthetically, it is possible
to assume, independently
of

core affect, that cognitive
disorganization in

a

limited number of

cases could be primarily the result
of aberrant neurochemical
variations in neural tissue.
In that case, the deleterious
chemical

changes would be attributed to some
sort of tissue pathology or
defect.

However,

a

significant elevation in core affect
would be

an inevitable consequence of the
latter situation.

With such an

elevation in core affect the neurochemical
activity in some areas
of the brain would be deviant anyway
due to severe functional manifes-

tations of anxiety.

Thus, the cognitive symptoms which may
have been

initiated by an assumed abnormal neurochemical
activity

in

case are maintained by the functional effects
of anxiety.

this
In

addition, it may be postulated that if the assumed
tissue pathology
or defect and the ensuing deviant neurochemical
activity were pre-

sent, their cognitive effects would be facilitated
and/or enhanced
by functional

anxiety.

Based on the preceding, one may suggest

that even when the potential exists for an abnormal neurochemical

state due to tissue pathology or defect, the likelihood of psychosis

would be greatly diminished in the case of
affect.

a

normalized core

In

connection with the
preceding, the pathological
possibiliof an abnormally extreme
sensitivity of the
cognitive structures to arousa, or of
an abnormally intense
arousal discharge
to the cortex could
be construed as
potentially responsible
for the
cognitive manifestations
of anxiety in some
cases.

ty

This topic has
been considered earlier
and will not be
discus$ed any
here.
Just the sa me if core
,
affect is lowered to a
subclinical
level, the need for
increased defensive functions
would not be
present.
That is, clinical levels
of functional anxiety
would not
be elicited in any case.
No doubt that if core
affect is reduced during
osychotherapy

such a reduction will most
likely occur gradually.

may expect the

gradient

Therefore, one

of functional manifestations
of anxiety

mentioned earlier.
The foregoing conclusion
dictates that the condition known
as psychosis

is, according to such view,

state but may occur in degrees.

not an all-or-none
'

This means that psychosis may

be described in terms of varying
levels of severity at different

times in the same individual.

Obviously, it

is

gleaned from the discussion that
psychiatric

diagnostic categories (American Psychiatric
Association, 1980) would
be considered in the proposed model
as descriptions of the way the

person interacts with the
environment as

function of core „m,t,
rather than being associated
with any particular etiology.
The latter is convenient
since the question of
etiology becomes
unanswerable in most instances
when the concept of ,„,.,,u,
nines,
a

is applied.

An example of importance
is the difficulty
encountered in the

consideration of

a

putative etiology for the condition
labelled as

schizophrenia.
An analysis of six major
scientific models of the etiology
of

schizophrenia concludes that the only
con.non denominator to
the models
was a second-order model which the
authors call a vulnerability model
(Zubin & Spring, 1977).
The vulnerability concept is divided
by the authors into two

major components.

One component is considered by
the authors as the

factor associated with the genetic endowment
of the individual and
the other component is considered

mental
In

tion is

a

factor associated with environ-

influences.
any case, they suggest that the common
denominator In quesa

natural

"degree of vulnerability that under suitable cir-

cumstances will express itself in an episode of schizophrenic
illness",

(p. 109)

At any rate,

they conclude that there is

a

threshold above which

there will be the expected symptoms if both the degree
Of the vul-

nerability and the magnitude

of

the challenging event',

ment are reciprocally high enough.

in

the environ-
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That is, with

a

higher vulnerability

a

lesser magnitude of

the challenging events in
needed, and with the increasing
magnitude
of the challenging events a
lesser vulnerability is needed
for the

symptoms to appear.

Albeit for different theoretical
reasons, the model being proposed in this dissertation construes
the interaction of the person

with his environment along similar
lines.
In our case,

however, the vulnerability in question
is the inten-

sity of core affect.

In

general terms, with increasing levels of

core affect less demanding environmental
challenges would be needed
to further elevate core affect and
elicit defensive maneuvers and

functional and physical manifestations of anxiety.
On the other hand,

increased environmental demands would elicit

complementary elevations in the intensity of core affect
and could
produce similar effects.

Naturally, the cognitive and reciprocal

core affect processes considered earlier would be in
operation during

these situations.

Considering the model being proposed, one can reiterate that the

normalization of clinical core affect in any case would be the factor
underlying favorable changes in the cognitive interpretation of the
environment, the defensive maneuvers, and the manifestations of anxiety.

Of course, what are called symptoms would be the expression

of any of the preceding functions.
Now, the behavioral

patterns observed which are part of the de-

fensive maneuvers to counteract core affect appear to partially be
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d.y.lopmenf 1

Therefore, it seems appropriate
to the disoussion
of such defensive maneuvers in
material ahead, to next
examine brief,
ly the developmental
aspects of core
.

affect.

CHAPTER

IV

THE ONTOGENY OF CORE AFFECT

As far as this clinical

about core affect being
It

a

study

is

concerned, there is no doubt

phylogenetic product.

may even be said that core affect

is

a

phylogenetic property

of organisms whose complex defensive
behaviors are mediated by structures like the human limbic system.

Clearly, the survival value of core affect
in early humanhood

must have been incalculable.

Nevertheless, as the functional pro-

perties of the neocortex were refined and
social relationships continued to increase in complexity, the survival
value of core affect

appears to have diminished.
As such, one may consider that under ordinary
circumstances now

only enough core affect is needed to keep up
motivation and goal-

directed behaviors, establish relationships, and so
forth.
At any rate,

derivative of

a

if core affect is to be considered

a

phylogenetic

survival mechanism, its presence must be evident as

soon as there is enough neural

substrate development to sustain it.

The latter obviously occurs before birth.

Prenatal

Core Affect

There are virtually no new neurons added to the number present
at birth.

While the generation of new neurons has probably slowed

down somewhat by the time of birth, it may be calculated that neurons
172

.
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are created in the developinq
,eLdl
y fetal

am

brain »t
*
Dr
at thQ
the rate
more than

250,000 per minute (Cowan, 1979).
Obviously, at that rate of
development, it is difficult
to pinpoint the exact time when a
function, such as limbic
system activity,
hence core affect would start to
operate.
Nonetheless, one can judge
core affect being present when the
embryo or fetus is perceived
as

performing organized defensive behaviors.
Clearly, the display of defensive
behaviors has to be preceded
by

a

learning period for those behaviors.

Thus, core affect is most

likely in operation long before it can
be judged to be present.
Much of what is known about fetal behavior
is summarized by Verny
and Kelly (1981) in connection with the
adult behavioral consequences.

Although their conclusions and those reached
in this work are
separated by almost unsurmountable theoretical
obstacles, their ob-

servations about fetal behavior adjust well to the
core affect theory.
For example, they report that some reflex action
development may
be observed in the unborn child by his fifth week.

Also by the eighth

week, the fetus may react to the pushing on the mother's stomach
by

making movements which resemble

a

squirming away from the point of

pressure
By the fourth month,

the unborn child reportedly can grimace,

frown, or squint, and may start sucking if the lips are stroked.
The unborn child, according to these authors, is sensitive to

touch around the sixth month of intrauterine development.

For exam-

ple, if cold water is injected into his mother's stomach, he kicks
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vigorously in protest.
Similarly, the unborn child
would react to anxiety in
his
mother.
The evidence considered by these
authors indicates to them that

awareness in the unborn child may
begin between the twenty-eighth
and the thirty-second week of
gestation.
The reason being that by
such

a

as

newborn's would be.

a

point the brain's neural circuits
are reportedly as advanced

Obviously, one could go on and on citing
findings which would
support

a

survival mechanism in the unborn child.

But there is no

doubt that the unborn child reacts to
physical and chemical stressors

with what appears to be

a

defensive behavior each time.

Clearly, if the fetus is reacting with

a

defensive posture, the

underlying discomfort could be, as it has been
postulated here,
sensation of danger.

a

It should be noted that a sensation it
must be

because cognitive function would most likely be
extremely primitive
at this point.

Birth Experience

Barring prenatal extremes, the first really significant elevation
in core affect may occur at birth.

It

is

perhaps the most traumatic

experience with the least cognitive development in the direct confrontation of the environment by the child.
The newborn appears to already have, albeit limited, an emotional

repertoire at birth.

One is reminded by Ekman and Oster (1979) of the
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finding of expressions of disgust
resembling the adult version
in
the responses to unpleasant
taste by newborn infants,
anencephalic
infants, and hydrocephalic infants.
Clearly, the latter suggests
other than high cortical origins
for such an emotional display.
One can imagine how the sudden
shift from the safe and nurturing

warm environment of the womb to the
stressful conditions of birth may
elicit a supreme sensation of danger.
It should not be surprising
to conceive the child as trying
to

feel

as

with

a

secure as he felt in the uterus.

Therefore, he may respond

decrease in his protestations if he

mother's belly, or chest, or if he

is

is

placed on or about the

held very closely by her.

Unfortunately, the safety of the womb is forever
gone.
now on, the child, with

a

very elevated core affect or vulnerability,

must learn ways to reduce such

with the environment.

From

a

For that,

vulnerability during his interaction
he

is going to need

the protection

afforded by his caretakers.

Developmental Progression

The range of personal characteristics which one may ascribe
to

the adult does not appear to be applicable before adulthood to the
same person.

If one

considers cognitive development, it may be ar-

tifactually organized into functionally discrete stages from birth
to puberty,

such as, sensorimotor

al, and formal

operational

,

preoperational

(Piaget,

1975/1977).

,

concrete operation-

These artifactual

developmental stages perhaps could be considered somewhere between

.
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descriptive and explanatory
of behavior (Bra ln erd,
,978), but tunctional ly hierarchical
Likewise, the global functional
representation or waning of an
experiential event in the nonadult
may be constrained by the
degree
of functional development.
For example, it would be
premature to
expect a child who does not crawl
yet to start walking.
It appears clear that
change in objective meaning

of the adult could occur as

a

in the case

function of experiential events.

While

in the case of the nonadult
it involves not only such
an experience,

but also the effects of the
gradual

integration and development of

functional systems until the adult
level of functioning is reached.
It is

reasonable to observe at this point
that the observed

behavior in nonadulthood is compatible
with the notion that during
this time in life the global

functional

representation of experience

or meaning is more susceptible to
alterations than during adulthood.
It appears

that during the period before adulthood
the individual

gradually developing mechanisms
to integrate experience until

and functional

is

strategies with which

the adult level of meaning is reached.

The relative importance of experience in
development appears to
be especially relevant during the first
three years of life.

first three years of childhood appear to be characterized
by

The
a

sort of

sensitivity to the effect of experience on much later social
behaviors, such as initiative, trust, compassion, curiosity,
and so forth

(McVicker-Hunt, 1979), or their counterparts.
Illustrated by Figure 14 on the following page, the process of
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child development has been
divided into four discrete
stages in
terms of cognitive development
(Piaget, 1975/1977) and
other forms
of development.

The illustration is an
adaptation of an almost
identical table,
schematic of a neuropsychological
model of child development
(Holmes
Note 2).
In the present case,

Figure 14 only aims at
providing

a

very

schematic neuropsychological view of
development.
The primary concern here is
to postulate what major role
cor e

affect plays during development.
to provide an account of all

Obviously, it would not be feasi

bl"e

the consequences and functions
of core

affect during development.
It

suffices for the purposes of this
dissertation to present

the material

in very general

terms.

According to our view, core affect, while
very intense at birth

n

postulated to gradually decrease to

fey

Tate adolescence or later under ideal circumstances.

It is

a

normal

range of intensity

Although,

similarly postulated that the latter never occurs
at the ideal

fevel

During the period between birth and 18 to 24 months of age,
ttare is considerable exploration by the child.

During this period,

(osasiderable knowledge about objects is gained.

Obviously, there is

«»!

accelerated rate of synaptic adaptation.

That is,

a

lot of asso-

Native interactions and integration, especially of the concrete
pnaperties of things.

The most effective functional

activity during

this period appears to primarily
be occurring at the
posterior association areas of the hemispheres.
As Gazzaniga and LeDoux

(1978) point out, both cerebral

hemis-

pheres may be considered to work
together in order that the integrity
of mental functioning be maintained.
.

They also point out that both
hemispheres may have the ability

for mapping spatial

of the hands.

context onto the perceptual and motor
activities

That is, mani pulospatial activities
expressed in the

forms of drawing, constructing, and so
forth.

However, the right hemisphere ordinarily
develops

eventual

enhanced abilities for both the perception of
spatial stimuli and
the origination of spatial

responses as part of

superiority over the left hemisphere.
integrated

bi hemi

spheri

c

a

late manipulospatial

The latter is expressed as an

function.

The left hemisphere is considered to develop faster
than the
right.

As a result,

language is considered to start developing in

the left hemisphere and to precede the effective
manipulospatial

functions, which would come much later.
It could be suggested

that there is some functional crowding of

the left hemisphere and hence language functions begin to gradually

displace some of the capacities for spatial perception and the production of spatial

responses in that hemisphere.

Meanwhile, the latter

similar functions continue to operate fully in the right hemisphere.

Unhampered by language development, the right hemisphere may
assist the left with the development of language, especially providing
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for the intonations!
qualities of the latter
(Holmes, Note 2).
It seems that infants
respond to the tone of
speech or of other
forms of expression with
a greater degree of
accuracy than they do
to the content of expression.

Clearly, the reference to tone
has to do with the affective
context of the message.
Therefore, if the tone is soft
and nurturing,
the infant will most likely
not display apprehension.
On the other hand,

tile, the infant will
It seems

if the tone of the message
is harsh and hos-

invariably display apprehension.

that during this early period the
infant has to inter-

act with the environment predominantly
with those functions facili-

tated by the right hemisphere.

Undoubtedly, the vulnerability or helplessness
of the infant
is very intense.

Thus, the infant begins to construe the
objects

around him in terms of how they decrease or
increase his discomfort.
In

other words, core affect is very eJevated at
this early age,

and the infant begins to find ways of
attaining

safety.

a

relative sense of

That is, begins to use maneuvers to counteract or
decrease

his sensation of danger.

Clearly
to

,

at t hi

s

stage of development, his available resources

interact with the environment are predominantly those subserved

by the right hemisphere and to

a

lesser extent those subserved by

the left hemisphere.

Therefore, his limited cognitive interpretation of the environ-
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ment ,111 be initially based
mostly on gioba!
perceptions of affective tone based on, for
examp,e, spatia, and
intonationa, functions.
Son,e

of these spatial and intonationa,
functions could include facia,

expression, tone or variations
in pitch of speech,
gestures of others,
patterns of being held by caretaker,
and so forth.

At a certain point, the infant
inadvertently develops maneuvers
to obtain a reduction in core
affect.

Some of these appear to be,

crying to obtain nurturance, attachment
to certain objects, holding
on to caretaker, maintaining visual
contact with caretaker, and so
forth.

What may be important here is that as

a

result of the development

of defensive maneuvers to cope with
core affect and also to his gradual

confrontation of the environment, the core
affect

is

reduced

somewhat as the child matures.
In

other words, the initial

crease as

a

result of the child testing his environment as
he develops

the necessary agility to do so.
a

intense helplessness begins to de-

At the same time, the infant reaches

point where he begins to use objects in the environment
to feel

secure and to rely less on the proximity to his

by now obvious, source

of safety, the caretaker.

According to the model being proposed here, core affect would
always be the same sensation of danger, the difference at the very

early stage from other later stages and adulthood

is

obviously that

there is less cognitive development with which to understand the

environment in terms of core affect.
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No less than would be
expected at any other time,
the infant

would inadvertently interpret
his environment as

a

function of core

affect using the limited cognitive
resources at his disposal.
This means that there would be
elements in the environment
whose
cognitive representation, even at a
very crude level, would become

linked

to

a

particular level of core affect.

That is, the elements

in question would become symbolic
of danger in terms of the process

discussed earlier and would elicit increases
in core affect with the

corresponding

defensive maneuvers appropriate to current
cognitive

development.

Anyone who has tried to interfere between

a

child one or two

years old and an object he feels comfortable
with, has probably seen
a

defensive reaction of anger.
Obviously, anxiety as defined earlier would always
be present

as a reaction to core affect, whether it
happens at an appropriate

prenatal stage or during adulthood.
It is not

difficult to make

of the physical symptoms of

a

a

connection sometimes between some

child and anxiety.

For example,

a

higher than usual incidence of visceral or other physical complaints
in the absence of a putative pathology.

The cognitive interpretation of the environment in terms of core

affect could be observed sometimes in the infant's apprehension or
fear of strangers or of certain objects.
It

seems that the superior capacity of the right hemisphere to

perceive spatial stimuli, to produce spatial responses, and to eva-
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luate the affective tones of
visual and auditory stimuli
continues
to develop in association
with the functions of the
left hemisphere.
The latter could be why
expression without intonation
does not
convey affective meaning.
It could also be the
reason for subjective meaning of visual stimuli
being perceived according
to spatial
relationships, such as was seen in
the "faces" on Figure 8 in
the
previous chapter.

However, the development of language
adds

a

new dimension to the

representation of ongoing experience and
the cognitive interpretation
of the environment.
The period between 18 to 24 months
and

6

to

7

years continues

to see a cognitive activity
predominantly modulated by the posterior

association areas of the hemispheres.

Also, the complexity of the

cognitive matrices continues to increase with
synaptic adaptation in
the brain proceeding as

a

result of experience.

During this period, language is characteristic
and it

is

used

to express the cognitive interpretation of
ongoing experience.

Lan-

guage is also used to interact symbolically with
objects, for example,

construing

a

box as

a

truck and ascribing animated properties to

inanimate objects.
This period may be characterized by an enhanced modulation of

cognitive functions by the left hemisphere.

While, the right hemis-

phere continues to contribute to the overall subjective interpretation
of the environment.
However, what was probably

a

fairly pure sensation of danger at
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birth, that is, core affect,
is by this time hidden
within the cognitive interpretation of the
environment and the defensive
maneuvers
developed to this point.

other words, core affect goes
underground due to its dispersion into the very complex
associative process now in
operation.
In
this case, the sensation of danger
may be construed as beginning
to
become extensively intertwined with
cognitive metaphors.
In

Thus, there may be

given time.

cluster of defensive maneuvers
at any

a

For example, during this period
the child may place blame

on others to counteract his core
affect, but at the same time, display

other defensive maneuvers such as
aggression, resistance to authority,
helplessness, and so forth.
Despite the increasing cognitive distance
between core affect
and the awareness of it as

a

sensation, it is possible for the child

sometimes to perceive core affect as such when
it

is

clinically ele-

vated.
A very painful
i

vignette about

a

paralyzed seven-year-old boy

llustrates the point.
The boy in question was supposed to have suffered
the traumatic

interruption of the spinal cord at the second cervical vertebra.
could not breathe without

a

He

respirator and was supposed to have lost

sensory and motor capacity below the neck.
The family of this brave little boy lived

a

considerable distance

away from the hospital and they could only visit during the weekend.
So,

presumably this contributed to an increase in his vulnerability.
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Many months of his hospitalization
were spent in an intensive
care unit where he was always
surrounded by elements symbolic
of
danger, such as the malfunction
warning sound from his or somebody
else's respirator.
The obvious panic usually
displayed during the
latter circumstances made clear
that he understood this signal
as
dangerous.
At any rate, during

a

contact when he was aware of considerable

subjective discomfort, he expressed, and
reiterated on inquiry, feeling a sensation of discomfort over
all of his body.

He further la-

belled the sensation also as sadness resulting
from being told he had
"a

bigmouth" by someone he liked.
Obviously, his sensation was probably visceral
and mediated by

neural function above the injury and below the
cortex.

The latter

points to limbic functions.
It appears clear that during this period,

the child is still

quite vulnerable and seeks the protective relationship with
the caretakers while at the same time testing the environment and increasing
his sense of competence.

During the period between the age of
old, the considerable functional

very prominent.

6

to 7 years and 10 years

integration of both hemispheres is

Clearly, the corpus callosum has reached adequate

functional efficiency and the associative process reaches new levels
of complexity.
By this time, the child may determine relations bewteen objects,

classify, and order objects in intrapropositional terms and focus on
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-dividual

elects

of

a

complex problem rather
than on the,, interre-

lationships to explain the
problem.

These are

exiles of the
types of cognitive tasks
that he has capacity for
at this point.
What is important here is
that the complexity of
both the defensive maneuvers and the
cognitive interpretation of
ongoing experience
increase tremendously.
Therefore, core affect becomes
still more
enmeshed into the cognitive
processes.
a

few

However, an enhanced cognitive
perspicacity still allows the

child to discriminate between
opposite affective poles and see

relationship between emotional comfort
and discomfort.
example of the latter may be the
statement of

a

girl

a

An anecdotal

seven years of

age, pondering on the relationship
between fear and pride.

Para-

phrasing her, she found it interesting
that when she felt proud of
herself she was not scared.
feel

On the other hand, she reportedly
would

afraid when the opposite would be the
case.
At any rate, it is postulated that by
this time under normal

circumstances the child has developed an extensive
repertoire of

defensive maneuvers to suppress core affect.

In

addition, the child

begins to relinquish some of the protection furnished
by the caretaker.

As a matter of fact,

the child may become quite oriented to

peer activities at this point.
Yet, despite the spurt in the apparent need for independence

during this period the child essentially still needs the supportive
and protective influence of the caretaker.

Obviously, at this point,

just like at any other point in development, the slightest hint of

a
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potential

loss of the sense of protection
afforded by the relation-

ship with the caretaker produces

a

considerable elevation in core

affect and the consequences thereof.
After all, it is

a

sense of safety that the child
seeks and

obtains from the relationship with the
caretaker.

One can imagine

the adverse results obtained when the
threat comes from the caretaker,

who is necessarily perceived as

case in

a

a

source of protection.

Such is the

situation of parental child abuse or neglect.

Nonetheless, this period is postulated as one
where the intensity
of core affect is generally lower than during
earlier and later periods of development.

It could be

seen as the period where the maximal

effects of caretaker support and protection have been
reached.
Naturally, an increased cognitive amplitude most likely
contributes to the state of affairs.

In terms of the

latter, it may be

suggested that such an increase in cognitive capacity allows the
individual to test his core affect against the objective interpretation of the environment.
For example, the child may be apprehensive about

a

particular

activity, but nevertheless performs it without adverse consequences.
In

this case, the child is able to learn and cognitively process the

discrepancy between his anticipation of danger and the harmless
nature of the activity.
Past the age of 10 years, the referential distance between core

affect and the cognitive awareness of it as
becomes vastly greater.

a

sensation of danger

.

188

Clearly, by this time, the effective
contribution of the frontal
lobes to brain function is quite evident.

From now on, the individual may use
deduction to develop hypo-

theses from what may appear just possible
to what may be
native.

In this case,

cognitive operations are

That is, two ideas may be used to produce

a

i

a

real

alter-

nterproposi tional

third one.

Also, the

individual at this point is able to grasp the meaning
of proportions,

correlations, and probability, among many other cognitive
tasks that
he is able to perform at the eventual

adult level.

Obviously, the interpretation of ongoing experience in terms
of
core affect and the defensive maneuvers to counteract the latter

become extremely complex from this point on.

Moreover, the defensive maneuvers appear now to become fairly
stereotypical.

That is, the defensive maneuvers begin to acquire

a

longitudinal stability which later becomes more firmly established

during adulthood.

Barring of course, changes as

a

result of psycho-

therapy or any other appropriate experience.
However, the most significant event during this period is the
very high elevation in core affect which occurs during adolescence.
It is during this period that the individual

is

faced by the

demands for emotional competence from an adult world.

Understandably, the adolescent, who begins as

a

child and is

expected to end as an adult, initially depends on the ghost of parental

or caretaker protection to feel

secure.

As that sense of protection begins to be eroded by environmental
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demands for an adult level
ievei of
na i
or Mntin
emotional
competence, the intensity
of core affect begins to
increase.

a

Ordinarily, the intensity of
core affect or insecurity
reaches
zenith but the adolescent manages
to gradually confront
it, result-

ing in its gradual
In

reduction.

this case, the adolescent
relinquishes almost all of the

sense of parental or caretaker
protection.

capacity to feel competent and safe
core affect to

a

normal

is

It

is

postulated that the

synonymous with

a

reduction in

range.

This climacteric reduction in core
affect is seen as

a

result of

the adolescent acceding to accept
the demands for adult emotional

competence.
need of

a

That is, assuming responsibility for his
behavior and

sense of wellbeing.

This way, the adolescent reaches the crucial
point in develop-

ment where

a

climax in vulnerability occurs, which constantly
colors

his interpretation of the environment and elicits
whatever defensive

maneuvers he has acquired by now.
However, under ideal circumstances, no matter how ambivalent
he

would be or whatever his beliefs could be, in theory the adolescent

would ordinarily test his subjective impressions, ambivalence, and
beliefs against the objective reality and his core affect would drop
to about a normal

range.

In

this case, the defensive maneuvers would

mostly be adaptive.
Unfortunately, the latter does not happen often enough.

It

likely that the adolescent will become an adult and remain with

is
a
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somewhat elevated core affect.

The latter means that
depending on

how challenging the environment
is at any given moment
later on, the
intensity of core affect will similarly
fluctuate.
As a result, adolescence
appears to mostly end with an
adult

who may display

a

cluster of defensive maneuvers
which may include

both adaptive and maladaptive types.

How adaptive or maladaptive

the person turns out to be would
depend on the prevalent intensity

of the core affect which remains
present after adolescence.

Evidently, with

a

chronic clinical elevation in core
affect the

long term results could be as postulated
in the material covering

emotional disturbances.
While it is outside the scope of this dissertation
to expound
on the immediate consequences of the acute or
chronic elevations
in core affect during childhood and adolescence,

it should be indi-

cated that they have the same mechanisms in operation
as during

adulthood.

However, these must be considered and understood

of the particular stage of development.

in

terms

For example, apparent psy-

chosis in either the child or the adult could be attributed to an

idiosyncratic or disheveled organization of the cognitive matrices
as a result of severe functional

anxiety.

However, such an apparent

state of cognitive disorganization has to be considered very cauti-

ously in terms of the cognitive equipage each individual carries at
the time.

Obviously, the cognitive resources of

a

child are limited

when compared to those of an adult.
By the time a person becomes an adult, the intensity of core
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affect ideally should be at an
approximate normal range.

If it

is

not, something happened during
childhood or adolescence which pre-

vented its normalization.

Without going into detail, some examples
of the circumstances

which are considered here to produce

a

pervasive clinical elevati on

in core affect are child abuse or neglect,

severe physical or mental

trauma, loss of parents, deprivation, history
of rejection, overly

demanding or overly critical caretaker, and many
others in an almost
endless list.
Clearly, the latter examples would be tied to the early
conso-

lidation of maladaptive defensive maneuvers.

Therefore, the farther

back in development the clinical chronic elevation in core affect
goes, the more severe are likely to be the maladaptive maneuvers.

The

same would very likely hold for the manifestations of anxiety asso-

ciated with such

chronic elevation of core affect.

a

For example,

a

young child who uses physical symptoms to obtain

nurturance and support in order to feel
school

secure and avoid going to

for some reason or another, could use the same, albeit more

severe, defensive maneuver as an adult.
In any event,

barring specific tissue pathology, any adult chro-

nic elevation in core affect above its putative normal

considered here to be
ment.

a

range is

consequence of inadequate emotional develop-

Clearly, the factors underlying such

a

developmental flaw

would be multiple, but could include socioeconomic, political, and
cultural

factors in addition to any of

a

vast number of threatening
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circumstances.
At any rate, as indicated
earlier, the defensive
maneuvers an
adult uses to counteract core
affect could include either
adaptive
of maladaptive ones at any
given time.
And whatever such defensive

maneuvers are, they appear to display
some longitudinal stability
during certain periods in the
person's life.

CHAPTER

V

DEFENSIVE MANEUVERS

a

Commonly enough, adult human behavior
may be observed to display
certain degree of longitudinal stability.
For example, the long-

itudinal consistency of the majority of

a

substantial number of

variables related to the personality
structure has been supported by
research in this area.

In

that instance, such

a

consistency was

supported by the intrasubject analyses of the
data collected for 84
men and 87 women from early adolescence
to the middle of the late

forties (Block, Note 3).
The relative stability of adult behavior appears
to be confined
to behavioral

ties.

characteristics within

a

particular range of possibili-

Although the onset of psychological disorders and/or
emotional

disturbances would probably disrupt the stability of the general

characteristics of the behavior of any individual, it is possible
even in such cases to recognize said stability in the form of

a

ty-

pical, albeit maladaptive behavioral repertoire (Shapiro, 1965).

Moreover, the maladaptive repertoire displayed may be constituted
by exaggerated versions of the previously distinguishing characteris-

tics of the behavior of the individual.

cribe

In

the absence of disrupting conditions, it is possible to des-

a

particular person's ways of interacting with the environment

or with other persons in more or less the same terms throughout his

adult life and even be able to predict some of his behaviors.
193

194

However, such a stability must
be considered in terms of
environmental and personal factors.
For example, the enduring
charac-

teristics of the conduct of

a

particular individual could be
consi-

dered in one context when he would
be 30 years old, and in
another
when he would be 60 years old.
Likewise, physical factors, such as the
effects of aging and

disease could affect the context in which
the individual's behavior
is considered.

Moreover, ongoing experience also appears
to be able

to change, or at least modify,

those characteristic ways in which

a

person behaves at different points in his life.
Of course,
a

if humans did not have the capacity
for change as

function of experience then there would not be any
reason to con-

sider psychotherapy as

a

possible agent of change!

Despite all the factors which may intercede with the
apparent

constancy of human behavior, it seems reasonable to maintain
that
person will display
tics within

a

a

a

fairly stable range of behavioral characteris-

given lapse of time in his life.

That stability is what allows the observation of change in the

behavior of

a

particular person, either in the direction of an or-

dered and satisfying interaction with the environment as
of

a

a

beneficial experience, or in the opposite direction as

result
a

con-

sequence of adverse factors.
Typical examples of the enduring qualities of behavior may be

found in any of the adjectives recurrently used to describe

cular person.

a

parti-

.
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Clearly, the adjectives used to describe

a

particular person or

said person's behavior across similar
situations also define what

may be considered as that person's personality.
In the

latter respect, Stevenson (1969) suggests
that "we may

define personality as the

sum

to external

25)

events",

(p.

of the habitual

reactions of

a

person

Naturally, according to the model being proposed here, the
habitual

reactions of the person to external events are actually defen-

sive maneuvers developed to avoid, counteract, or validate core
affect
in meeting the demands

for competence from the environment.

There-

fore, according to our view, the personality of the individual may be

defined as the cluster of enduring defensive maneuvers which such

a

person habitually displays in interacting with the events surrounding
him.
As

sketched by Figure 15 on the next page, the defensive maneu-

vers are the phenomenol ogical outcome of functional

illustration provides

a

integration.

That

panoramic diagram of the model of human beha-

vior proposed by this dissertation.

It

depicts the integration of the

major functional aspects of ongoing experience with its phenomenological manifestations.

Obviously, the complex interactions between the different elements of the model which are graphically illustrated by Figure 15
have been considered before and need not be elaborated upon any

further
The simplistic separation of the elements of the model of human
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behavior portrayed by the
figure is totally artificial
since it
would be impossible to
separate such elements in
actuality.
The defensive maneuvers
are considered to be
an expression of the
integrated function of the
brain much out of volitional
control li ke
any other accompanying
defensive reaction of the
organism, and mostly
just as inadvertent.

Needless to say, awareness of
the defensive maneuvers
and their
purpose can be achieved, according
to the view presented here.
The mechanism in operation
for the defensive maneuvers
is likely
to be evident by now.

However, to recall, the defensive
maneuvers

are aimed at fulfilling the need
for safety resulting from the
in-

fluence of core affect.
As indicated earlier, the defensive
maneuvers are the extremely

complex, automatic product of the vast
associative activity of the
brain.

That is, the cognitive matrices are
always processing infor-

mation in context with the intensity of
core affect at any given time.
The logical nature of the associative
processes, one could say, at-

tempts to make sense out of the core affect
in terms of the functional

representation of ongoing experience.
Obviously, since the representation of ongoing
experience

is

a

functional analog of the environment the behavioral
expression of the

cognitive matrices occurs in context with the environmental
circumstances.

Therefore, the defensive activity would invariably be

directed at environmental factors.
At any rate, whatever the defensive maneuvers are, they are gra-

I'm

duany developed

by the brain.

Most of the learning
appears to

occur before adulthood,
but there would not be
any obstacles for
the complexity of the
defensive maneuvers to increase
at any time
or for the person to
acquire some new ones.
It should be

very complex.

reinforced that the defensive
maneuvers could be

Sometimes they may be predominantly
cognitive, as in

the case of the rationalization
of affective discomfort.

Other times,
they could be predominantly
behavioral, as in the case of
compulsions.
On other occasions, they could
be a mixture of observable

behaviors, cognitive formulations,
and manifestations of anxiety.
The combination of the different
behavioral maneuvers, especially maladaptive ones, which a
person may use consistently may not
fol-

low any particular correspondence
between them.

However, it appears

that some of them appear together more
often than others.

For exam-

ple, denial of emotional discomfort
and somatization.
As Figure 15 suggests,

the defensive maneuvers may be considered

either adaptive or maladaptive.
Obviously, the adaptive defensive maneuvers are
those which are

productive for the wellbeing of the person.
facilitate

a

These are the ones which

continuous sense of competence and

range of core affect

a

around normal elevations.
They are postulated to occur as

a

result of

core affect, and are aimed at fulfilling

a

a

very low level of

very mild need for safety.

The intensity of these defensive maneuvers in this case would
be associated with

a

tonic level of motivation and goal -di rected

.
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activity.

It seems that a normal

range in the intensity of
core

affect serves primarily to
maintain adequate levels of
cognitive
functioning and arousal, that is,
an adequate performance.
Therefore, one may say that for
all practical purposes
the
adaptive defensive maneuvers are
not aimed in this case at
counteracting core affect because there
would not be any significant
elevation
of core affect to counteract above
the
normal

On the other hand, the

range.

maladey^^

are gen _

erally considered unproductive for
the wellbeing of the person.

They

presuppose an intensity of core affect
above the normal range.
It

should be noted that there would be
instances when the defen-

sive maneuvers which are ordinarily
considered maladaptive would be

very adaptive.

For example, anger as

a

result of being the victim

of an attack.
At any rate, the maladaptive defensive
maneuvers are very unpro-

ductive because they tend to be ineffective in
counteracting core
affect and lead to maintaining or increasing the intensity
of the
vulnerabi
From

1 i

a

ty

social point of view, the latter may be due to the effects

of the repelling environmental reactions elicited by the defensive

nature of the maladaptive behaviors.

From

a

functional

perspective,

the increased vulnerability is due to the reciprocal cortico-1 imbic

mechanisms of core affect and the anxiety loop which were considered
in Chapter 3.

Maladaptive maneuvers ordinarily indicate

a

clinical

level

of

.
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core affect of acute (temporary)
or chronic proportions.

Acute Core Aff ect

Obviously, the implication of an
acute clinical level of core
affect is that it is a temporary
elevation from a normal baseli ne.
The maladaptive defensive maneuvers
in this case could

al so

similarly be temporary and ordinarily
would not be descriptive of
the person, if the elevation in core
affect is from

a

normal base-

line.

Of course, since the latter case assumes
an individual whose

core affect is ordinarily at

a

normal

range, the unwitting sensation

of danger would be assumed to eventually return
to normal.

Likewise,

the maladaptive defensive maneuvers in question
would eventually fade
An example of the preceding may be the foreseeable
display of

anger and helplessness by
for

a

divorce.

spouse who unexpectedly has been asked

this case, the emotional pain is expected to sub-

In

side gradually to

a

a

normal

level

and the defensive maneuvers to fade

away eventual ly
However, an elevation in core affect from

a

normal

range is

postulated to tend to exacerbate the longitudinally stable defensive

maneuvers which the person uses to inadvertantly cope with core affect in context with his circumstances.

That is, if for example

a

person ordinarily tends to seek structure to feel comfortable, an

elevation in core affect could exacerbate such
to very maladaptive proportions.

a

need for structure

For example, from evident neatness
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to an obsessive concern over cleanliness.

The latter notion is very important
because according to the

proposed model the intensity of core affect invariably
fluctuates
and frequently goes above its normal

adjusted person.

range even in the most well

The latter is due to the frequent environmental

challenges the person faces in the course of living.
Therefore, one may expect that any person during any given
period of time will display

a

series of both adaptive and maladap-

tive defensive maneuvers.
The extent to which

a

person may be predominantly adaptive or

maladaptive would depend on what

is

the then prevalent intensity of

the core affect.

One may find such

a

person described in terms of his tendencies

to react in one way or another to particular circumstances.
is

nothing more than

a

Which

description of the tendencies to inadvertently

use particular established defensive behavioral maneuvers on

a

predic-

table basis.
Clearly, the assumption is that no person has the capacity to

avoid using particular maladaptive maneuvers or suffering from some
sort of manifestations of anxiety at one time or another.

Chronic Core Affect

The situation in the case of

a

chronic clinical elevation of

core affect is somewhat different from that of
In the

case of such

a

a

temporary elevation.

pervasive clinical elevation of core
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affect, the defensive maneuvers would
likely be generally maladaptive

.

Naturally the severity of the maladaptive
maneuvers could depend to some extent on the severity of
the intensity of core affect
at any given moment.

Therefore, if there is an increase in core
affect over an already chronically elevated range, an exacerbation
of the current

maladaptive defensive behaviors would occur.

This maladaptive beha-

vioral exacerbation would be generically similar
to the one occuring

with acute elevations in core affect from

a

more or less normal base-

line.

For example, the ordinarily suspicious person with

clinical

a

particular

intensity of core affect would most likely become paranoid

with much higher levels of vulnerability.

Obviously, in this case

the cognitive manifestations of anxiety would be facilitating the

exacerbation of the defensive maneuvers from suspiciousness to paranoia in all

likelihood.

Clearly, there are many other common examples of defensive

exacerbations, such as, from hostility to aggression, from helplessness to hopelessness, from real

i

stic sel f-enhancement to grandiosity,

and so forth.
At any rate,

it should be emphasized that in the presence of a

chronic clinical elevation in core affect, maladaptive defensive

maneuvers of one type or another would be pervasively predominant
over adaptive ones.

.
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Obviously, matters can become
quite complicated with increasing
levels of core affect and functional
(cognitive) manifestations of
anxiety.

In this

case, the defensive maneuvers,
while still being

observed as such, could acquire very
idiosyncratic and unrealistic
perspecti ves
An example of the above could be
seen in the thoughts of

person about being irradiated with

a

a

ray of wisdom by a man on the

moon
The defensive maneuvers may be classified
in terms of the defen-

sive actions that they purportedly portray.

Said defensive reactions

are labelled as avoidant, active, and
passive.

Avoidant Defensive Maneuvers

The avoidant defensive maneuvers generally operate to
prevent

acknowledgement of the core affect or of the discomfort associated
with

it.

In the

adaptive group one may include, for example, realistic

self-enhancement.

In

this case, the person uses valid information

to increase his sense of security by enhancing himself in context

with

a

particular environmental challenge or demand for competence.

A situation which may be applicable in the latter case is when

an individual's unwitting sense of threat is elevated by the compe-

tent performance of

a

coworker, but said individual recognizes his

performance as just as competent.
In the

maladaptive group of avoidant maneuvers one could include,

,
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denial of subjective discomfort
or concern, intellectual
and rationalization, among others.

i

zation

Obviously, these defensive maneu-

vers are very common and their
function again is to prevent the

acknowledgement of emotional pain or its
functional effects.
The main characteristics of these
defensive maneuvers are that
they basically are all cognitive
formulations of one type or another
and that in their case feelings are for
the most part not acknow-

ledged, but rationalized.
An anecdotal
a

example which comes to mind, is the statement
by

depressed young woman about how unhappy her father
must have been

when she was younger because he used to travel all the
time and could
not spend

a

lot of time with her.

Active Defensive Maneuvers

The active defensive maneuvers are characterized by some kind
of reactive activity, and appear to be more closely associated with
the physical manifestations of anxiety than the others.

The adaptive maneuvers in this case are those related to goal-

directed activity, such as, alertness, motivation, and the like.
The maladaptive maneuvers of the active type are further classi-

fied into three types.

These are, the primary emotional reactions,

neurotic symptoms, and somatization.

Primary emotional reactions

.

as, anger, jealousy, and the

The primary emotional reactions, such
like are considered here to be defen-
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sive maneuvers in the form
of response tendencies
aimed at counteracting emotional pain.
The latter view is in considerable
agreement with the notion of
emotional behavioral reactions being
response tendencies based on

intuitive appraisal accompanied by
physiological changes organized
toward approach or avoidance (Arnold,
1960).

However, while the development of
particular types of primary

emotional reactions may have been influenced
by cultural, develop-

mental, and other factors, the neural
substrate for their expression
appears to be present in all cases.
For example, emotions, such as, anger,
disgust, sadness, and
a

combination of fear-surprise appear to have
unambiguous facial

expressions across cultures according to

a

recent review by Ekman and

Oster (1979).
At any event, the primary emotional

reactions appear to be

modulated by defensive physiological mechanisms to some extent.

Per-

haps, this is the reason for their appearing to be facilitated
by an-

xiety or

a

state of general arousal.

The maladaptive properties of the primary emotional

reactions are

associated with an obvious lack of correspondence with the environmental reality.

For example, the parent who physically assaults an

infant because the latter is crying and the parent is unable to sleep.

Another example could be, the unjustified jealousy of

a

vulner-

able man who observes his spouse talking amicably with another man.

Clearly, the exaggerated and inappropriate nature of the defen-
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sive reaction to the circumstances
may be

primary emotional reactions.

a

It seems the

hallmark of maladaptive
individual appears to

react as if he was facing an
imminent threat which is not
there.
Of course, the apparent defensive
reaction to

a

nonexistent

threat is characteristic of maladaptive
defensive maneuvers of any
type, but it appears more evident in
behaviors such as anger and the
like.

Naturally, when facing

a

real

danger such primary emotional re-

actions, especially anger, may be very
appropriate and possibly
just as necessary then as anxiety could
be for survival.

Neurotic symptoms.

It

would be unlikely to find arguments against

considering symptoms, such as, tics, compulsions,
obsessions, phobias,
and the like to be maladaptive.
In

the view of the model

being proposed, these behaviors are

considered to be defensive maneuvers against the sensation of
danger
which defines core affect.

In these cases,

the persons are aware

sometimes of the anxiety which is elicited by core affect, or may
become aware of such an anxiety without much difficulty.
As a matter of fact,

cases what the individual

the manifestations of anxiety are in many

intentionally is trying to avoid.

The mechanism in operation here would be that the person whose

emotional pain is above

a

normal

level, learns at one time or another

to use a particular behavior to counteract his sense of vulnerability,

and hence the manifestations of anxiety.

Therefore, whenever anxiety
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is

in effect,

the person performs the
behavior in question and an-

xiety decreases.
been

a

Obviously, anxiety decreases
because there has

palliative decrease in core affect.

SomaMzaj^on.

Somatic complaints are also
considered here to be

used as maladaptive defensive
maneuvers in many instances.
In the case of somatization,

the brain of the individual

learns

to use the somatic complaints to
validate somewhat his vulnerability

and to obtain nurturance from his
environment, or to avoid

a

challeng-

ing situation.
It seems

that in this case, the person learns
to use physical

manifestations of anxiety on target organs which
may be sensitive to
such an anxiety.
In

many instances, such as for example, in some
cases of pain,

colitis and many others, the person lives in

a

continuous saga of

treatment from one professional to another, but never
achieving the
resolution

of

his problem.

Naturally, the stressful nature of the symptoms themselves increases core affect, which in turn causes an increase

in anxiety,

which in turn makes the symptoms more severe.
While somatization has some elements of avoidance and helplessness,
is

its major characteristic as

a

maladaptive defensive maneuver

considered here to be the use of physical anxiety on sensitive

target organs and using the symptoms to deal with the environment.
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Passive Def ensive Maneuvpr*;

The principal mechanism in
operation in the maladaptive
passive

defensive maneuvers is the cognitive
and functional validation of
core affect, that is, a functional
surrender to core affect.
Said
differently, it is like giving up to
an unwitting sensation of inevitable harm and of being helpless to
prevent it.

Obviously, the latter

occurs in degrees.
In

this situation

as, for example,

a

person has learned to understand core
affect

hopelessness, and to validate it in terms of
his

beliefs about himself and the environment.

In

other words, the brain

has learned to process the sensation of vulnerability
as

a

state of

hopelessness as if facing some imminent and inevitable
danger.

Ob-

viously, the cognitive interpretations by the individual
of himself
and of the environment would reflect that feeling of
hopelessness.

Clearly the situation being discussed

condition known as depression.

It

is

one instance of the

should be noted that our view of

depression is in some agreement with the view of such
terms of

a

a

condition in

learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975).

Now, while there appear to be definite physiological manifes-

tations of this negative cognitive state, these are considered to be
part of the defensive maneuver and not its cause.
That is, it is postulated here that the alterations in the acti-

vity of neurotransmitter substances and other accompanying physiological concomitants in depression occur as

a

result of the functional

validation of core affect by the
brain"•

In
in

this case, m,
tnis
the expression

of the analog of ongoing
experience would be constituted
by the cognitive interpretation of the
environment as inevitably harmful
to-

gether with the beliefs associated
with such an interpretation
and
the many physiological concomitants
to depression.
It should be observed that the
preceding construction of the

condition known as depression assigns
to the antidepressant drugs
the role of modulators of some of the
neurochemical changes which

result from the validation of core affect
by the brain.

Like with

the drugs used in the management of
anxiety, the use of antidepres-

sants is postulated to be useful as an
assuasive course of action in

depression rather than as

a

treatment which would produce psychothera-

peutic change.
The improvement which may be obtained in depression
with cog-

nitive psychotherapy (Beck et al., 1979) supports
the above view.

According to the view proposed here, during the conditions
of
helplessness or hopelessness (i.e., depression)
dual

is

is

when the indivi-

most directly in cognitive contact with core affect.

The

other time is during the experiencing of core affect as fear.
The adaptive types of the passive defensive maneuvers may reflect
some of the most tender and productive ways to interact with the en-

vironment.

In this

case the person appears to unwittingly use the

emotional pain not only to obtain nurturance but to offer it to some-

one else.
For example,

in

the case of empathy, the intensity of the per-

.
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son's vulnerability is increased
with the observation of
someone
else's suffering.
That is, the behavior indicative
of an elevation
in core affect displayed by
the person who is suffering
is a generic
cognitive input symbolic of danger
to the observer.

Naturally, the observer is not aware
of the process, but when
his emotional

pain or core affect is elevated
he may use such

sation to identify with the other
person's suffering.

a

sen-

That is, there

is a cognitive interpretation
of the situation as painful

by the ob-

server, directly as the consequence
of an elevation in his own core
affect.

In this way,

the observer's own discomfort becomes

a

relative

index of the pain being suffered by the
other person.
In

love, just like in the case of any other
defensive maneuver,

the purpose is to satisfy the person's
subliminal need of safety.

Obviously, at the ideal adaptive level love is prompted
by
range of vulnerability.

The latter would mean that

fying feeling of safety and

a

normal

mutually satis-

sense of equal responsibility and com-

petence would be characteristic of
a

a

a

a

relationship between

a

man and

woman whose levels of vulnerability would be at an ideally normal

range
Of course, the perfect relationship does not exist according
to our proposed model,

because the intensity of emotional pain fluc-

tuates according to physical and environmental demands and both members could not keep an ideally normal

continuously.

level of such

Thus, the degree of closeness

in

a

core affect

the relationship would

be determined by the degree of vulnerability of each of the members
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of the couple and by the types of
defensive reactions and strategic
les

each would display towards the other
during any given period of time.

Bethatasitmay,

it is

possible to conceive the possibility
of

an idyllic relationship in the case
where both members of the couple

are only vulnerable to an ideally normal
It should be

level.

indicated that there may be other factors
in

love relationship which decrease core affect.

a

These factors are cog-

nitive elements in ongoing experience which are
symbolic of safety.
That is, they are associated with

a

reduction in core affect.

Such

cognitive elements may particularly include, but not be
limited to,
the physical and other personal

characteristics of someone which one

may like or find pleasant.
Perhaps it should be brought up at this point that the confrontation of core affect or its derivatives appears to be useful in

softening the persistent nature of any of the maladaptive defensive

maneuvers during the course of therapy.
Obviously, if the defensive maneuvers and anxiety are in reaction to

a

subliminal anticipation of danger or vulnerability anything

which would decrease said core affect would also cause fading of the

defensive maneuvers and decrease the anxiety.
Perhaps the most obvious proof for the preceding assumptions
are the improvements which are obtained in anxiety and the defensive

maladaptive maneuvers by just receiving emotional support.
The construction of ongoing experience by the brain is influenced
by the intensity of core affect.

Thus, when the vulnerability is
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above normal the cognitive
representation of ongoing
experience
becomes symbolic of danger and
in t U rn further increases
the intensity of core affect.
However, with consistently
frequent cognitive input which

refutes the notion of environmental
danger the cognitive interpre-

tation of ongoing experience eventually
would be more objective or
more of a cognitive analog of the
environment.
As such, the afferent

communication from the cortex to the
limbic region would not contain
elements of danger, but rather statements
about the absence of the
1

atter.

Obviously, in the latter situation there
would be an unwitting

ancitipation of danger which is being constantly
dissociated from
the cognitive elements of the representation
of ongoing experience,
and which is gradually diminishing as

a

result of

a

lack of cognitive

stimuli which would elicit it.
In

context with the preceding,

understanding of core affect as

a

a

person may be instructed in the

subliminal

sensation separate from

the cognitive representation of ongoing experience.

That is, one may,

for example, feel worthless, but be able to cognitively
appreciate
the fallacy of such

a

Similarly, when

feeling.
a

person is called stupid, he may identify the

elevation in core affect as

a

feeling of being stupid, but admit to

himself that he is not and subsequently not feel stupid anymore.
Therefore, one may confront core affect directly in the same
manner.
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To that effect, the
clinical

of this theoretical

interventions during the course

investigation have obtained gradual

ment in defensive behaviors and
other symptoms

in

improve-

most instances

when the person has been instructed
to tell himself that he feels
in danger,

but that there is no danger,
either in

or only during moments of increased
discomfort.

been especially useful

in the cases

a

scheduled manner

This technique has

where there have been severe

physical symptoms.
It

should be specified that the latter
instructions have gra-

dually produced the desired results even
when the person has been
invited to follow the instructions without being
informed initially
about the reasons for doing so.
This confrontation of the intensity of the
emotional pain with
the objective environmental

reality can be done in several different

ways to obtain the desired decrease in the frequency of
the maladaptive behaviors and in other symptoms.
it may be successful

the process of

a

However, the degree to which

appears to depend on it being instituted within

psychotherapeutic relationship.

Interpersonal Relationships

Generally speaking, all human relationships are modulated by
the intensity of core affect.

Therefore, depending on how symbolic

of safety the relationship is, that is how strong the need is to

preserve

it.

The latter difference could be obvious between the

relationship among two coworkers and the one between spouses.
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In terms of the model

the capacity of

a

being proposed, it may be concluded
that

person to establish and maintain
satisfying close

interpersonal relationships is an inverse
function of how subliminally

insecure such

a

ly proportional

person is.

That is, such

a

capacity would be inverse-

to the intensity of core affect,
particularly in the

case of elevations above its normal range.
It

appears evident that our society impresses as being
very

compressed and that the person lives in constant
interpersonal interaction.

Regardless of what one is doing or thinking, or where one

is coming from or going to,

it

is

almost impossible to avoid inter-

acting directly or indirectly with others.

It

would appear then,

that the lion's share of core affect elevations are associated with

interpersonal and/or social demands.
Being

a

social creature, as assumed by this work, the defensive

maneuvers an individual uses to cope with core affect in his interaction with the environment would, to an enormous extent, operate
in

the interpersonal

context.

For example,

a

very vulnerable person

would have difficulty with trusting and feeling competent enough
to become close to someone without some sort of discomfort associated

with core affect.
As postulated here,

for emotional

competence.

interpersonal closeness acts as
In

other words, for

a

a

demand

person to feel secure

with others he must have some measure of feeling secure within himself.
In

the case of

a

vulnerable person,

a

demand for emotional or

.
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interpersonal competence is very
threatening.
at closeness in the latter
case would cause

a

Therefore, attempts

further elevation in

core affect.
The latter is

a

paradox in the sense that the
person who may

need the most the secure and
competent feeling of closeness
cannot

tolerate said closeness because the demand
for the emotional com-

petence required exacerbates his insecurity.
At any rate,

minal

if a person is being affected
by an intense subli-

sensation of threat his tendencies would be
to interact with

the environment in an apprehensive manner.

That is, as if he was

in some sort of inconspicuous danger.
In

that case, he could unwittingly make excessive
demands from

his environment for nurturance and/or react to
it defensively or with

hostility.

For example it is quite common to find that no
matter

how much support one may offer at

particular time to someone who may

a

be very dependent or depressed it may not be considered
enough by that

person, especially on an initial contact.

comfort far exceeds
vul nerabi

1 i

a

It seems that the need of

reasonable limit during periods of augmented

ty

At any rate, during any given period of time, the behavior,

thoughts, beliefs, and feelings of

efforts to defend against

a

a

person would reflect unwitting

subliminal

sensation of danger in context

with the environment and interpersonal relationships.
Being that core affect is, according to our view, the motivating

force underlying the person's investment into interpersonal relation-
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ships, ,t is not difficult
to conceive the
therapeutic relationship
as a vehicle foe the
realization of such a core affect
or vulnerability.

CHAPTER

VI

PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC CHANGE

Psychotherapy is based on the assumption
of its own effectl-vei

ess

as a method which may make evident
an equally assumed change-

ability of behavior.

Change in this case may be sought through
ways

which may include but not be limited to
behavioral, psychological,
or social manipulation and the purveyance
of support and communica-

tion by another person trained in such endeavors
(Enelow, 1977).
It

is

extremely likely that at this very moment

a

given number

of clinicians is engaged in efforts ranging from their
best to their

worst, to help promote change in one particular aspect or more
of
an individual's life.

The methods or approaches used by such clini-

cians may vary among them, but the purpose is always to produce change
in the direction of a goal

set by either the therapist and client

jointly, or unilaterally by one or the other.
However, when change may be suspected of having taken place,
one can but only infer that such

a

change took place from the obser-

vable behavior of the individual, from the reports of others, or
from that individual's own reports.

Thus, what actually took place

as an intrinsic aspect of the individual,

that is, the nature of the

change and the process by which that change occurred may be considered
to belong in the realm of theory.
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The abundance of theories of therapy
creates the possibility

of

a

different theory behind the therapeutic
efforts of each one of

several clinicians at any particular
point in time.
is

Moreover, it

likely that the number of theories of
therapy will increase rather

than decrease.

To this latter effect,

it has been reasonably obser-

ved that the disappearance of any
particular school of psychological

theory has
will

a

low probability due to the loyalty many
of its followers

invariably demonstrate (Frank, 1978).

Therefore, one may find

theories of therapy ranging from concerns about observable
behaviors
and events to concerns about inferential perspectives.
In a

conservative form of behavior modification, for example,

the clinician may be more concerned about observable behaviors and

events than about inferences related to mediational processes for
the behaviors observed (Wolpe,

1969).

deal only with observable behavior.

Thus, the intention is to

Such is the case of systematic

desensitization where the basic underlying mechanism of change has
been assumed to be the incompatibility between the behavioral symp-

toms of an emotional state, such as the recognized fear of

ticular object, and physical relaxation.
just the fact that

a

Despite

a

par-

its limitations,

method such as systematic desensitization may

be successfully applied in some cases may be sufficient justification

for its utilization independently of the possible idiosyncrasies of
the theory behind it.

However, it could be noted that the relaxation component of

systematic desensitization has been conceived as being

a

matter of
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mental, rather than physical
relaxation in the case
where instructions are given to the subject
to sel f- i nstruct to
hecahn (Michenhau™,
1977).
As it is evident in the
latter procedure, the same
incorporates

cognitive changes into the sphere
of the techniques of
behavioral
modification to constitute one
instance of what has become
to be known
as cognitive-behavior
modification (Mahoney, 1974;
Michenbaum, 1977).
It appears

that the prominent distinction
between behavior modifica-

tion and cognitive-behavior
modification resides in the expressed

theoretical and methodological emphasis
of cognitive causal factors
in the

latter and the lack of that same
emphasis in the former.

The theoretical emphasis on the

cognitive causation of what

have been labelled as emotional disorders
is characteristic of several

models of behavioral change which emphasize
cognitive theory and

methodology (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962).
instance it has been suggested that in

a

For example, in one

condition such as depression,

the cognitive structures or mechanisms are
not themselves disordered,

but rather that the contents of the cognitions do
not correspond to

external realities (Beck, 1976).
In

other terms, the premises upon which

a

person bases his be-

liefs and imaginal experiences may be incorrect.

This way, in

a

case

such as clinical depression, the ideas one may have about the environ-

ment and oneself and the facts about the external world emerge as
sort of cognitive conflict.

self as

a

a

That is, such as having notions of one-

failure while the evidence points toward the opposite.

,

.
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The origin of such cognitive
distortions is assumed to be
defective learning during the
person's development, and thus,
subject
to change or correction through
the semantic exchange between
the

client and the therapist, and through
cognitive exercises (Beck et
1979; Emery et al

.

,

1981

al

.

)

Besides the theoretical ascription of
therapeutic change to
the direct effect of cognitive changes
or behavioral manipulations,

intense emotional experiences have been
suggested to also produce
some type of psychotherapeutic change (Frank,
1974).

A related si-

tuation may be described by the following description
of personality
change, in connection with the analysis of

a

minor revolution at

a

Japanese relocation camp (Leighton, 1946).
It is fairly well recognized in psychology that
at periods
of great emotional stir the individual human being can
undergo far-reaching and permanent changes in his personality.
It is as if the bone structure of his systems of
belief and of this habitual patterns of behavior becomes
soft, is fused into new shapes and hardens there when the
period of tension is over. (p. 360)

It is,

in terms of the preceding,

a

known fact that several

contemporary psychotherapeutic approaches emphasize the dominant role
played by intentional emotional experiences in therapeutic change.
It

appears obvious that although the many different forms of

therapy, even those not referred to here, emphasize different or

combined theoretical formulations and may utilize similar or different
techniques, they all have in common,

in

varying interpersonal degrees,

the relationship between the client and the therapist.

This relationship by force has to be considered unique in each

.
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instance.

No matter how consistent
across situations the therapist

may attempt to be, the variability
from one client to another
would
have a differential effect on the
different client-therapist relationships.

This personal

interaction between the client and the
therapist

appears so related to therapeutic change
that
the theoretical

models of psychotherapy.

In

(Rogers, 1951) process-oriented

the interactional model, for example,

the client replaces maladaptive interpersonal

It

a

has been used as

core of the therapeutic maneuvers in
interactional

(Cashdan, 1973) and interpersonal

ones as

it

strategies with adaptive

result of his interaction with the therapist (Cashdan

,

1

973)

seems more reasonable to assume that each therapeutic rela-

tionship has certain unique properties, as may occur between any
two
persons, independently of the technique used, than to assume that
the therapeutic relationship would always be the same given

cular theoretical approach or

a

like in any other interpersonal
the relationship

a

particular technique.

In

a

parti-

other words,

interaction, each member brings into

different set of defensive maneuvers and many other

factors, such as differences in sex, race, culture, education, age,
and so forth.

Moreover, the differences between therapeutic interactions could
be considered liable to increase if it has been correctly observed

that there is

a

trend in psychology toward eclecticism in the practice

of therapy, while particular theoretical orientations may still be

professed by the same eclectic practitioners (Mahoney, 1977).

However,

.
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despite the potential for said differences

it

is our

contention in

material ahead that the process through
which the therapeutic rela-

tionship develops appears to be generically the
same in all instances.

Despite the differences among clinicians in terms
of the theories
they subscribe to, the techniques they use, and the
type of relationship they seek, or even have with the client, it
that all

is

fairly evident

formal psychotherapeutic interventions may achieve relative-

ly satisfactory results at one level or another of outcome
criteria

(Smith, Glass & Miller, 1980).
The latter appears to be in agreement with the related suggestion

that the treatment of what have been formally recognized as emotional

disorders may predominantly follow any one of three methodological
or theoretical routes, that is, cognitive, behavioral, or affective
and achieve somewhat similar results (Frank, 1973).

based on the model considered in this work, that it

One may observe
is

a

combination

of these functional routes which is challenged during the therapeutic

process
Except for didactic or experimental reasons, it would be ludicrous to assume, even in an extreme form of behaviorism, that the

therapist would be interacting with the client at only one functional
level

whole.

rather than with the very complex makeup of the person as
It

is

a

impossible to look at any particular form of therapy

and in the absence of

a

theoretical bias not to consider that cog-

nitive and affective changes and manipulations or, as suggested by
Enelow (1977), reinforcement of certain behaviors of the client by the
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therapist are part of such
on

a

process.

Thus, despite the emphasis

particular theoretical perspective
or

a

therapist is dealing with

a

of that system to which such

a

specific technique the

whole system rather than with
the part
a

theory or technique may apply.

Now it seems that all formal
psychological clinical approaches

may achieve somewhat satisfactory
results at one level or another.
These results may be considered possible
with the use of simil ar or

different techniques based on the same theory
or on different theori es
in a therapeutic relationship with

sonal

elements.

a

unique combination of interper-

Therefore, it appears that something happens
in each

case which is common to all therapeutic attempts
which achieve any

relative measure of success in meeting their goals.
Evidently, in agreement with the model being proposed
in this
work, what is common to all partially or completely
successful psycho-

therapeutic situations

is

probably what appears to be either

or durable functional change which may take place as

a

a

passing

result of the

intervention.

Without question, the basic change being addressed here
a

is

either

transient or lasting reduction in the intensity of core affect as

a

result of the therapeutic intervention.
The enduring character of the reduction in core affect or it

fugacious nature would be determined by either the fulfillment of the

psychotherapeutic process in the former or the lack of its realization
in the

latter.

Obviously, the latter means, according to our view,

that psychotherapeutic change occurs if and only if the therapeutic
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process reaches maturity.
In other words,

psychotherapeutic change

is

a

basic reduction

in the intensity of core affect
to a fairly stable normal
a

function of the psychotherapeutic
process.

lization of such

a

range as

Obviously, the norma-

sensation of threat would be accompanied
by an

increase in adaptive defensive maneuvers,
by the fading of symptoms
and maladaptive maneuvers, and by
sal

a

more realistic cognitive apprai-

of ongoing experience.
As stipulated, as

a

result of the process of psychotherapy,
the

normalization of core affect occurs to an adaptive
baseline.

This

baseline would be just the amount of vulnerability
necessary to maintain tonic cognitive and affective functions.

However, as indicated

earlier, core affect could become elevated above its normal
range by
physical and environmental challenges or stressors in the course
of
living.

Therefore, symptoms and maladaptive maneuvers may be present

during those periods at which there are core affect elevations above
the normalized level.

Nonetheless, if the person has gone through the whole process of

therapy according to the model proposed, it

postulated that he

is

should ordinarily be able to recognize the recurrence of symptoms
and maladaptive defensive maneuvers as indicators of an elevation
in core affect and use the understanding acquired during psychotherapy
to confront such an elevation

After all, once

a

in

vulnerability.

person has completed

he is supposed to enjoy the emotional

a

full

course of therapy

competence required to confront
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adversity, at least under less than
catastrophic conditions.
Naturally, under catastrophic conditions
the person's vulnera-

bility is so intense that he may
temporarily display symptoms and

maladaptive defensive maneuvers.
discussed in Chapter

3

The reasons for the latter, as

earlier, are the aggregated functional
effects

on the brain and the rest of the body of
an intense core affect.

However, once the crisis is over his core affect
would gradually

subside and the person would recover capacity to
cope with emotional
pain, with
It

return of vulnerability to

a

a

more or less normal range.

may be necessary in some cases where recovery is not prompt

after the crisis is over for the person to again contact the
therapist

briefly for

a

booster interpretation of current circumstances in terms

of an elevated core affect.
Now,

in order for the person to be alerted of an increased vul-

nerability by anxiety, negative thinking, maladaptive behavior, or
other symptoms, he must understand what core affect is, how the brain
and the rest of the body react to it, and what sort of defensive

maneuvers he uses or has used to cope with

it.

The latter knowledge

does not appear difficult to acquire during psychotherapy with spe-

cific techniques befitting the model being proposed.

Psychotherapeutic Techniques

As

it would be evident to those who would formulate emotional

disturbances in terms of core affect, most techniques used in psychotherapy would be in agreement with the model being proposed, even

.
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though they may have been conceptualized
under other theoretical
auspi ces

For example,

a

particular therapeutic approach mentioned
earlier

which is entirely supported by the theory of
core affect

is

the inter-

actional model of therapy suggested by Cashdan
(1973).

Cashdan suggests as the basis for his model of therapy
the need
of people to interact with and depend on one and other
for their emotional wellbeing.

The incapacity to achieve a sense of emotional

wellbeing is in this case associated with the display of maladaptive
interpersonal strategies by the person.

Obviously, these concepts

are in complete agreement with the interpersonal

needs stipulated

as manifestations of core affect.

After an initial period of supportive interaction, Cashdan suggests the confrontation of the maladaptive strategies displayed

towards the therapist and others by the client and the channelling
of the client's behavior to the display of more competent interpersonal

strategies.

At any rate, therapeutic change is evident when

the client is free from symptoms and consistently displays competent

behavior.

While Cashdan's model of therapy is not discussed here in enough
detail to offer

a

complete picture of its process, suffice it to note

that is theoretical foundations and techniques are in comparative

agreement with the core affect principles considered in this work.
Moreover, Cashdan's therapy model fits well into the process of therapy based on core affect which is considered in pages ahead.
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While the theoretical mode!
being proposed

is

amenable to most

therapeutic techniques, there are
some specific interventions
which
are particularly suited to
the model.
The principal one of these
interventions is helping the
client

understand himself in terms of an
unwitting anticipation of danger
or vulnerability.
In the latter case the client
would learn what core

affect is, learn to recognize it if
possible, and become aware of the
defensive maneuvers he uses to cope with
it.

In addition,

anxiety manifestations of any type would
be inter-

preted to the client in terms of defensive
reactions to core affect.

Similarly, the effects of core affect on thoughts
and beliefs would
be interpreted as such, rather than in
terms of the lexical

content.

Particularly helpful with this model has been to
explain to the
client that his problems or symptoms are direct or
indirect consequences of an elevated core affect and not due to
disease, and to

describe to him the process of psychotherapy.
Obviously, these latter interventions may be performed at any

appropriate time during the course of therapy, but usually their initiation has been found to be most propitious during the earliest
phase of therapy.
Of course,

a

basic aim of these interventions is to allow the

client to objectify his feelings.
in terms of the actual

That is, to confront the feelings

circumstances surrounding him.

For example,

if a person expresses paranoid thinking the feeling behind those

thoughts is gradually reduced through semantic exchange to an antici-
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pation of danger which the client is then
asked to confront in context with the actual

nondangerous circumstances surrounding him.

As explained earlier, the cognitive input
to the cortex then

would be

a

causes

cortical afferent input to the limbic system of

a

danger.

negation of the limbic sensation of danger, which

The theory assumes that this repeated cortical

a

in

turn

lack of

afferent in-

put to the limbic system is what gradually reduces core
affect and

allows for it to be understood and perceived as

a

pure sensation of

a

supportive inter-

danger.

Similarly, the message the brain gets from
action is also of

a

lack of danger because the analog cognitive repre

sentation of the therapist and his behavior in the brain
a

source of safety.

is

that of

The latter is, according to the model proposed,

why emotional support decreases core affect.
Naturally, the traditional view of organized subconscious psycho

dynamic processes would not be consistent with the model being proposed.

As such, during the clinical work preceding this writing

the existence of such processes has been purposefully de-emphasized.
It

is

noteworthy to mention that virtually all of the individuals

who completed

a

course of therapy and most of those who did not

during the period of clinical observations which form the basis for
this dissertation, found it very simple and palatable to understand

themselves and their problems in terms of the core affect theory.
To

a

considerable

extent

the specific interventions above aim

at equipping the client with skills to cope with elevations in core
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affect on an ongoing basis after leaving
therapy.

Thus reducing

the chance of any further need of therapy
under ordinary circum-

stances
It

.

is

important to emphasize that the most effective
ongoing

techniques during the course of therapy with this model
are the con-

frontation of negative feelings (core affect) with the
reality of
the surroundings and the interpretation of behavior in
terms of core

affect.
It

should be pointed out, however, that while direct confronta-

tion of core affect is most effective, indirect confrontation of the

sensation of threat may be necessary in cases where the person is not

acquainted yet with core affect or when the capacity to conceptualize
such

a

core affect is not present.

In

this case, the particular fee-

ling or thought may be explored in the same form as it is perceived
by the person rather than as a sensation of threat.

For example,

a

person

whose core affect emerges as

of guilt, could be led to confront such
of not being quilty of anything.

a

a

feeling

feeling with the reality

That is, one may feel

in a parti-

cular way which does not conform to the reality of the environment.
Clearly, the techniques mentioned above are just
types of clinical
model.

a

few of the

interventions which could be performed with this

Among the types of clinical interventions which are compa-

tible with or supported by the core affect model are virtually all
of the cognitive, interpersonal, and behavioral

techniques.

It should be pointed out that using the specific techniques of
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interpretation and confrontation of
core affect indicated above,
and the model

in general, considerable
expediency appears to be

achieved in completing the whole
process of psychotherapy in
tively short period of time.
the model

a

rela-

For example, it has been found
with

being proposed that under favorable
circumstances the pro-

cess may have been completed in as few
as ten sessions.

However,

that matter requires further investigation
with quantitative para-

meters

.

The Process of Psychotherapy

In

terms of core affect theory, the process of
psychotherapy

can only occur as

a

function of the relationship between the client

and the therapist.
It becomes

necessary that

a

competent interpersonal relation-

ship be established between the therapist and the client for the

process of psychotherapy to be completed and produce the normalization of core affect.
The latter means that, according to our view, the therapeutic

relationship has to proceed from one of dependency on the therapist
as

a

provider of safety to one where the client feels on equal ground

with the therapist.
In

our view, therapeutic change occurs when the client accepts

responsibility for his own sense of safety and the therapeutic relationship shifts to

a

close interpersonal one, where both the client

and the therapist perceive each other without apprehension and as
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competent persons.

In

apeutic relationship to

other words, the change would be from
a

a

ther-

competent social relationship.

As stated earlier, core affect is proposed here to
be the moti-

vating force underlying all interpersonal relationships.
it is

Therefore,

not surprising to find that in order for core affect to be

normalized the process of therapeutic change depends
ment of

a

on the develop-

competent interpersonal relationship between the client

and the therapist.

Since core affect is

a

subliminal sensation of threat or danger

which is most apparent in the interpersonal realm, it fits that
relief from such an emotional pain be sought in an interpersonal context.

It should be observed that the

latter is largely predetermined

by the recognition and establishment of interpersonal

relationships

as sources of nurturance and safety during the period before adult-

hood.

Obviously, the latter process is

a

functional aspect of the

brain and one may not be quite aware of it.
Since the therapeutic relationship is the medium for the norma-

lization of core affect, the process of psychotherapy has to be

considered in terms of the changes in the intensity of core affect
as a function of the phases

sonal

in the

development of such an interper-

relationship.
The process of psychotherapy is depicted graphically by Figure

16 on the following page.

Obviously, such

a

graphical

representation is purely theoretical

since the core affect curve shown has to be generically qualitative.
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That is, it is postulated,
according to the clinical
observations
upon which it is based, that the
curve varies somewhat in
each individual case.

It should be

curve would not be

a

emphasized that such

a

vulnerability

smooth one as represented in the
illustration

due to the constant fluctuation in
the intensity of core affect.
The latter means that the relative
proportions of vulnerability

represented in the illustration on the
vertical axis are qualitative
rather than representing absolute values
in the intensity of core
affect.

Similarly, the theoretical periods for the
process of psycho-

therapy indicated on the horizontal axis of the
illustration do not

represent actual values for the duration of each period.

Like for

the intensity of core affect, it is postulated
that the duration of

each period of the process of psychotherapy will vary with
each
individual case.

However, the illustration depicts the qualitative changes in
the intensity of core affect

(shaded area) which can be predicted

as a function of the therapeutic process.

Such qualitative changes

are based on the similar relative variations in core affect indirectly observed in all

the cases which completed

a

course of psychotherapy

during the three years which preceded this writing.
The latter means that, according to our model, the process of

psychotherapy

is

words, such

process is always constituted by the different periods

a

qualitatively identical in every case.

or phases represented by Figure 16 in the preceding page.

In

other
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The process of psychotherapy,
as the illustration
indicates,
is divided

model

into four chronological

periods which according to the

proposed can be predicted in every
case.

mm^enod,

the

termination period
In

cjntUaJjenod,

the

These phases are the

o^tej^^

.

addition, the illustration depicts
certain points in therapy

which have considerable clinical importance.

The first point (A)

represents the very initial contacts with
the client.
is

and the

The latter

followed by the point where the critical
period begins

to the pull on the client for emotional

ship.

from

(B)

due

competence by the relation-

Next comes the critical point (C) where the
client shifts
a

very high vulnerability to

a

feeling of wellbeing.

The last

three points of interest are the peak of discomfort
during termination

(D),

the last session (E), and the period after therapy (F).

Parenthetically, the theoretical process curve for emotional
pain depicted by Figure 16 appears to qualitatively coincide with
the core affect curve which could be construed for the developmental

progression from birth to adulthood.
tical

latter case, the cri-

In the

period, for example, would represent adolescence.

Support period

.

There is no question about the favorable consequences

of support being the most blatant evidence for the sensation of vul-

nerability postulated as core affect.
elevation in core affect enters

a

When

person with

a

clinical

therapeutic interaction

a

decrease

in vulnerability can invariably be seen

a

immediately.

As depicted by
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Figure 16, the point of entry into
the relationship
the highest level

in

(A)

represents

the intensity of core affect.

Naturally, no matter how much support
one may offer it may not be
enough and the client may withdraw from
the relationship immediately.
Also, the extreme vulnerability in
the client during the initial

contacts itself acts as

unwittingly perceived as

barrier to therapy because support
may be

a

a

sign of closeness, which would be
very

threatening due to the demands for emotional
competence it imposes.
During this period of supportive interaction
the sensation of

danger gradually decreases tonically.

Obviously, during this period

the client performs considerable work in
understanding himself and

confronting his core affect, but always deriving

sense of safety

a

from the relationship with the therapist.

According to our observations, the benefits of support and increased understanding arrive at
optimal

level

of effect.

a

point where they have reached their

At this point the client feels comfortable,

usually the symptoms are either mild or absent to

a

great extent, and

the client is coping with his environment with mostly adaptive maneu-

vers

.

It is during this period when the therapist begins to relate

to the client in ways which establish

from such

a

client.

a

demand for competent behavior

The latter may be in the form of merely asking

the client where he feels he is in therapy or how close to termination
he is.

Also, for example, just by relating to the client as if he

was an emotionally competent or secure person.

.
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The onset of the discomfort
associated with the latter is
indicated by B in Figure 16 and
initiates the second stage or
period
of psychotherapy.

Cri tical

peri od,

it is

during this period where the
sense of vul-

nerability reaches high levels as

result of the demands for com-

a

petence from the therapeutic relationship.
A most interesting aspect of this
phase is that the person feels

terrible but is generally handling his
environment adequately.
A vignette which comes to mind is that
of

a

woman who reported

suicidal thoughts during this period just like
those at the onset of

therapy and to feel just as uncomfortable.

However, when asked to

describe her ongoing activities, she reportedly was enjoying
her work
and getting along with everybody, was busy taking care
of her family,

whose members were all suffering from influenza, and she herself
was taking antibiotics for

a

respiratory infection with strict ad-

herence to the prescription because she
i 1 1

desired

to get over her

ness

Needless to say, exploration of the discomfort evidenced

a

feeling

of threat quite separate from her environmental circumstances and

behavior.

Such

a

feeling of threat disappeared quite promptly after

being explored and confronted.

As

a

matter of fact, the client found

it quite humorous after the discomfort was explored and interpreted.

Clearly, one of the hallmarks of this period

is

that the client

returns to the use of some of the maladaptive defensive maneuvers
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displayed at the beginning of therapy.
Some clients may indicate being
bored with therapy, feeling
that

therapy does not help, or report

a

desire to leave therapy right

away because they feel as well as they
wanted to feel.

They may

insist on the therapist doing something
for them which would relieve

their discomfort quickly but not be able to
know what they are asking
for or display

a

host of other similar behaviors.

The behaviors listed above are aimed at breaking
the relationship, increased demands for nurturance, criticism,
and many other

defensive activities.
In parenthesis,

pist is also

a

it should be pointed out that since the thera-

participant in the establishment of the therapeutic

relationship his core affect would also be subject to significant

elevations during this period.
Therefore, this

is

a

time when the therapist may fall prey to

his own maladaptive defensive maneuvers.

Obviously, there are many

dangers associated with the latter situation.

For example, it appears

that this would be the stage of therapy where the therapist may be

most willing to allow the client to leave the relationship prematurely or make the client's statements and behavior his own personal

sues.

is-

Based on our construct of the process of therapy, the critical

period of psychotherapy

is

the phase where the therapist is most

likely to be technically or personally inappropriate.
At any rate,

a

prominent topic during this period

interpersonal relationships.

is

that of

Also, it is perhaps the stage at which

.
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most people leave ongoing psychotherapy for
one reason or another.

During this critical period the intensity of
core affect in-

creases to
into

a

a

maximal point of discomfort, which is the threshold

feeling of wellbeing.

This point of maximal discomfort is

considered here to be the critical or turning point in the
process
of psychotherapy and is indicated by

C

in Figure 16.

It should be stressed that according to the observations on
which

this process is based, the culmination of the sensation of threat
at this point can be very intense.

sive maneuvers may also be intense.

As such,

the maladaptive defen-

The latter means that depending

on the types of defensive maneuvers observed initially, the therapist
has to assist the client with the interpretation of the symptoms or

discomfort to avoid undesirable consequences.
For example, in the case of an initially depressed and suicidal

person, it is possible to predict that the same maladaptive maneuvers
may be displayed by the client during the critical period of therapy.

Especially important is to monitor cognitive function in

a

client

with original tendencies to become disorganized with core affect

elevations
It

is at the critical

point in psychotherapy where the cognitive

interpretation of core affect as an actual anticipation or sensation
of danger which is not consistent with environmental reality allows
the client to shift from being an insecure and vulnerable person to

start being the opposite.

The critical

poit is postulated as the

juncture where the limbic sensation of danger

is

finally defused and
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becomes increasingly susceptible to the normalizing effects of
the

established cognitive feedback of no danger which has been slowly
developing up to this point.

Basically, what the person does here

is to confront his own sense of vulnerability purely as a sensation

unrelated to environmental reality.

In

other words, affect is ob-

jectified.
Clearly, the sudden drop in core affect which occurs when the
critical point is crossed is considered to be encompassed by the

dissociation of

great part of the limbic anticipation of danger

a

from the functional analog of ongoing experience.

Therefore, the

cognitive interpretation of the environment becomes more realistic
and pragmatic.

In

many cases, however, the sudden drop in the inten-

sity of core affect and defensive reactions of the organism may cause
an exhilarating nurturant feeling of varying duration.

Once the client crosses the threshold into

a

feeling of compe-

tence the third phase of therapy starts.

Competence period

.

The hallmark of this period is the swift feeling

chronic

of relief and wellbeing which occurs with the shift from

a

clinical core affect to one closer to the normal range.

As

a

matter

of fact, some clients have reported considerable elation with the

process from vulnerability to
a

a

capacity to feel secure.

Obviously,

positive affective state is seen by the model of behavior being

proposed as

a

reduction in

a

negative affective state.

That is,

affect whicl
positive feelings are construed as the reduction in core
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corresponds to such feelings, rather than
as the activity of
cess antagonic to core affect.
is

In

other words,

a

pro-

positive affect

conceptualized as the relief from emotional
pain.
However, it is possible to postulate that

reduction in core

a

affect could activate or disinhibit some sort
of endorphin or endor-

phin-like activity in the brain.

The latter is more realistic in the

case of strong positive affect as the result of
in the

a

sudden large drop

intensity of core affect.

Thus, the brief exhilarating positive feeling which
may follow
the large drop in intensity of core affect at the critical
point in

therapy may be construed to be produced by the stimulation or disinhibition of such an endorphin or endorphin-1 ke activity.
i

It

is

during the competence period that the client may begin to

see core affect and the defensive maneuvers in others.

This is also

where it is common for the client to link developmental events to the

elevation in core affect which brought him into therapy.
Similarly characteristic during this stage of psychotherapy

is

for the client to become interested in learning about the process
and to tie ends to explain to himself the many behaviors, situations,

thoughts,

and

feelings which could come together now.

Clearly, the state of the relationship
and quasisocial at this point.

tion is introduced

Termination period

a

.

is

very close, pleasant

However, when the notion of termina-

new phase of therapy in entered.

There are two small elevations in core affect
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during this period.

One occurs when termination
is targeted, and

the other, which is smaller,
occurs with the last meeting
between
the therapist and the client,
indicated respectively by D
and E in
Figure 16.

Obviously, the end of therapy
is symbolic of the
loss of support
or of a safety factor and some
elevation in core affect takes
place.
However, like in any other situation,
interpretation of the discomfort as core affect by both the
client and the therapist is
performed^
but more in terms of an equal

relationship.

According to our view, the process of
normalization of core
affect is actually completed after
therapy has ended, as indicated
by

F

in

Figure 16.

In

other words, the client has to overcome
the

last strand of vulnerability attaching
him to the therapist and con-

tinue feeling secure without the contact
with the latter.

Naturally, the relationship continues from
then on at
less social

equal

level

a

and both the therapist and the client feel

to each other.

Such

a

more or
about

relationship should remain competent

and interpersonal ly satisfying after therapy
has ended.

A Question of Nomenclature

The foregoing section has considered therapeutic change as

a

functional shift from an elevated sensation of danger intrinsic to
the person to the reduced normal

tion

range of activity of such

a

sensa-

.

Clearly, the change has to do with the individual and not with
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his environment.

In addition,

the change occurs as

a

result of

a

process denominated as psychotherapy.
If the process described here
is psychotherapy, then a
distinc-

tion may be possible between the
latter and what could be labelled
as counselling.

The distinction being made here is that
psychotherapy is actually
a

functional change to

a

normalized core affect in the individual,

while counselling may be the manipulation
of behavior, environmental
factors, or relationships in terms of their
symbolic value of safety.

Naturally, the apparent reduction in core affect
in the latter
case is caused by the increase in safety factors
rather than by the

normalization of core affect.

With the removal of the safety factors,

core affect elevations would become evident again.
For example, an individual with an elevated core affect may
be

very sensitive to ordinary environmental stress, but if the stress
is

removed the manifestations of core affect could become milder, at

least temporarily.

However, if the stress is again brought into

the situation the manifestations of core affect would become evident

again.
On the other hand,

if the

same individual undergoes the process

of psychotherapy, his tolerance for ordinary stress would increase

substantially and he would not react

in the same

defensive manner to

ordinary environmental factors which were previously stressful.
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Other Applications

Since in the model being proposed core
affect is considered
to underlie human behavior it is not
difficult to assume that the

applications of such

a

model

are inexhaustible.

Discussion of all

the possible applications of the model would
most likely turn out

endless.

Besides, many of the applications of the model may
be best

approached from an empirical point of view.
Nonetheless, there are

a

few applications of the model of the

process of psychotherapy proposed here which would be probably appro-

priate to mention briefly.

Supervision

.

The concept of core affect and the process of psycho-

therapy postulated give strong indications of being very effective
in clinical

supervision.

The latter impression is based on the faci-

litative nature of the process in the supervision of clinicians.
In

terms of the preceding, the predictive properties of the

theoretical curve of the process of psychotherapy allow the clinician
and the supervisor to share

a

common theoretical framework to conceive

and formulate the developments in therapy.

bility for the prediction of the shifts

in

It is perhaps the capa-

core affect and the mani-

festations of the latter which make the model potentially very useful
in supervision.

Obviously, such

a

view emphasizes

a

formulation of the therapeu-

tic process in terms of the ongoing affective context rather than the

cognitive or behavioral content.

That is, the emphasis is on what is
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the affect being conveyed rather
than on how it is being
expressed.
C

linical group

s

etting.

An area where the proposed
core affect

model appears to work well

is

in clinical

interventions with mul-

tiple relationships, such as, with
couples, families, and groups.
In these cases core affect becomes
the common denominator of the

group and the relationships between group
members are construed in
terms of core affect.
The process appears virtually identical

to the one described

earlier, except that the process curve for each member
of the group
could be somewhat different from that of any other
member.

Clearly,

the differences would be in terms of where in the
process each member

of the group would be at any given time.
process tends to proceed at

a

It seems also that the

slower pace in group interventions

than in individual therapy.

Evaluation of outcome

.

A particular

property

of the model of the

process of psychotherapy being proposed is that it establishes para-

meters for outcome during its different stages.
Obviously, if the parameters for therapeutic change are construed only in terms of the normalization of core affect, then

outcome could only be evaluated in cases where the process of therapy
had reached maturity.

Since it is not unlikely that many persons drop out of therapy

before

a

long lasting therapeutic change occurs, the outcome para-

meters for that

population

would have to be established according to
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the period of the process of therapy reached
at the time the inter-

vention ended.
Of course, the fact that someone may be
allowed to drop out of

therapy without some definite efforts by the
therapist to encourage
that person to remain engaged with therapy, may be
considered

a

negative outcome measure in itself according to the model
being proposed.
It

should be noted that since, with

the model

few possible exceptions,

a

being proposed does not consider emotional disturbances

to be illnesses,

a

lack definition as

clinical

intervention based on core affect would

treatment modality.

a

However, for the sake of

tradition and convenience one may avoid that issue.
Be that as

i

t

may

,

in terms of outcome one must consider that

treatment or therapy is aimed at the normalization of

a

sensation

of danger which may become again clinically elevated under seriously adverse circumstances.

In

this case, the outcome of the clinical

intervention may have been excellent, but the person may require
a

second intervention in order to reduce the acute elevation in core

affect produced by extraordinary or catastrophic circumstances.
The preceding suggests, according to the model being considered,

that psychotherapeutic interventions do not cure anything, but merely

induce the attenuation of emotional pain to

a

stable adaptive base-

line.

Naturally, some of the reactive symptoms which characterize

elevations in core affect may result in pathological physical condi-
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tions sometimes.

For example, somatic consequences of
chronic core

affect elevations, such as ulcers, colitis, and so
forth.

Indeed,

it does not come as surprise to find that
these reactive pathologi-

cal

symptoms improve with psychotherapy.

Similarly, physical

symptoms attributed to pathological processes which are ordinarily

exacerbated by anxiety may improve with psychotherapy.
it

is

For example,

not uncommon for clients to report decreases in the dosages

of antihypertensive or pain medication needed and
in physical

a

general reduction

complaints during and after the course of psychotherapy.

Obviously, the latter fringe benefits of psychotherapy may be

atrributed to

reduction in the manifestations of anxiety due to

a

the normalization of core affect.

Regarding the possible applications of core affect theory, it
is

difficult not to succumb to the temptation of an endless enumera-

tion.

Assuming the theory as valid it becomes

a

simple task to

imagine the legal, social, and political consequences from its

application to the different areas of human involvement.
For example, according to our view criminals would be looked

upon as clinically maladaptive in terms of our definition of emotional disturbances.
ill

However, they would not be considered mentally

even in the presence of severe functional manifestations of

anxiety unless

a

determinable pathological reason (e.g., tumor,

encephalitis) for the cognitive dysfunction and criminal behavior
would be found.

The impact of the preceding view of criminal beha-

vior on just the legal system alone would be tremendous.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

There is no question about the model of human behavior
proposed
by this dissertation being somewhat controversial.

The latter may

be related to the very pragmatic approach the model

takes to explain

behavior and therapeutic change.
For example, as earlier introduced, the model

is alien to

the

traditional view of psychodynamic subconscious processes and to the

concept of mental

illness.

Clearly, the model proposed suggests that what may be understood
as psychodynamic processes

is

nothing more than the sel fdetermi

associative processes of the brain under the influence of
sensation of danger.

a

ni

ng

limbic

As postulated in previous chapters, the inte-

grated cognitive activity of the brain ordinarily does not depend on

volition but rather on the functional analog of ongoing experience.
Obviously, the functional analog of ongoing experience would be
an integration of the current event with the cognitive elements of

previous experiences which are in any way connected with each other.
The preceding, according to our view, occurs not because the individual wants it to occur, but automatically as

a

result of the very

complex associative functions of the brain, which are proposed to
be mediated by the cognitive matrices.

Similarly, the defensive maneuvers the individual uses to cope
247
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with core affect in context with the
environment, that is, that person's behavior, are out of volitional
control for the most part.

other words, behavior is virtually out
of awareness until

In

after it has occurred.

It is common for a person to review
his

behavior at any given time and find

it

to have been inadvertent.

For example, some individuals could react with
anger or other

defensive maneuver to the same situation over and over,
despite

wishing they would not do

it.

According to the model proposed, even planned actions or
intentional thinking may constitute unwitting maneuvers against
core

affect, their purpose therefore out of awareness.
The preceding review of some of the properties of the model

of human behavior proposed, which have been considered earlier in
this work, suggests that people do not act as freely as one may

think they would from predetermined influences.

other words, since an adult's behavior

In

determined, the decisions and actions of such

is
a

virtually self-

person in the ordinary

course of living would be the product of an intrinsic brain function
rather than of the will of that person.
The latter is perhaps one of the most controversial issues

raised by the core affect theory.

The theory implies that what is

usually considered as the freedom of the individual to intentionally
pursue

a

goal

or formulate

a

decision is in fact somewhat limited.

According to the theory proposed, under ordinary circumstances
the person can choose from whatever alternatives the functional pro-
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cesses of the brain produce.

However, even the choosing of
an alter-

native in itself may constitute or
be part of

a

defensive maneuver

against core affect.
It

would seem that

a

person who has become aware of
his own

core affect and how he defends against
it, could be in

a

position

to use that knowledge to increase
the amount of freedom he would have

from such predetermined functional
influences.

Naturally, the inten-

sity of core affect in the latter case would
have to be at

a

normal

range.

However, the model proposed suggests that regardless
of how

aware one may become of one's own core affect and
defensive maneuvers, the freedom to choose and decide will

inevitably always remain

to the greatest extent under the influence of the intensity of
such
a

core affect.
Yet, despite its controversial

nature, the model of human beha-

vior proposed by this dissertation may be construed as having some

very desirable properties.
One of these properties is the simplicity of the concept underlying the model.

This simplicity allows for

a

coherent relationship

between the biological reduction of the model and the phenomenology
of behavior.

At the same time the principle of core affect can be

consistently used to interpret behavior at any time during the person's life and under conditions ranging from everyday life situations
to clinical

interventions.

In the clinical

environment, the simplicity of the notion of core
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affect has been favorably received by
clients.

In

needing some further observations, the
impression

addition, while
is

that persons

with somewhat less than average intellectual
skills are able to con-

ceptualize the notion of core affect without
great difficulty.
Of particular importance, is that the
theory proposed furnishes
a

suitable model for the understanding of
neuropsychological ly im-

paired individuals.

In the

latter case, given particular cognitive

resources, it can be determined how those resources
emerge as ex-

pressions of or defenses against core affect.

Clearly, the latter

would facilitate the clinical interventions with such individuals.
While there are indications that the model enables the process
of psychotherapy in individual

interventions to occur in

a

relatively

brief period of time in the absence of severe functional manifestations of anxiety or drug dependence, more work

is

needed to verify it.

The further elaboration on the properties of this model of human

behavior appears unnecessary in connection with the aims of this
theoretical study.

On the other hand,

now in closing the task of

the dissertation appears to have hardly begun.

Perhaps the reason for the latter is that what has been developed
in this dissertation is
in

its conceptual

empirical

a

theory whose validation currently resides

and clinical

findings.

In

applications rather than in strict

addition, one must consider that essential

functional aspects of the model, such as the cognitive matrices, are

beyond the reach of current empirical determinations.
It

is our belief that the validity of the model

becomes explicit

.
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during its applications and that
its basic design will withstand
the rigor of the clinical

and empirical

research which would have

to be performed in order to confirm
the observations and concepts

postulated here.
The postulates of the theory of core
affect may be used as the

rationale for many existing techniques and
procedures which are based
on other theories.

However, any type of research conducted
to con-

firm or negate the validity of the proposed
theory must conform to
the constraints of the latter.

The determination of the validity

of the theory can only be performed in terms of its
own logic and

design.

That is, without violating the integrity of the theoretical

model
In

terms of the material presented in this work, two things

appear reasonably certain.

One of those is that

understanding of human behavior
is that core

is

affect is universal.

a

neuropsychological

the way to the future.

The other
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